Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5431 Series

National Security Council Report¹

secret
NSC 5431/1

Washington, August 13, 1954.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Cooperation With Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

References:

A.

NSC 5431²

B.

Memo for NSC from the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, subject, “Development of Nuclear Power,” dated December 11, 1953³

C.

NSC Action Nos. 985 and 1202⁴

The National Security Council, the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, at the 210th Council meeting on August 12, 1954, adopted the statement of policy on the subject contained in NSC 5431, subject to the amendments therein which are set forth in NSC Action No. 1202–b.

The President has this date approved the statement of policy contained in NSC 5431, as amended and adopted by the Council and enclosed herewith and directs its implementation by the Secretary of State and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, advising with the Operations Coordinating Board in order to ensure that proposed actions in the field result in maximum psychological advantage to the United States pursuant to paragraph 8 of the enclosure.

Also enclosed are a financial appendix and an NSC staff study, as amended by the Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council on Cooperation With Other Nations in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

assumptions

1. This paper is based on the following assumptions: (a) that the USSR will not at this time participate in carrying out the President’s proposal of December 8, 1953; (b) that the Atomic Energy Act will be amended generally as proposed in HR 9757 to permit bilateral cooperation with other nations in the atomic energy field;⁵ and (c) that by treaty multilateral cooperation with other nations can be effected.

general considerations

2. The ability of the U.S. to construct reactors and to make available moderate quantities of fissionable material for peacetime reactors should be used in a program of cooperation with other nations to advance our national policy objectives. Power reactors, while technically feasible, are not yet economically competitive. Small-scale reactors are available which are useful for research, training, medical, and related purposes, and require only small amounts of fissionable material (not of weapons quality). Such reactors and the supporting training and information programs are a natural step in the development of any nation’s capability to utilize nuclear power when it becomes economically attractive.

3. U.S. cooperation with other countries in advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be both multilateral through an International Atomic Energy Agency as proposed by the President on December 8, and bilateral under Agreements for Cooperation under Section 123 of proposed revision of the Atomic Energy Act.

4. Negotiations for a treaty should be commenced promptly, leading to establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency. This International Agency might be loosely affiliated with the U.N. and would be open to all countries (including the USSR) which accept certain common objectives and obligations stated in the treaty. The Agency would exercise an important function in encouraging cooperation in research, in assisting nations to acquire facilities such as small-scale reactors, in supporting training and exchange of technical information and services, and in aiding other nations in developing a capability to use nuclear power.

5. During the interim period of a year or longer while the treaty is being negotiated and the consent of the Senate sought for an International Agency, the U.S. should proceed vigorously with direct actions to demonstrate its resolve to assist other nations and maintain its world leadership in peaceful uses of atomic energy. These activities, which in due course might be taken over by the International Agency, should include:

a. Sponsorship of international scientific conferences.

b. Aid in construction of small-scale reactors, including provision of fissionable material in the requisite small amounts under bilateral Agreements for Cooperation.

c. Training programs, provision of technical information, and consulting services to aid other countries in building up their capability to use atomic energy.

d. Promotion of medical and other humanitarian uses of atomic energy.

6. Cooperation with other countries in areas of importance to the U.S. atomic energy program and to the security interests of the U.S. will be undertaken on a bilateral basis with requisite security safeguards, an agreement with Belgium being the first.

7. Requirements for fissionable material (not of weapons quality) for this program are, and will be, in harmony with military requirements. Specifically U.S. participation will not cause any significant diversion of fissionable material or trained personnel from the nuclear weapons programs.

8. Maximum psychological and educational advantage should continue to be taken from the substantial actions of the U.S. in this field.

courses of action

9. a. Arrange for the President or the Secretary of State to make a statement, at an appropriate time, not later than the convening of the U.N. General Assembly on September 21, relative to U.S. plans for the organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency, described in b.

b. Take necessary steps to proceed with the organization of an International Atomic Energy Agency, which may be affiliated with or report its accomplishments to the United Nations.

10. Earmark initially a reasonable amount of U–235 of less than weapon quality of U.S. material, for use in small-scale reactors and for other research purposes abroad.

11. Initiate a program of aid in construction of small-scale reactors in selected countries, under Agreements for Cooperation which do not involve U.S. funds for such construction.

