Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

600.0012/1–1154

Draft Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

top secret
eyes only

Washington, January 11, 1954.

• Subject:
• Atomic Energy Proposals

• Participants:
• The Secretary
• Mr. Georgi Zaroubin, Soviet Ambassador
• Mr. Michail N. Smirnovsky, First Secretary, Soviet Embassy
• Mr. Merchant—EUR
• Mr. Logofet (Interpreter for the Secretary)

The Soviet Ambassador called at 10:30 this morning at the Secretary’s request. The Ambassador was aware that the meeting was for the purpose of opening discussion on procedural points that arose from Mr. Molotov’s suggestion to Ambassador Bohlen that these talks be conducted by Ambassador Zaroubin on behalf of his Government with the Secretary.

The Ambassador and Mr. Smirnovsky arrived promptly and, to the Secretary’s opening reference to the snow outside, remarked genially that it was even colder in Moscow. The Secretary remarked that he hoped it would be warmer in Berlin, particularly if it developed that he and Mr. Molotov would have to meet in the street in the absence of agreement on the building in which the conference would be held. The Ambassador laughed and said he was sure that would not be necessary.

The Secretary then said that he appreciated the willingness of the Ambassador to meet with him on the subject which they were about to discuss. He said that he hoped it might mark the beginning of a relationship which could change the current of tension which has existed over the last few years. He then asked the Ambassador if his Government had any ideas as to the time, the place and the participants for conducting the proposed discussions.

The Soviet Ambassador replied that he fully shared the views expressed by the Secretary and similarly hoped that these talks would lead to a lessening of tension. He said that his Government welcomed their beginning and that he wished to assure the Secretary of the most sincere desire of the Soviet Union to cooperate. He added that his task in Washington was to seek ways to improve relations. As to the question of procedure, the Ambassador said he had received no views from his Government but that he would be grateful for any suggestions the Secretary might care to make.

The Secretary thereupon discussed seriatim the points contained in the attached memorandum. He said that one matter left open in preliminary exchanges has been whether the talks now beginning should be conducted through diplomatic channels or under the auspices of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. He said that if the Soviet Government has no preference to express at this time he would present the views of the United States Government which were that the conversations in the first instance should be held in the diplomatic channel and that as they progressed agreement be reached upon the proposal of either participant regarding the desirability of shifting the talks to the United Nations. (On this point the Ambassador sought precise confirmation of his understanding that the United States was not excluding the discussions at some point being conducted in the United Nations, which understanding the Secretary confirmed.)

The Ambassador then asked if the Secretary had any suggestions regarding the participants in these talks. The Secretary replied that in our view the initial talks regarding procedure should be on a bilateral basis between the US and the USSR. He went on to say that question of other participants should be decided by the US and the USSR since the subjects to be discussed and the order of their discussion would have a bearing on what governments would in fact be principally involved. For example, he said, the “governments principally involved” in any conversations relating to atomic weapons, as suggested by the Soviet Government as one topic for consideration, might be only those governments possessing atomic weapons. On the other hand, the Secretary said question of putting atomic material at some phase of its development into fissionable material into a “pool” or a “bank” might involve still other governments. (Zaroubin nodded vigorous agreement at the suggestion made by the Secretary that the initial talks on procedures be on a bilateral basis. He gave no facial or other reaction to the Secretary’s suggestion that talks on atomic weapons be confined to governments possessing them. On the Secretary’s second illustration of participation by subject matter he interrupted to confirm his understanding that the Secretary was referring to the use of atomic material “for peaceful pursuits.”)

The Secretary then suggested that if it were the desire of our two governments to make a beginning of practical cooperation, the maximum results might be best achieved by a small number of participants and that the greater degree that views can be exchanged between the two governments as a preliminary, the better the hope of success. The Secretary added that this seemed true even though it were understood that such exchanges were informal and preliminary and that they might require later discussion with and ratification by other nations.

The Soviet Ambassador then asked if he might summarize the main points made by the Secretary as he understood them. He did so accurately, adding at the end however his understanding that at present the talks should be kept confidential. The Secretary confirmed his understanding and then gave him and his companion the original and a carbon of the attached memorandum which was read to him slowly in translation.

