Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2

Disarmament files, lot 58 D 133, “NSC Papers 1953–1955”

Report to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board¹

top secret
NSC 112/1

Washington, September 1, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Possibility of a New United States Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General Assembly

References:

A.

NSC 112²

B.

NSC Action Nos. 717 and 725³

C.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments”, dated June 3, 1953⁴

D.

Memo for Senior NSC Staff from Executive Secretary, subject, “Armaments and American Policy”, dated February 4, 1953⁵

The enclosed draft report on the subject, adopted by the NSC Planning Board as a response to NSC Action No. 717–b, on the basis of a draft prepared by a working group of the Executive Committee on the Regulation of Armaments, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council of the Recommendations in paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof at the meeting on Wednesday, September 9, 1953.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed Recommendations, they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them and direct their implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the coordination of the Secretary of State.⁶

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Report by the NSC Planning Board on Possibility of a New United States Disarmament Proposal in the Eighth General Assembly

the problem

1. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 717 of February 18, 1953, to explore the possibility of new disarmament proposals by the United States in the Eighth General Assembly.

conclusions

2. Since past experience has indicated that efforts to achieve any limitation of armaments do little good unless they are closely integrated with the adjustment of other major international problems, we can expect little progress toward genuine disarmament until measurable progress is made toward the solution of other political questions, such as the German and Austrian problem and Korea.

3. Because of the complexity and nature of the problem, disarmament is peculiarly ill-suited to provide a real test of Soviet intentions to negotiate genuinely on political differences between the USSR and the free world. It is relatively easy for the USSR in the disarmament field to prolong negotiation by equivocal statement or involvement in details and by making illusory “concessions” which could confuse public opinion and create an unwarranted climate of hopefulness, with serious consequent damage.

4. Any serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on the subject of disarmament would probably take place in bilateral or multilateral discussions outside United Nations organs even though such discussions probably would have the previous approval of the United Nations and might be influenced by the United Nations discussions, both public and private.^*

5. The working papers which the United States, either unilaterally, or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and France, has already submitted to the Disarmament Commission, taken together, represent a sufficiently comprehensive approach to make possible genuine negotiations leading to a safe-guarded disarmament program.

6. Despite the difficulties outlined above, it is advisable that the United States continue to demonstrate to the world its abiding desire for comprehensive and safe-guarded disarmament. The general desirability of such posture is heightened by the probability that the interest of our Allies in lessening international tensions and reducing armaments has been augmented by their hopes arising from the Soviet peace offensive and their fears derived from the announcement that the Soviets had exploded a hydrogen bomb or device on August 12, 1953. Such posture would also improve our ability to meet any Soviet moves in the General Assembly. Consequently, it is desirable for the United States to introduce in the General Assembly a proposal affirming the principles regarding world peace contained in the President’s speech of April 16, 1953.⁷

recommendations

7. a. In the Eighth General Assembly, the United States should review the record of its efforts in the United Nations to achieve agreement on disarmament, and forcefully emphasize that the proposals which the United States has already submitted in the Disarmament Commission, either unilaterally or in conjunction with the United Kingdom and France, provide a comprehensive approach to genuine disarmament negotiations which treats all elements of the problem.

7. b. The United States should not initiate any new major substantive proposals on disarmament in the Eighth General Assembly, nor elaborate the existing substantive proposals already introduced in the United Nations by the United States, individually or joined by the United Kingdom and France.

8. To maintain United States initiative in the disarmament field, to demonstrate to the world our continued desire to achieve comprehensive and safe-guarded disarmament, and to anticipate Soviet proposals, the United States should introduce a proposal along the lines of paragraph 6 above, reaffirming the sections of the President’s speech dealing with the problem of disarmament and, in particular, the statement in that speech that as progress in the settlement of certain other political problems “strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world.”

comment

9. NSC Action No. 717 of February 18, 1953, calls for exploration prior to the Eighth General Assembly of the possibility of a new United States proposal in the field of disarmament.

10. In considering this question, the most important basic factor confronting us is that there is no anticipation that serious negotiations on disarmament will take place in a United Nations organ, at least in the foreseeable future, although the United Nations would doubtless approve the agreed framework for such discussions. This evaluation is based on two general lines of reasoning.

a. The President stated in his speech of April 16 that as progress in certain other areas of political differences “strengthens world trust we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world.” This is part of the United States policy that a precondition for serious detailed negotiations on disarmament would logically be progress toward the settlement of such political questions as Korea, Austria, and Germany.

b. Any serious negotiations on the subject of disarmament would undoubtedly be more fruitful if they take place in bilateral or multilateral discussion outside United Nations organs, even though such discussions probably would have the previous approval of the United Nations and might even be influenced by United Nations discussions, both public and private.

