PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Atomic Energy”
Memorandum of Conversation
Summary of Meeting With the Secretary of State on Implementation of the President’s December 8th Speech, 6 January 1954
Present:
- Department of State:
- Secretary Dulles
- Mr. Murphy
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Merchant
- Atomic Energy Commission:
- Mr. Strauss
- Mr. Smyth
- Department of Defense:
- Secretary Wilson
- Deputy Secretary Kyes
- Mr. Nash
- Mr. LeBaron
Secretary Dulles paraphrased Ambassador Bohlen’s cable from Moscow relaying Molotov’s suggestion that preliminary talks be [Page 1325] held in Washington with Ambassador Zarubin in preparation for further discussions of the President’s atomic proposals at the Berlin meeting.1
Secretary Dulles then summarized four basic questions which he said he discussed with the President on Tuesday, January 5th.2
- 1.
- Where should talks be held, in the UN Disarmament Commission or through diplomatic channels?
- 2.
- What other nations, if any, should participate?
- 3.
- Should the US ask to confine the talks to the questions of the President’s “atomic pool” proposal or should we also be prepared to discuss atomic disarmament?
- 4.
- If we discuss atomic disarmament should these discussions be based on the principle that atomic weapons and conventional weapons must be linked together, or are we prepared to discuss atomic disarmament alone?
Secretary Dulles stated that the preparation for these talks was a full time job that required a high-level working group consisting of State, Defense and Atomic Energy Commission. State is thinking of designating Howard Peterson, former Assistant Secretary of the Army, as their representative.
Secretary Dulles said that in his discussion with the President he did not ask for any definite decisions on these four points, but only the President’s preliminary views. The President thought that we should be prepared to talk atomic disarmament, if the USSR raised the matter. He said he felt he made this clear in his December 8th speech when he said “The US … is instantly prepared to meet privately with such other countries as may be ‘principally involved’, to seek ‘an acceptable solution’ to the atomic armaments race …”.3
Secretary Dulles pointed out that in our recent press release we said that if the USSR wanted to make any atomic disarmament proposals we would be prepared to discuss them. Both the President and SecretaryDulles believed the Soviets would find it difficult to formulate acceptable proposals, but for our part we would be prepared to listen to anything they had to say. Secretary Dulles stated that the President feels if a way could be found which would eliminate atomic and similar weapons of mass destruction under a really reliable security system he would be prepared to accept it even if it left the USSR with a numerical predominance in ground forces. Secretary Dulles said the President indicated he would be willing to do this because he is convinced that the US industrial potential and capability for rapid mobilization would still constitute [Page 1326] an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression and that if such aggression should occur, the US industrial capability, when harnessed into a war effort, would ultimately defeat them. Secretary Dulles said that he was reporting this not as a decision but only as the President’s initial reaction to the subject.
Admiral Strauss stated that the idea behind the President’s speech was that even limited contributions from the several stockpiles would improve international relations, and if the USSR rejected the proposal, the US would have won a psychological victory.
Secretary Wilson observed that we should still approach this subject with an open mind even if our hope of success in subsequent negotiations may be slim. He commented that ultimately war is war, and that there must be a broader disarmament than merely atomic disarmament. He remarked that until the Iron Curtain was pierced or lifted we could not achieve any real security system. Secretary Wilson recognized that if we want to relieve tension we must be willing to talk and listen. However, he cautioned that we should not talk with “two mouths”. We can not go on telling our people that our strength in deterring aggression rests in SAC and that we are making our military plans on this basis; i.e., the full use of atomic weapons,—and at the same time talk about eliminating atomic weapons without at the same time reducing the level of conventional armaments.
Secretary Dulles remarked that in our negotiations with the Russians we do not need to depart from our present governmental position of the inter-relation of atomic and conventional weapons in any disarmament discussions. Nothing in the President’s speech itself need be taken to mean that we are prepared to discuss atomic disarmament separately.