12. Initiate, as rapidly as plans can be developed, activities such as reactor training courses for foreign scientists.

13. Determine, as soon as possible, whether the International Scientific Conference, now tentatively scheduled for January 1955, will be sponsored by the U.S. alone, by the U.S., U.K., and Canada jointly, or by the United Nations.⁶

14. Resume negotiations with Belgium, as soon as the revisions of the Atomic Energy Act have been passed, leading toward an Agreement for Cooperation covering, among other matters, technical aid in the construction of a power reactor in Belgium.

15. In every case where the U.S. provides to another country fissionable material for research or power reactors, whether by gift, lease, or sale, the U.S. should seek to reserve the right to regain such fissionable material after usage in such other country’s reactor, in order to reprocess such material and obtain all the by-products therefrom for peaceful purposes, and in order to obviate the necessity of creating reprocessing facilities in such other country.

16. Prepare a statement of policy for Council consideration regarding the construction of power reactors abroad.

Financial Appendix

Cost estimates in the Financial Appendix indicate order of magnitude.

Approval of the policy statement does not indicate approval of cost estimates in the Financial Appendix.

Appropriations and expenditures to finance the policy will be subject to determination in the regular budgetary process.

notes

1. Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency would be expected to bear their share of operating costs. Recipients of direct services or of equipment (including small-scale reactors) would in general be required to pay for them. The U.S. may conclude that for control or other reasons, it will be to our advantage to furnish the fissionable material content of small-scale reactors without charge. The fissionable material cost, while substantial, will be less than the cost of the reactor itself. In recognition of the special U.S. interest in seeing that an active program of assistance to other countries is gotten under way, funds should be available to permit U.S. financial aid where considerations of prestige or other gains to the security of this country would justify such aid.

2. Under these assumptions, U.S. financial commitments under the programs outlined in this paper would not be more than $2,000,000 during the first 18 months and would rise perhaps to $5,000,000 annually by FY 1957 or 1958. These estimates include funds for constructing a number of small-scale reactors abroad should financial aid to this end prove in our national interests, but are exclusive of any program for construction of power reactors abroad.

Program Cost Estimate

FY 1955	None*
FY 1956	$2,000,000
FY 1957	$5,000,000
FY 1958	$5,000,000

NSC Staff Study on Cooperation With Other Countries in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Problem

1. To determine action to be taken in carrying out the President’s proposal of December 8, 1953, to the UN for the establishment of an International Atomic Energy Agency; and to determine other action to employ the U.S. capability in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to attain foreign policy and other national security objectives.

Assumptions

2. This paper is based on the following assumptions: (a) that the USSR will not at this time participate in carrying out the President’s proposal of December 8, 1953; (b) that the Atomic Energy Act will be amended generally as proposed in HR 9757, to permit bilateral cooperation with other nations in the atomic energy field; and (c) that by treaty multilateral cooperation with other nations can be effected.

New Provisions of Atomic Energy Act

3. Cooperation with Another Nation. The proposed revisions of the Atomic Energy Act permit furnishing classified information and material to another country under conditions which are, in summary: (a) That the Commission has approved an agreement for cooperation, including detailed terms, a guarantee by the other nation to maintain agreed security standards, a guarantee against diversion of fissionable material to military purposes, and a guarantee respecting the use of Restricted Data; (b) the President has approved the execution of the agreement and has made a written determination that the performance of the agreement will promote the defense and security of the U.S.; and (c) the proposed agreement has been submitted to the Joint Committee for a period of 30 days while Congress is in session. This means that at least a month after Congress reconvenes in 1955 will be the earliest date that a bilateral agreement can become effective.

4. Multilateral Arrangements. The bill states in Section 124 that “the President is authorized to enter into an international agreement with a group of nations providing for international cooperation in the non-military applications of atomic energy.” The act further defines “international arrangement” as a treaty (approved by the Senate) or an “international agreement” (approved by Congress). Thus, if the President’s atomic pool proposal of December 8, 1953, is implemented by an agreement with a group of nations it must be submitted, as a first step, to the Senate as a treaty or to the Congress for approval as an international arrangement. The bill further provides, as a second step, that after the Senate or Congress acts, any agreement must meet the conditions set out in paragraph 3. While technically it might be possible to meet all the requirements of the bill during the first session of the 84th Congress a more realistic estimate is that at the very earliest it would be some time during the second session of the 84th Congress, beginning in January 1956, before an arrangement with a group of nations could become effective.

