600.0012/1–2054
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)1
- Subject:
- Discussions with Soviets on President’s Atomic Proposal
- Participants:
- Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
- Mr. Arnold Heeney, Canadian Ambassador
- Mr. Merchant—EUR
- Mr. Bonbright—EUR
Sir Roger Makins and Mr. Heeney came in at 5 o’clock to be filled in on the latest developments on the above subject.
Mr. Merchant began by telling them of our telephone call to the Soviet Embassy yesterday which resulted in the Secretary’s receiving Soviet Ambassador Zarubin at 5 p.m. at the latter’s request.2 Before showing the Ambassadors a translation of the paper left by Zarubin with the Secretary,3 Mr. Merchant explained that at the previous meeting the Secretary had, for the sake of precision, set down in writing the points which he wished to make to the Soviet Ambassador. When the interpreter ran into difficulties the Secretary had given him the paper from which he had been reading to assist him in his translating. At the end of the conversation the Secretary had acquiesced in Zarubin’s request that he keep a copy. This, Mr. Merchant explained, accounted for the references in the Soviet paper to “the U.S. aide-mémoire.”
Sir Roger and Mr. Heeney then read the Soviet paper and, with Mr. Merchant’s permission, took notes on it.
There followed a brief discussion in which both Ambassadors expressed the view that the Soviet reply was encouraging. Sir Roger then left with Mr. Merchant an informal paper which set forth the views which he said Mr. Eden would express to the Secretary in Berlin (see separate memorandum).4
Both Ambassadors asked if there was any clarification on the Soviet reference to “all powers that bear the chief responsibility for maintaining peace and international security.” Mr. Merchant explained that this had not been further defined by Zarubin. He said that the Secretary’s tentative thinking was that these countries should include the United Kingdom and Canada, probably France and possibly others such as Belgium and South Africa. When Sir Roger inquired whether the Australians would be included Mr. Merchant said that the Secretary had not come to any firm conclusions as to what countries should be included. Both Ambassadors expressed the view (and this was one of the points in the paper left by Sir Roger) that for broad policy reasons the French should be completely cut in and at an early date.
Mr. Merchant then told them of the line which the Secretary was thinking of taking with Molotov at Berlin (see first two paragraphs of Mr. Merchant’s memorandum of January 20).5 In brief this was that the Secretary would suggest that we prepare a written paper for transmission to the Soviet Union showing the US plan for implementing the President’s proposal of December 8. The [Page 1351] Secretary would also suggest that at the same time the Soviets would prepare and let us have a paper outlining their proposal. It was our thought that when we had prepared our paper we would seek to obtain agreement on it with the British and Canadians (and probably the French) prior to giving it to the Soviets. This would take a certain amount of time and probably would not be given to the Soviets until after the Berlin conference. The Secretary would explain the delay to Molotov as being due to his keen personal interest in the problem and his desire to study our paper on his return to Washington.
In conclusion, Mr. Merchant told the Ambassadors that he was about to have a talk with Mr. de Juniac of the French Embassy. However, he did not intend to show the Soviet paper to Mr. de Juniac but merely give him orally a summary of the points. Nor did he intend to tell the French representative of the Secretary’s ideas for his discussion with Molotov in Berlin.