Admiral Strauss commented that it would be illusory to suppose that we can get a binding agreement on the reduction of armaments out of the Russians. He said that in his speech the President put disarmament to one side and invited the Soviets to talk about peacetime uses of atomic energy.
Secretary Wilson commented that nevertheless the President did talk about atomic disarmaments in his speech.
Admiral Strauss was of the opinion that if we talk about disarmament we will be talking about something we know will not work at this particular time, and therefore he is convinced that the President intentionally pushed this idea aside, and went on to peacetime uses of atomic energy. The principal reason for making any mention of atomic disarmament discussions was the inclusion of the idea of “private” discussion.
Secretary Dulles then suggested that there was no point in getting too legalistic about the President’s speech. He admitted it was [Page 1327] subject to a lot of interpretations, but hoped that we would pick out the one that was best for the United States. We should go into these discussions with the goal of getting the President’s atomic pool plan accepted. He considered that we will have to listen to a lot of the same old speeches from the Soviet representatives. After we had heard them, we should reply that the current international climate does not permit much progress in any form of disarmament since neither side trusts the other. However, the President’s atomic pool plan is one which we could both at least try out. Secretary Dulles does not believe that the Soviets can make an acceptable proposal for atomic disarmament, but nevertheless we should listen to whatever they have to say.
Secretary Dulles indicated that he would prefer to have the discussions of this matter handled through diplomatic channels rather than through the UN Disarmament Commission as it would be very difficult in the latter forum to keep the discussions from bogging down.
As to who should participate in these discussions, Secretary Dulles said that there is considerable logic to limiting the discussions to countries who actually have atomic weapons; namely, the US, USSR, and UK. If, however, emphasis is to be placed on the establishment of a “bank of fissionable material”, then perhaps the French, Canadians, and Belgians should also take part.
Admiral Strauss said that if these other countries had to come in, they could come in later. Secretary Dulles agreed with Admiral Strauss adding that otherwise the meeting may deteriorate into just another international conference.
Admiral Strauss, Secretary Wilson, and Secretary Dulles all agreed that we should try to keep the French out of the discussions, at least initially. Secretary Dulles added, however, that this may be very difficult as if the French are excluded this might bring about a revulsion in their thinking which would turn them toward the USSR. However, all of this is a question of tactics. Secretary Dulles recalled the Foreign Ministers Meeting in Moscow in 1947 which resulted in the breaking-up of the previously close working relationship between the French and the USSR. Since then we have had the French fully on our side.
Mr. Nash suggested that the best way to handle it would be bilaterally between the US and USSR. Secretary Dulles agreed, but said that the British have been quite concerned that US made approaches to the USSR without consulting them. Secretary Dulles felt that the best idea would be for the US to carry the discussions alone for two or three months, and after Berlin perhaps to bring the British in, and the French if absolutely necessary. Secretary Wilson remarked that if the British do come in we should be prepared [Page 1328] to admit the Canadians and Belgians. Admiral Strauss observed that he would hate to see the French brought in the discussions. As to the Belgians, Admiral Strauss remarked that “their nose has been out of joint” since Bermuda, but all in all he did not expect too much trouble from the Canadians and Belgians.
Admiral Strauss and Mr. LeBaron then entered into a discussion of the status of our current agreement with the Belgians for purchase of uranium ore, with particular emphasis on the fact that our contract expires next year. They also discussed the ramifications of the Lilienthal proposal which suggested Brussels as the center of an international atomic agency.
Secretary Dulles stated that he hoped the UK would agree not to insist on participation and in that way make it less embarrassing for us to leave the French out.
Mr. Murphy commented that that would be a safer approach to the problem. He noted, however, that the Malik–Churchill discussions might lead to UK initiative alone. Secretary Dulles pointed out that he would have to tell Ambassador Makins about his forthcoming talk with Zarubin. He noted that Churchill has complete contempt for the French, and therefore wouldn’t take kindly to the idea of including them in any atomic discussions. (Mr. Merchant entered at this point.)
