Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 161st Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, September 9, 19531
eyes only
[Extract]
Present at the 161st Council meeting were the following: The Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Douglas Mac Arthur, II, Department of State; Elbert P. Tuttle, Department of the Treasury; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Acting White House Staff Secretary; Gerald D. Morgan and Bryce Harlow, White House Staff; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
Following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.
. . . . . . .
3. Possibility of a New United States Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General Assembly (NSC 112 and NSC 112/1; NSC Action No. 717)2
Mr. Cutler summarized the background on this problem, and read the conclusions and recommendations in the Planning Board’s report to the Council. The substance of the present report, he added, was that the UN General Assembly was no place in which to seek a genuine disarmament. On the other hand, the United States did not want to lose the initiative which it had previously taken in the field of disarmament.
The Vice President inquired whether it would not be possible to dress up the proposed position of the United States on this subject so that it at least would look like a “new story”. He pointed out that the President’s April 16 speech had had very great impact, but many believed that our follow-up to this speech had been insufficient. What with recent developments in the sphere of fusion weapons, it might be desirable, thought the Vice President, to heighten [Page 1211] the psychological repercussions of any position we took on disarmament in the forthcoming General Assembly.
Mr. Bowie replied that the feeling behind the present report was that the General Assembly was simply not a feasible forum in which to put forward disarmament plans with any expectation that they would be seriously treated. Moreover, Mr. Bowie expressed the view that the United States should not put forward any position on this important subject which we were not fully prepared to follow up on, even though we recognized the propaganda value of such moves. The thought behind the present paper was rather to reaffirm in the General Assembly the desire of the United States to proceed with disarmament, but to transfer consideration of the problem from the General Assembly to the UN Disarmament Commission, which would be a much more effective forum for getting ahead.
Mr. Cutler pointed out that the proposal under consideration really constituted a reaffirmation of the past position of the United States on the disarmament problem, with the addition of certain thoughts taken from the President’s April 16 speech. He also pointed out that the President might conceivably desire to change the position set forth in this report, but meanwhile, if the Council would approve the report, it would provide us with the necessary start.
Mr. Strauss then informed the Council that his consideration of the present report had given rise to a number of questions in his own mind. Does the United States have at present an effective disarmament plan? Is the so-called Baruch Plan still our only position, or do we have others in reserve? Does the Baruch Plan still make sense in the light of developments in the field of thermonuclear weapons? Inspection and verification, said Mr. Strauss, now seemed to him the only sensible criteria for achieving disarmament. The criteria of ownership and control of atomic materials have probably ceased to be important. Accordingly, was not a new look at our situation needed?
Mr. Bowie agreed with Mr. Strauss that this Government possessed no plan which took account of the developments Mr. Strauss mentioned, and very obviously needed one. The present paper, which dealt merely with a position to be taken by this Government in the UN General Assembly, was of course no substitute for an adequate and detailed disarmament plan to meet the new situation. Mr. Bowie thought that a group had been set up some time in August to study the situation and to come up with the desired new plan.
The members of the Council were unaware of the existence of any such group as that mentioned by Mr. Bowie. Accordingly, Mr. Strauss [Page 1212] suggested, and the Vice President agreed, that our disarmament position needed reexamination as a matter of urgency.
Thereafter, Mr. Cutler read to the members of the Council the bases on which our present disarmament plan had been established in NSC 112, noting that the problem had not been thoroughly studied since July 1951.
It was the view of several members of the Council, particularly Mr. Flemming, that Council action on the present paper should in no wise seem to reaffirm and reemphasize the Baruch Plan, in view of developments which cast doubt on its validity. It was accordingly agreed to make certain changes in the text of the report designed to avoid such an implication.
Thereafter, the Vice President expressed the view that the President should be requested to set up a new committee, consisting of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, to work out a revision of our present disarmament plans in the light of what had occurred since July 1951.
The National Security Council:3
- a.
- Adopted the recommendations contained in paragraphs 7–b and 8 of NSC 112/1.
- b.
- Did not adopt paragraph 7–a of NSC 112/1; but agreed that action under paragraph 8 could include a review of U.S. efforts in the United Nations to achieve agreement on disarmament.
- c.
- Agreed to recommend to the President that the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission be appointed a special committee to review, as a matter of urgency, the current policy contained in NSC 112, with particular reference to the international control of atomic energy, and to report back to the Council their findings and recommendations.
Note: The above actions, as subsequently approved by the President, transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.
. . . . . . .
- Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Sept. 10↩
- For NSC 112/1, Sept. 1, 1953, see p. 1190. For NSC Action No. 717, see footnote 6, p. 1108. For NSC 112, July 6, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 477.↩
- Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 899, Sept. 9, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)↩