5. Section 121. Independent of the provisions of Section 124 of the proposed bill regarding multilateral cooperation, it appears that another course for establishing such cooperation is open. Section 121 provides that any provision of the Act which “conflicts with the provisions of any international arrangement made after the date of enactment of this Act shall be deemed to be of no force or effect.” As this section recognizes, any multilateral cooperation in accordance with a treaty duly approved by the Senate would have full effect regardless of the provisions of the Act. Negotiation and ratification of a treaty would require more than a year, but may provide the simplest basis for multilateral cooperation in establishing an International Agency.

Decision to Proceed with International Atomic Energy Agency Without the USSR

6. U.S. cooperation with other countries in advancing the peaceful uses of atomic energy should proceed on a multilateral basis under the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency and also on a bilateral basis under agreements for cooperation negotiated under Section 123 of the Revised Atomic Energy Act. There is precedent for this dual approach in this nation’s program of technical assistance which proceeds both through the U.N. and on a nation-to-nation basis.

7. The principal objectives stated by the President in his December 8, 1953 speech to the United Nations were: (a) to reduce tensions between the East and West; (b) to siphon off fissionable material simultaneously from the military stocks of the U.S. and the USSR; (c) to assure that scientists throughout the world have fissionable material to conduct necessary studies; and (d) to advance the peacetime uses of atomic energy generally. These objectives were proposed in the common interest of all nations.

8. The U.S., in addition, had special foreign policy objectives in advancing the proposal. These were (a) to seize the initiative for the U.S. and maintain our free world leadership; (b) to demonstrate again the devotion of the U.S. to peace; and (c) to counter such expected USSR moves as the subsequent announcement of a 5000 KW power reactor or an expected new Stockholm-type peace petition. These foreign policy objectives remain valid.

9. The assumed decision of the USSR not to participate in an international agency has a regrettable but not unforeseen effect upon the scope of such an agency and upon the interest of the U.S. and other nations in participating in it. In particular, the first two of the above objectives of the President’s proposal may not be attained, but other U.S. foreign policy objectives could be attained.

10. By going ahead with the proposed International Agency, we would gain the following advantages:

(a) Focus on cooperative peaceful uses of atomic energy helps place the military aspects of the atom in proper perspective;

(b) An integrating force will be exerted at a time when the cohesion of the free world is threatened;

(c) The favorable world reaction to the President’s proposal will be retained and the contrast with the USSR rejection will be emphasized;

(d) Criticism that the U.S. made the proposal on December 8 only because it knew that the USSR would not accept it will be met; and

(e) Direct rebuttal will be given to Soviet propaganda that the U.S. attempts to keep a monopoly of atomic energy.

These advantages though not pertaining exclusively to an international agency as such, might be forfeited in whole or in part should our cooperation with other nations be limited to bilateral arrangements.

11. In proceeding with an International Agency, certain possible disadvantages must be recognized:

(a) The U.S. will lose some bargaining power with its raw materials suppliers;

(b) The U.S. will be required to make available some information, personnel, and eventually, nuclear materials with less control and less tangible returns than under bilateral arrangements;

(c) In the absence of USSR and satellites, the agency may appear to neutrals to be widening rather than closing the East-West split; and

(d) The USSR will retain the choice of entering the agency at a later time or of holding aloof and taking propaganda advantage of any failures or controversies attendant on the agency’s activities.

Such disadvantages can, in most part, be overcome by proper organization of the agency and by complementary bilateral cooperation with nations with special relations with the U.S.: e.g., raw materials suppliers.

12. Public announcement of the U.S. intention to press ahead with positive measures for organization of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be made as soon as possible, perhaps in a speech by the President or by the Secretary of State. In view of the fact that the President’s proposal was originally made before the U.N. General Assembly, there would be advantage to making the first announcement before that body. Private consultations should be held with interested friendly nations to inform them of U.S. intentions with regard to the international agency and our contemplated program of bilateral cooperation.