Mr. Merchant commented that although the French should be excluded, it would be difficult to get away with it. On balance he thought it was better to take the UK in from the start. This would be much better from the standpoint of world opinion.
Secretary Dulles conceded that Churchill will present an increasingly difficult problem. The UK is making an intensive effort to get into these discussions.
Mr. LeBaron observed that this is because the whole background of their thinking is directed towards realizing the peaceful application of atomic energy as soon as possible.
After some further discussion it was agreed that the US would conduct its initial negotiations on a bilateral basis through Ambassador Zarubin, in Washington. Later we may have to bring the UK in, but even then we would try to keep the French and Belgians out.
Secretary Dulles then discussed the question of whether to continue the discussions in the UN Disarmament Commission or bilaterally. He personally favored the bilateral approach as did Secretary Wilson and Admiral Strauss. Secretary Dulles said that he had never known a UN Committee that was held down to small size. It simply would not be possible to restrict it to the membership that we considered pertinent and discussions in that forum would automatically be turned into disarmament discussions.
[Page 1329]Mr. Bowie raised again the question of whether we would be willing to talk about disarmament in the field of atomic weapons, and expressed the view that this is what the President meant in his speech.
Secretary Dulles said that the Russians would probably want to talk about atomic disarmament, but there is no practical plan that they would put up. In the first place we can not trust their word, and secondly, there is no practical plan of inspection. However, the principle which we should follow, and this is one to which the President agreed, is that if you could get a really workable scheme of atomic disarmament, coupled with adequate security safeguards, the US would be prepared to support it, and the peace of the world would benefit thereby. However, Secretary Dulles stated he did not think that the President believes this is a presently attainable objective. The President believes that the only way to get there is by the path of peaceful uses of atomic energy. By making progress in this field we could develop mutual trust and cooperation, and eventually atomic disarmament could mushroom out from these small beginnings. However, this is not something we can expect to achieve by a stroke of the pen.
Admiral Strauss observed that if we get involved in disarmament discussions now we will get nowhere on our proposals for the peaceful application of atomic energy.
Mr. Bowie asked what would happen if the USSR were to say to us, “Write out your own ticket for atomic disarmament”? Is there none we could write out?
Secretary Dulles answered by saying that in his view there must be more than what you write down on paper, there must be a fundamental transformation of environment—there must be an opening-up of the present Iron Curtain. In his opinion nothing short of five years would bring about such a fundamental change in Soviet policies.
Mr. Bowie believed that it would be impossible to get a fool-proof plan for atomic disarmament as we are not living in a fool-proof world. It was Mr. Bowie’s judgment that we should continue to search for a workable system of atomic disarmament which would make the world a better and safer place than it is today. We must remember that as the Russian atomic strength increases the risks to the security of the US five years hence may be greater than they are today. Mr. Bowie felt that if things continue the way they are now, they will work out better for the Russians than they will for us. Therefore, we must seek some workable system that will improve our over-all security position.
Admiral Strauss commented that even if we assumed such a system existed—and the odds were against it—the problem was [Page 1330] still to find it and get it agreed to. Meanwhile, the odds of accomplishing this would be improved if something could be done to minimize the distrust and suspicion which exists between the two principals today.
Mr. Bowie said that he was not urging that we let the Soviets get us “smoke screened” out of our original idea of moving forward with the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, but he questioned whether this would really get us anywhere in the reduction of stockpiles of atomic weapons.
Secretary Dulles concluded the meeting by summarizing the agreement reached on (1), conducting the discussions through diplomatic channels rather than in the UN Disarmament Commission, (2), restricting them at least initially to the US and the USSR, although recognizing the UK may insist on coming in late, and possibly also the French, and (3) concentrating on the President’s “atomic pool” proposal although being willing to listen to anything the Soviets might advance on the side of disarmament.