The Secretary said with a smile that of all the problems enumerated in the memorandum probably that last one relating to secrecy and the avoidance of propagandistic treatment of these exchanges of views would prove the most difficult problem of all. The Ambassador laughed and said he did not agree and when the Secretary reminded him that every newspaperman in Washington would be on the trail of both of them to find out what had been discussed, the Ambassador replied, “Do not doubt it—I can assure you that no one will learn from me.”

The Soviet Ambassador then reverted to the third point of the attached memorandum and asked if he was correct in understanding that the participants in conversations on both the President’s proposal and the Soviet proposal on atomic weapons would be decided by the US and the USSR in the course of their preliminary bilateral discussions. The Secretary replied that he hoped he and Molotov could decide at Berlin what countries would come in and at what stage they would come in. Zaroubin indicated agreement and said that he would report fully to Mr. Molotov with a view to greater precision being arrived at in Berlin.

The Secretary expressed the hope that the Ambassador would be in a position to communicate to him prior to his departure for Berlin the Soviet Government’s reaction to the suggestions which he had made this morning. He pointed out that this would permit him to be better prepared for his talk with Mr. Molotov in Berlin. The Ambassador assured the Secretary that he would do everything in his power to comply with his request and said that he would hope to see the Secretary again before he departs for the Berlin Conference.

The Secretary again referred to the question of privacy and handed the Ambassador the attached proposed statement by the Department for the press. The Ambassador said he had no objection to it.

The meeting ended at 11 o’clock with the Secretary saying to the Ambassador as he left that he felt they had made a good beginning and that he hoped they would also achieve a good final result.

[Attachment]

Memorandum for the Soviet Ambassador²

1. The United States suggests that the conversation with reference to atomic energy should initially be conducted through diplomatic channels, reserving the right of any participant to propose shifting the deliberations to the United Nations pursuant to its resolution suggesting private discussions under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission.

2. It is suggested that the diplomatic discussions take place at Washington and wherever else it is convenient for the participants to meet. Presumably Mr. Molotov and Mr. Dulles would have a private discussion at Berlin.

3. It is suggested that procedural talks should in their initial stage be limited to the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., with the participation of the other nations principally involved as determined in the light of the subject matter to be discussed.

4. The U.S. is prepared to consider any proposal that the Soviet Union sees fit to make with reference to atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction.

5. However, the U.S. believes that the first effort should be to proceed on a modest basis which might engender the trust and confidence necessary for planning of larger scope. That is why the United States urges an early discussion of the proposal made by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953. The U.S. is prepared to have concrete private discussions about this plan and its possible implementation.

6. The U.S. suggests that privacy will best serve practical results at this time and that these talks should not be used for propaganda purposes by either side.

1. A covering memorandum from Merchant to Dulles, dated Jan. 11, reads:

   “I attach a draft of a memorandum of your conversation with the Soviet Ambassador this morning for your textual review. I believe you should also personally determine the distribution.

   “I also attach a proposed telegram to Ambassador Bohlen reporting this conversation.

   “I recommend that you call in today if possible Ambassador Makins and Ambassador Heeney separately and allow them to read your memorandum but not keep copies of it. At the same time you could give each of them a brief report of the Soviet Ambassadors reaction and the way matters were left at the conclusion of your conversation. If possible I believe you should see them today or at least arrange today for their appointments tomorrow.

   “With respect to the French Ambassador, I think it important that you personally ask him to come in as early as convenient and give him a brief oral summary of your conversation with Zaroubin but not show him a copy of the memorandum which you gave to the Soviet Ambassador.”

   The draft telegram to Bohlen mentioned above is not attached. However, telegram 456 to Moscow, Jan. 11, from the Secretary to Ambassador Bohlen (drafted by Merchant), summarizing the meeting, is in file 600.0012/1–1154.

   Signatures at the bottom of the source text indicate that this memorandum was read by Key, MacArthur, Murphy, Arneson, Bowie, Armstrong, and, on Dec. 2, 1954, by Gerard Smith of S/AE.

2. A notation on the source text reads: “Note handed to Zaroubin 1/11/54”.