Organization and Functions of the Proposed International Agency

13. The International Atomic Energy Agency should be organized in accordance with the following principles:

(a) The Agency should be an international organization which may be affiliated with or report its accomplishments to the U.N.;

(b) Membership in the Agency, in accordance with the spirit of the President’s proposal, should be open to all countries, including the USSR, who adhere to the objectives of the agency as described by the President. The charter of the organization will be drafted to include affirmative safeguards to prevent the USSR or any other nation from being able to defeat the objectives of the Agency or of the U.S. should the USSR subsequently decide to participate, and to prevent nations not recognized by the U.S. from being able to accept the treaty conditions;

(c) Initially the primary function of the Agency should be to serve as a clearing house and organ of cooperation in training, exchange of information, and provision of technical services;

(d) To maintain the effectiveness of the Agency, as well as to carry out the President’s proposal, fissionable material in moderate quantities and appropriately safeguarded should be available to the Agency for projects which it has reviewed and approved as to the effectiveness and safety of the proposed use of the materials. The U.S., in proposing proceeding with the Agency, should reaffirm its intent to make fissionable materials available and should state this intent in concrete terms, such as the earmarking of enough fissionable material for a limited number of small-scale reactors for research and related purposes;

(e) The operating expenses of the Agency should be financed by contributions from all members, perhaps in accordance with the formula for contributions for operating expenses of the U.N. itself.

International Scientific Conference

14. On April 19, 1954, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission announced the President’s intention to convene within the year an international scientific conference to explore “the benign and peaceful uses of atomic energy.” A decision concerning proceeding with an International Agency in the absence of USSR participation is necessary for planning for the international scientific conference. While the question of sponsorship (e.g. U.S. alone or U.S., U.K. and Canada jointly) remains open at the present, the U.N. alternatively could be asked to sponsor the conference, now tentatively scheduled for January 1955 and the conference could discuss the status of nuclear science and technology relating to peaceful uses of atomic energy and consider ways in which the international agency might best knit together and supplement national efforts in this field.

Actions Pending Establishment of International Agency

15. Introduction. As a practical matter, at least two years may be required to negotiate a treaty establishing an International Agency and obtain Senate ratification. In view of U.S. statements of intent and the active progress of programs in the USSR and other countries, positive action to assist other nations should be taken in advance of establishment of the International Agency, in order to maintain the U.S. position of leadership and to accelerate the benign uses of atomic energy. Action on such programs as aid in the construction of small-scale reactors, training in reactor technology or in the use of isotopes, the distribution of unclassified publications, and sponsoring of international conferences can be initiated by the U.S. without precluding subsequent activities in the same areas by the International Agency when it has been organized.

16. Small-scale Reactors for Research and Other Related Purposes. Small-scale reactors appear for the present to be essential elements in any nation’s atomic energy program and a necessary stage in the development of a nation’s capacity to employ nuclear power reactors. A small-scale research reactor might have the following general characteristics:

(a) Fissionable material requirements: 2 to 6 kg of U–235 not of weapons quality.

(b) Construction cost of complete reactor—approximately $250,000-$750,000 depending on type and location.

(c) Sensitivity of information required—unclassified or of low sensitivity.

(d) Fissionable material produced by reactor—insignificant.

(e) Danger of diversion of fissionable material—assuming safe insertion in reactor and operation of reactor through “break-in” period, U–235 becomes so contaminated that it must be reprocessed in special facilities such as exist at Arco. U–235 of the quality contemplated will further have to be run through separation equipment such as exists at Oak Ridge. The U.S., U.K., and USSR are the only countries likely to have reprocessing and separation equipment for U–235 available during the next several years.

Such a reactor is, however, probably the most useful instrument that could be made available at this juncture to other countries. By use of enriched material rather than natural uranium, a more compact, inexpensive, convenient, and much more useful reactor can be built. In general, the higher the neutron flux possible, the more versatile is the reactor for research experimentation. The neutron flux of a reactor (1012 to 1014) of this type is considerably higher than the flux of the French or the Norway-Netherlands natural uranium reactors (1010 to 1012), which require tons of natural uranium and can produce plutonium.

17. U.S. commitment of fissionable material for construction of small-scale reactors and other peaceful uses abroad must, of course, be harmonized with prospective military needs. Limited diversion of source and fissionable materials in the interests of peaceful reactor uses can now be accepted. As the war reserve of weapons increases and power reactors become economical, it may be possible to allocate increasing amounts of fissionable material to power production in the U.S. and abroad. Some———kilograms of U–235, of less than weapons quality may be earmarked for reactor and other peaceful purposes abroad. In order to make material available to another country, an Agreement for Cooperation under the revised Atomic Energy Act would of course have to be negotiated and go to the President and the Joint Committee. The material would not be likely to be needed before FY 1956, and will remain available to the U.S. stockpile.