In the light of this situation, United States policy in the field of disarmament now rests on the premise that in the Disarmament Commission, and presumably in the General Assembly, we should conduct a holding operation, as outlined in the RAC Policy Paper RAC (NS) D–5a.^†

11. However, the above factor does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of certain types of new United States proposals to the Eighth General Assembly in the field of disarmament. Such proposals might become desirable because of the following considerations.

a. We may be faced with the necessity of fairly extensive disarmament talks, either inside or outside the United Nations, even though the record of the past years indicates there is no likelihood of genuine negotiations at present with the USSR because of proposals and pressures from the Soviet Union, from France, or from certain of the smaller states which are members of the Disarmament Commission. In this connection, it should be emphasized that under Articles 11 and 26 the United Nations is charged with the mandate of seeking to reduce armaments.

b. It must be recognized that, regardless of the nature of the particular proposal, the mere fact that the United States makes a proposal has an important effect upon world opinion, as exemplified by the reaction of Indian officials to our past disarmament efforts and the favorable world reaction to the President’s April 16 speech placing disarmament in perspective to other problems.

c. Proposals submitted to the United Nations by the United States could conceivably set the stage for subsequent Great Power negotiations.

12. When considered in the light of the many outstanding political questions dividing the Soviet Union and the United States, the past United States proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission, and the failure up to the present time of the Soviet Union to offer any suggestions of its own that might serve as the basis for serious negotiations, it would seem that any proposals we might submit to the General Assembly would have as their primary objectives either:

a. A serious attempt to break the present disarmament deadlock by presenting new and revised United States positions likely to be more acceptable to the Soviet Union; or

b. Proposals primarily calculated at least to maintain and possibly to advance our present advantageous political position in the disarmament field and to give support to the general effort to maintain free world initiative.

13. Any revision and elaboration of existing United States positions with the aim of breaking the present deadlock would necessarily be drastic. (e.g., it could conceivably be along the lines suggested in the Annex of “Armaments and American Policy”, Report of the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament of the Department of State:^‡—a disarmament scheme with a relatively simple system of inspection designed merely to prevent any major violations from going unnoticed and including a revision of the present United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy.) Aside from the question of the merits of any major revision of United States policy, there are basic reasons which weigh against any serious attempt to break the disarmament deadlock through proposals in the Eighth General Assembly. The extreme unlikelihood that serious negotiations on disarmament can take place in a United Nations organ would make it unwise to present any major revision in the General Assembly, particularly when such proposals would constitute unilateral disclosure of our minimum positions before agreement has been reached on any of the East-West political differences and before entering into serious disarmament negotiations.

14. The question thus arises as to what proposals we might make in the General Assembly to accomplish the other objective, namely, the maintenance and possibly the advancement of our political position in the disarmament field. It should be noted that to advance a proposal solely for this reason is not equivalent to relegating our interest in disarmament purely to the field of propaganda. The United States had consistently taken the position that it must be ready to carry out any proposals which it makes in the field of disarmament. In other words, all such proposals must be basically sound and capable of development into a workable program in the event of a change in the international climate. Our past adherence to such a course of action has convinced most of the world of our sincerity and has therefore been the best possible form of propaganda. Such proposals have the additional advantage of creating a foundation which would facilitate genuine negotiations in the event of a lessening of international tension.

15. In the light of the above, it is clear that any proposals concerned solely with disarmament which we might make in the General Assembly must have three characteristics.

a. The proposals must be such that we could carry them out if they were accepted.

b. The proposals must be relatively understandable and capable of reduction to simple terms, in order to have the necessary popular appeal.

c. The proposals must be of such a nature that their discussion in the General Assembly will not raise unjustified hopes which might interfere with the essential program of developing sufficient strength among the Western Powers to resist Soviet imperialism.

Possible proposals concerned solely with disarmament are set forth in Annex A, together with their advantages and disadvantages from the standpoint of these criteria. The general conclusion regarding these possible proposals is that the United States would probably not be justified in submitting any of them to the Eighth General Assembly. In connection with some of them, the disadvantages of their submission outweigh the advantages. Others lack sufficient popular appeal to justify their submission.

