PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Atomic Energy–Armaments 1952–1953”
Memorandum by Charles C Stelle to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie)
- Subject:
- An “Eisenhower Plan” for the Atom?
The recent evidences of Russian nuclear advances confront us with the problems of atomic plenty in the foreseeable and fairly immediate future. They also, however, add a new element to the possibilities of our dealing with these problems by indicating a considerable degree of Russian knowledge and competence in many sectors of nuclear development and by thus decreasing the value of U.S. security controls in these sectors.
Assuming atomic plenty, the stark elements of the situation will be that both we and the Russians will have the power to destroy the other but not the power to destroy the other’s retaliatory capacity so that both will encounter destruction in case of atomic war. This may quite possibly lead to what has been generally described as atomic stalemate, with neither side capable of the act of will to undertake an atomic attack because such an attack will lead to its own destruction.
The extent to which atomic stalemate will lead to an increase of Russian capabilities for atomic blackmail will depend on the confidence third countries have that the U.S. is willing to retaliate atomically [Page 1221] in their behalf, and that this U.S. will is sufficiently evident to the Russians so as to deter attack. To build this confidence or to provide an equally valuable substitute for it is the primary problem of U.S. foreign policy in this field.
On the assumption that the requirements of U.S. security controls in the nuclear field are now considerably lessened, there would seem to be a potential substitute at hand. The U.S. can have confidence in its own will to use atomic weapons in case it is attacked by atomic weapons because it possesses the weapons. The U.S. thus controls the deterrent. The Allies of the U.S., or for that matter other third countries can have confidence in their own will to use atomic weapons in case they are attacked and thus have confidence in their control of the deterrent—if they have atomic capabilities. The substitute for confidence in the U.S. would be self-confidence, which would be contingent, however, on possession of atomic capabilities. The U.S., therefore, should seriously consider whether it is not now in the national interest to assist in the development of atomic capabilities in the other countries of the Free World. Certain questions arise immediately. All of them require the most careful examination.
In the first place is the assumption valid that the dangers of Russian gain through the inevitable leakages which would be involved in U.S. sharing of nuclear weapons, knowledge, and techniques has been materially lessened by Russian progress? Would Russian acquisition of substantial information on U.S. nuclear knowledge and techniques significantly increase Russian capabilities, or lead to danger of a Russian technological breakthrough which would pose even more drastic threats to U.S. security? The answers here are technological but there is perhaps enough basis for a layman to hazard that there are some grounds for the conclusion that U.S. security would not now be materially endangered by an increase of Russian possibilities of acquiring U.S. nuclear knowledge and know-how.
In the second place would it be the part of wisdom for the U.S. to assist in the development of atomic capabilities in the hands of Allies or third countries who, in the very nature of the history of sovereign states, must be assumed to be not completely reliable friends of the U.S. The offhand answer might be made that the capability of complete destruction of the U.S. will be in the hands of an implacable foe of the U.S. in any event; that the U.S. can only be destroyed once; and that the gamble of spreading among friends the capability, eventually, of complete destructiveness, is not materially greater than the gamble involved in having this capability already in the hands of our worst enemy. It can also be answered that in the nature of things sovereign states of the requisite industrial [Page 1222] capacity will in any event arrive at atomic capabilities and a U.S. initiative would affect only the timing and not the end result of the inevitable decentralization of atomic capacities. But the question must be searchingly examined. Other questions must be equally exhaustively explored. Taking it as axiomatic that the U.S. must always possess a retaliatory capacity to inflict destruction on the U.S.S.R., or for that matter any other state which might be or turn hostile, at what point and when will the U.S. be in a position to share its weapons without undue sacrifice to its retaliatory capacity? What would be the order of magnitudes of the costs involved in sharing atomic weapons with other countries or in assisting the development of nuclear programs? What countries would have the capability for either using the weapons or developing full scale nuclear programs?
Should exploration of the numerous questions involved lead to the conclusion that a sharing of atomic capabilities with other countries of the Free World was in the interest of the United States, it would seem possible to devise a program which would not only remove the potential of Russian atomic blackmail, but might conceivably have real potency in increasing pressures on the Russians for accession to a system of international control of all types of armaments. The U.S. could announce that the atom, under present conditions is a menace to mankind. International control of atomic developments as well as conventional weapons is the only long term method of warding off this menace. But in the short term the possession of retaliatory capabilities is the only reasonably sure protection against the menace. Therefore to all nations who will guarantee accession to a system of international control, when by reason of the accession of all states such a system becomes possible, the United States will, in the interests of humanity, extend assistance in the development of atomic capabilities either in the form of weapons or in the form of technical assistance. The U.S. will not urge the development of atomic capabilities upon any other country, but stands ready to assist those who wish assistance and who will join in the agreement for eventual control. The impact of such a program on the Free World would be great. The political implications would be manifold. The possession by the U.S. of considerable temporary control over the rate of development of atomic capabilities in other countries would give it very considerable political leverage on such varied things as for example Franco-German relations, the nature of Swedish neutrality, Japanese rearmament, and ROK impatience for Korean unification. The self confidence of major partners of the U.S. might be revived and fortified. And the Soviets might be presented with a united front of countries with atomic capacities which at the least would [Page 1223] give it pause in undertaking further aggressions and which might just conceivably eventually lead it to acceptance of reasonable limitations on the quantity and character of conventional and unconventional armaments.
I recommend that we give careful thought to the possibility of a program of spreading the responsibilities, burdens, and benefits of nuclear capabilities.