18. A program of aid to selected nations in construction of small-scale reactors will be gotten underway upon approval of this course of action and after the Atomic Energy Act has been amended. Study of possible locations for small-scale reactors, and of political and other pertinent considerations, is now underway. The cost of construction will be borne by the country in which a reactor is located. The U.S. may well conclude that for control and other reasons, it will be to our advantage to furnish the fissionable material content of small-scale reactors without charge. The fissionable material cost, while substantial, will be less than the cost of the reactor itself.

19. Training and Information Activities. The possibility should be explored of establishing a training course in reactor technology to be given by the Oak Ridge Institute of Nuclear Studies or by the Brookhaven National Laboratory for foreign scientists and engineers. A course might be offered to accommodate 50 students a year designated by foreign countries. Although tuition fees might cover operating costs, there would be required modest U.S. contributions for capital investment and overhead. Activities of this type and others such as isotope training courses and unclassified publication exchange centers will be put into operation to the extent they prove feasible.

20. Capability of U.S. Private Industry. Some private U.S. firms and consultants, subject to AEC authorization and passage of pending legislation, are now able to undertake construction, design, or consulting services for foreign countries in the construction of research and power reactors.

Power Reactors Abroad

21. Introduction. Nuclear power, though demonstrated to be technically feasible, is not yet economically competitive. It would be unfortunate to encourage the hopes of the world for cheap power by premature negotiations with a number of countries for power reactors. We must discourage the belief abroad that the research reactor stage may be omitted in an immediate power program and make clear the essential relationship of training programs and the experience in operation of small-scale reactors to the goal of nuclear power and other peaceful uses of atomic energy.

22. Development of Policy on Power Reactors Abroad. When the Belgian negotiations have been concluded, or earlier if appropriate, a policy on the construction of power reactors abroad will be recommended to the National Security Council. The Belgian precedent should prove valuable background for formulating U.S. policy in respect to other nations. Many political factors will, of course, have to be examined in determining where and how many reactors should be constructed in addition to the first one in Belgium. Other ore suppliers such as South Africa and Australia obviously have substantial bargaining power. Countries with critical fuel shortages and high power consumption, such as Japan and Sweden, clearly merit consideration in any power reactor program. It is also obvious that any power reactor program must be limited in scope in the early years and that difficult selections will have to be made. Careful consideration must be given to the adverse reaction of countries not included in this country’s initial foreign nuclear power program and to the security considerations created by the construction of power reactors with their inherent ability to produce large quantities of plutonium and U–233. Friendly countries should also know that power reactors erected now would be early models and that rapid improvement in the art can be anticipated.

23. Commitment to Belgium. The 1944 U.S.–U.K. agreement with Belgium for procurement of uranium, which terminates in the early part of 1956, commits the U.S. and the U.K. to share with the Belgian Government on an equitable basis, power reactor technology when atomic power becomes feasible. In addition to the existing commitment to assist the Belgian atomic energy program which has recently been reaffirmed, any extension of the 1944 agreement will require satisfactory arrangements for the provision of reactor technology and material. As soon as revisions of the Atomic Energy Act permit U.S. aid in construction of a power reactor abroad negotiations will proceed promptly leading inter alia to the construction of a power reactor in Belgium. This is essential in order to provide assurance that there will be a continued flow of Belgian uranium to the U.S.

24. Belgium has the characteristics of a good location for a power reactor. Conventional power costs are high, general technology is well advanced, the Government is stable and friendly and the information and materials security situation is relatively good. Nevertheless, there are complex problems to be met. The U.S. statutory requirements will be stringent and many questions are still to be resolved. For example, the amount of fissionable material to be provided the Belgians, the disposition of whatever fissionable material is produced in the Belgian power reactor, the fabrication of new fuel elements and the reprocessing of the old, and the important policy problem of whether or not information which has not been made available to American industry generally can be provided the Belgians.

25. Fortunately, it is general knowledge throughout the world that the Belgians have a claim on the United States for aid in the construction of a power reactor and a minimum of criticism may be expected when priority is given to Belgium. The Belgians are now developing a capability in the reactor field by constructing a research reactor.

1. Copies sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence, the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5431 Series)
3. Ante, p. 1296.
4. For text of NSC Action No. 985, see footnote 7, p. 1297. For NSC Action No. 1202, see footnote 5, supra.
5. See the editorial note, p. 1505.
6. Documentation on the International Scientific Conference is in Atomic Energy files, lot 57 D 688, “Strauss Conference”.
7. Would be absorbed in present AEC appropriations. [Footnote in the source text.]