16. A general factor affecting any presentation in the General Assembly might be the status of US–USSR relations. Now that an armistice has been achieved in Korea, if Four-Power talks on disarmament seem imminent, it is doubtful that new substantive proposals on disarmament will be submitted to the General Assembly, and, in fact, will be considered by many states as inappropriate due to the expectation of discussion of this subject in Four-Power talks. It is possible, however, that the General Assembly might consider a resolution on the disarmament item urging the Great Powers to confer and seek to reach an agreement upon a program of safeguarded disarmament. In this event, it would be difficult and probably inadvisable to restrain the General Assembly from passing such a resolution.

17. Even if there is no prospect of Four-Power talks, it seems likely that the pressures in the General Assembly will be in the direction of securing Four-Power talks which would include the subject of disarmament. Under these circumstances, (despite the fact that the disadvantages appear to outweigh the advantages for the United States, in general, as indicated in paragraph 15 above) a disarmament proposal by the United States might serve the dual purpose of giving further assurance to the world that peace and a disarmed world are our ultimate goal and of lessening General Assembly pressures for Four-Power talks.

The chief advantages which might be derived from the submission of such a proposal might be obtained if the United States were to submit to the General Assembly an item dealing broadly with the entire problem of international peace and the courses of action necessary to secure that objective. The basis for that item could be the President’s speech of April 16 which indicates in outline the general problem of relaxation of international tensions and of ensuring peace. Disarmament plays a large role in this program, the chief stress being on the relationship of disarmament to settlement of other outstanding political issues.

18. From the standpoint of the United Nations disarmament discussions, the chief advantage of focusing the attention of the General Assembly on the problem of relating disarmament to relaxation of international tensions is that it touches on the large gap in the work of the Disarmament Commission. The serious discussions of the Disarmament Commission—in accordance with its terms of reference—have been devoted almost exclusively to the comparatively technical side of securing safe-guarded disarmament rather than to the broad relationship of disarmament to other world problems.

Another advantage of such an approach is that it conforms to the objectives emphasized in NSC 112 of avoiding proposals which would immerse the United Nations in a mass of details prior to strong indications of a possibility of securing genuine progress in achieving the programs.

Another important advantage of this type of proposal is that it, like our other disarmament proposals, would result in a favorable reaction throughout the world to the United States, through showing our continued interest in disarmament.

19. It must be recognized that the decision as to whether the United States should present to the General Assembly an omnibus item of this nature dealing in broad general terms with the causes of international tension will depend upon political considerations extending considerably beyond the field of disarmament. It should be noted that the United States in the past has criticized the USSR for introducing proposals of an omnibus type and has successfully contended that such proposals be placed at the bottom of the agenda after General Assembly consideration of the individual elements of the omnibus proposals. Also, it would be easy for other states to add their own ideas, possibly hostile to our position, to such omnibus proposals. For example, the Arab states might propose that a solution of the Palestine and North African problems in accordance with their ideas was essential to world peace. This process of political logrolling could result in General Assembly approval of a resolution completely objectionable to the United States.

Despite these and other dangers, it would be desirable for the United States to go ahead with an omnibus proposal, principally because our political position would suffer at this time by any indication that the United States lacks interest in disarmament or does not wish to take any initiative in this regard. The announcement that the USSR had exploded a hydrogen bomb or device on August 12, 1953 undoubtedly has stimulated our Allies’ interest in this subject, already great. In the past, the clearly expressed United States desire to obtain agreement on a comprehensive disarmament program, plus the broad proposals which the United States has made on this subject and Allied participation in or support of these efforts, has been helpful in securing popular support for necessary rearmament efforts by demonstrating that Western desire for disarmament was rejected by the Soviets and left no alternative for the present but to maintain armed strength to insure security. Moreover, United States interest in disarmament has favorable impact on the so-called “neutralist” powers in counter-acting Soviet propaganda that the United States seeks war.

20. The proposal would, in effect, ask the General Assembly to endorse the principles contained in the President’s speech. The sections of the President’s speech most relevant to such an item in the General Assembly (and some or all of which might be utilized) are set forth in Annex B. We could not, of course, expect the General Assembly to accept a wording even closely akin to the text of a speech by the head of government of one of the Great Powers. However, to indicate through reference to the President’s text the principles which might be developed in the General Assembly amply serves the limited purposes of this paper.

