Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

330.13/7–1954: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations¹

top secret

Washington, July 19, 1954—8:11 p.m.

44. Re US Position on Indian Proposal for a Moratorium on Nuclear Tests.

1. Would be contrary to security interests of US agree at this time to moratorium on tests of nuclear weapons either in form proposed by India or in any other form. Therefore US must reject Indian proposal if it is considered in DC.

2. If matter considered statement of US Representative should be along following lines: “After the most sympathetic and extensive consideration, the US has concluded that an agreement for a moratorium or a standstill on tests of nuclear weapons would not benefit the free world and in fact would be harmful. A moratorium would be largely a limitation on scientific experimentation. The experiments have been fundamental to the development of the weapons necessary to protect the free world.

“Furthermore, a moratorium on nuclear experimentation has nothing to do with disarmament. The real problem is to eliminate the weapons through a general disarmament program with safeguards which would assure the whole world that nuclear materials would be utilized only for peaceful purposes. A mere promise to forego tests on nuclear weapons would give the illusion that we were making some progress toward disarmament when in fact this would not be the case. Only through a program of disarmament can the world be relieved of its fears that nuclear weapons will be used in war”.

3. We realize that United States opposition to Indian proposal would have adverse political repercussions. To minimize and if possible eliminate such adverse repercussions you may wish to follow some or all of following possible courses of action.

a) We should avoid encouraging India or any member of DC to initiate discussion of Indian proposals.

b) We should seek to maneuver USSR into position where it rejects Indian proposal before we do. Soviet media of communication seem to foreshadow such rejection. Would be advantageous to couple with our rejection of Indian proposal a criticism of Soviet Union position on atomic energy control in general.

Essential however we should not be led into situation of agreeing to Indian proposal on condition that Soviet Union also agrees.

4. If issue is raised you should in your discretion determine best time for making statement in order to minimize adverse results.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Bechhoefer of UNP.