21. With regard to the question of preparations within the United States Government, it is probable that the United States could present in the General Assembly without extensive study a generalized proposal along the lines suggested in the previous paragraph. It would even be possible, without extensive studies, to elaborate somewhat on the various points of the disarmament suggestions contained in the President’s speech or to go forward with proposals along the lines dealt with in Annex A. It must be pointed out emphatically, however, that while such extensive studies would not be a prerequisite to proposals in the General Assembly they undoubtedly would be a prerequisite to the determination of United States positions in connection with Four-Power discussions. Considerable additional machinery would have to be set up within the United States Government on an urgent basis in order to carry out such studies.

Annex A

Possible Proposals Concerned Solely with Disarmament That Might be Presented to the Eighth General Assembly

1. Proposals or comments, following up the President’s April 16 speech, concerning the devotion of a “substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction.”

This might take the form of one or a combination of the following:

(i) Illustrations of the type of program the United States would support, and some illustration of just what this would mean for the various countries now in need of such aid;

(ii) An indication of the probable or possible amounts that would be available and some illustration of just what this would mean for the various countries now in need of such aid;

(iii) A suggestion that a United Nations study committee be set up to survey the means and methods of establishing and carrying out such a program.

Advantages

a. Such action would enable the United States to further dramatize and elaborate on the President’s suggestion regarding use of disarmament savings. General Assembly discussion of a United States proposal on this subject would have a powerful appeal to the peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The resulting increased pressure on the Soviet leaders, possibly even from some of the satellite officials, to take action to permit such a program to come into being would serve greatly the interest of the United States and would help forge another bond of common interest between the Western nations and the rest of the free world.

b. Some initiative on our part indicating a desire to develop further this aspect of the President’s “peace program” would serve to counter the arguments advanced in some quarters that the “peace program” is just words for propaganda purposes and that the United States does not intend to press for its implementation.

Disadvantages

a. Increased attention in the General Assembly to the benefits that would accrue from disarmament, and particularly any General Assembly involvement in actual planning of a program to administer such benefits, might well divert attention from the present obstructionist position of the Soviet Union and might cause some governments to press for a rapid “compromise”, unacceptable to us but economically and financially profitable to them, in order to initiate the program. In addition, such a result, through by-passing problems and concentrating attention on the benefits of disarmament, might hinder our present policy of encouraging the rearmament efforts of the free world until we secure genuinely safeguarded disarmament.

b. It is entirely possible that proposals on the utilization of disarmament savings at the Eighth General Assembly might lessen chances of Soviet agreement not only on disarmament but also on other political issues. In the first place, if the Soviets were to participate in such a program as a contributing nation, it would make it more difficult for them to utilize the savings resulting from disarmament to increase the standard of living for their own people. One of the most likely motivations for any sincere Soviet effort to achieve a political modus vivendi would be the desire of the new regime to strengthen its popular support by finally delivering the long promised increased standard of living. Thus the strength of the above motivation for agreement would be reduced to the degree that Soviet leaders felt they would be forced to divert savings to other countries. Furthermore, if the Soviets were convinced that the United States actually planned to carry out its share of such a program, either with or without Soviet participation, such conviction might weigh against chances for agreement on disarmament. United States participation would, in Soviet eyes, not only cushion the domestic and world-wide disruptive effects of a reduction of United States armament production but would also increase the likelihood that the economies of various countries which the Soviets would hope to see disrupted during a period of reduced tensions could instead be strengthened.

c. A proposal of this sort might cause pressures on the United States to accept inadequately safeguarded Soviet proposals which might unless we are alert lead to unilateral disarmament by the United States.

2. New proposals for international control machinery.

A working paper presently contemplated for possible future submission by the United States to the Disarmament Commission is one concerning the nature and functions of an international control organ which would supervise the carrying into effect and operation of a comprehensive disarmament program. (A preliminary draft paper on this subject has been prepared and circulated to the French and British for their comments, which have not yet been forthcoming.) If, however, it were deemed desirable, submission of a paper on this subject could be made to the Eighth General Assembly. In order to ensure the maximum propaganda appeal, a proposal on this subject submitted to the General Assembly as opposed to the Disarmament Commission should place greatest emphasis on the general concept of international control and fill in the details only to the extent necessary to impress the world with the fundamental importance of the concept.

Advantages

a. Such a paper would have considerable propaganda value, whether presented alone or in conjunction with other aspects of a disarmament program. A control organ proposal presents to the public, and even to some officials, an image that is simple and concrete in nature and thus more easily understood and remembered than proposals, however significant, on types of limitations, correlationships, modification of the United Nations atomic energy plan or modification of the disclosure and verification proposals. If it were decided to achieve the maximum propaganda effect for such a proposal, the General Assembly offers a much better platform for dramatizing it than the Disarmament Commission. Similarly, if it were decided to dramatize any general presentation to the General Assembly, a control organ proposal could be of great value.

b. The proposal would dramatize the strongest United States and the weakest USSR positions, i.e., the necessity of breaking through the Iron Curtain as one essential element in achieving international security.

c. The Soviet Representative on March 21, 1953 in the Political Committee of the General Assembly in effect invited the United States to introduce a paper concerning the nature and functions of an international control organ and we must expect to be under considerable pressure to respond with a paper on the subject. This situation not only enhances the propaganda value of a General Assembly proposal on this subject, but adds to the effect it would have on other governmental representatives.

Disadvantages

a. A proposal of this nature might launch the General Assembly into a fruitless discussion of minute details, thus obscuring the basic differences with the USSR.

b. Such a proposal could easily become a central target of anti-United Nations groups for attacking the United Nations as a “world government.”

3. Presentation of a Paper correlating the principal aspects of a comprehensive disarmament program.

The problem of correlationship—the indication in broad general terms of the way in which the principal aspects of disarmament, such as disclosure and verification, international control of atomic energy, and regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments, would dovetail in a coordinate fashion in putting into effect a disarmament program—has been the subject which has most troubled the other non-Soviet members of the Disarmament Commission. At the present time, however, it is United States policy to introduce a paper on this subject into the Commission only if absolutely necessary to preserve the United States tactical position in the Disarmament Commission:—for example, if non-Soviet members of the Commission were about to secure strong support for proposals which would be damaging to our position. There is no possibility that such a paper will be introduced into the Disarmament Commission before the next General Assembly and therefore the presentation of a proposal on this subject can be considered as a possibility for the Eighth General Assembly.

Advantages

a. Such a proposal would add to whatever other action we might take in the General Assembly in strengthening our effort to convince the world that we are pressing forward in our efforts to achieve an effective disarmament program. This effort would have more effect on governments than on public opinion in general, for the subject is necessarily a complex one.

b. The pressures from such countries as France and Pakistan for a correlationship paper could be met partially by a proposal on this subject during the next General Assembly. It must be recognized, however, that any proposal we might submit—particularly our initial position—probably would not satisfy all the interested non-Soviet representatives and we would thus still face pressures in this regard. Furthermore, if the Soviet Union, during the Commission meetings or during the Eighth General Assembly, makes some gestures that convince others that they are making substantive concessions, the present pressures for a correlationship paper will be increased considerably and probably will necessitate some response on our part.

c. Until the position is clarified, the Soviet Union can claim that the unrevealed aspects of the United States position on the correlationship problem are the legitimate concern of Soviet policy makers, even though from the standpoint of negotiations, Soviet failure to present proposals that could serve as even a possible basis for negotiations relieves the United States of any obligation to indicate our positions on this subject. Therefore, if there are any forces within the Soviet Government that look with some favor on possible disarmament agreements, presentation of our views on correlationship might advance the possibility of substantive progress.

Disadvantages

a. There would be little if any mass appeal in any proposals we might make on the correlationship question for it is too involved and intangible a subject for such treatment.

b. Once our views on this subject had been presented, either as a United States or as a tripartite paper, there might well be considerable pressure from other countries, and possibly from such individuals within the French Government as Jules Moch, to press for further concessions by the West and thus divert attention from other aspects of the disarmament discussions.

c. Questions concerning correlationship are the type that should be saved for serious discussions, since there is considerable room for negotiation in this field. Furthermore, discussion of the basic points of conflict in the correlationship question would have an essentially ethereal quality unless accompanied by simultaneous discussion of the specifics of the political solutions, i.e., in Great Power talks.

4. Modification of the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan.

The question of a proposed major revision of the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan has already been alluded to and the subsequent consideration of this paper has been based on the premise that such a revision was not a possibility for the Eighth General Assembly. However, consideration might be given to the desirability of proposing in the Eighth General Assembly some revisions to the United Nations Plan. The two most probable such revisions would be:

(i) Some diminution of the areas connected with fissionable material which would be subject to international ownership, operation and management. An example of this would be a provision which would specifically permit private ownership and/or operational control of reactor plants in non-Socialist states and national ownership and/or operational control of such plants in socialist economies;

(ii) Modification of the present provisions of the United Nations Plan with respect to the veto and the application of sanctions.

Advantages

a. Modification proposals, even though minor in nature, would be useful in conveying the impression that the United States was continuing to review the United Nations Plan, which many non-Communists believe to be “dated”, with a view to improving it and making it more acceptable to the Soviet Union. Thus to those individuals somewhat more familiar with the problem, modification proposals could be presented basically as an indication that we were willing to take a new look at the United Nations Plan, and to the foreign public in general they could be presented as yet another United States proposal made in the interest of promoting agreement.

b. Proposals for modification would help to meet Soviet charges that our insincerity regarding the United Nations Plan as a whole is revealed by our “turning atomic energy over to private individuals”, which they may claim will make any form of international ownership and control more difficult if not impossible in the future.

c. Modification of the veto provisions would meet one of the criticisms of the United Nations Plan, a critcism which while it has not received too much attention lately is one which the Soviets are increasingly able to support with the writings of non-Communists.

Disadvantages

a. The suggestion for some diminution of the areas connected with fissionable materials which would be subject to international ownership, operation and management is not and could not be a “minor” modification. A major change at this time in the United States position toward the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan is precluded not only because of the general considerations set forth in paragraph 5 of the “Comment” but also because of a number of considerations related specially to the problem of the control of atomic energy, which may be briefly stated as follows:

(1) Any United States suggestions for modification would intensify pressures from governmental and private sources for further changes of a more significant type at a time when we have not established whether any concessions are possible or, if they are possible, the maximum limits of those concessions.

(2) The resulting pressures for further modifications of the United Nations Plan would tend to divert attention from Soviet obstructionism on atomic energy control to United States refusal to go further with modification.

(3) The USSR will contend that the United States suggestions for modification establish the fact that we have been wrong in continuing to adhere to the United Nations Plan and, conversely, that the Soviets have been right in demanding a new approach.

(4) Any suggestion for a major change in the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan, because of its importance in relation to the entire problem of negotiations with the Soviet Union, might well be reserved for bilateral or multilateral negotiations rather than for presentation in the United Nations.

It is entirely clear that this disadvantage of a proposal at this time to diminish the areas connected with fissionable material which would be subject to international ownership, operation and management is of such consequence that any such proposal must be eliminated as a possibility.

b. A modification of the veto provisions at this time would not be of sufficient consequence to permit us to secure the hypothetical advantages as set forth above of a modification of the United Nations Atomic Energy Plan.

c. Any suggestion for modification of the United Nations Plan might subject the United States Government to considerable criticism from Congressional and private sources for having made “concessions” without receiving any quid pro quo from the Soviets.

Annex B

Sections of the President’s April 16th Speech Relating to a Possible U.S. Proposal for the Eighth General Assembly

“The Road Followed by the United States”

The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs.

• First: No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice.
• Second: No nation’s security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow-nations.
• Third: Any nation’s right to a form of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable.
• Fourth: Any nation’s attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible.
• And Fifth: A nation’s hope of lasting peace cannot be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations and honest understanding with all other nations.

In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war, toward true peace …⁸

“Working for Peace”

This we do know: a world that begins to witness the rebirth of trust among nations can find its way to a peace that is neither partial nor punitive …

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.

It should mean, no less importantly, an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total.

Out of this can grow a still wider task—the achieving of just political settlements for the other serious and specific issues between the free world and the Soviet Union.

None of these issues, great or small, is insoluble—given only the will to respect the rights of all nations …

We have already done all within our power to speed conclusion of a treaty with Austria, which will free that country from economic exploitation and from occupation by foreign troops.

We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but also, upon the foundation, to strive to foster a broader European community, conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas.

This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections.

This free community and the full independence of the East European nations could mean the end of the present unnatural division of Europe.

“Reduction of Armaments”

As progress in all these areas strengthens world trust, we could proceed concurrently with the next great work—the reduction of the burden of armaments now weighing upon the world. To this end we would welcome and enter into the most solemn agreements. These could properly include:

1. The limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations.

2. A commitment by all nations to set an agreed limit upon that proportion of total production of certain strategic materials to be devoted to military purposes.

3. International control of atomic energy to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. A limitation or prohibition of other categories of weapons of great destructiveness.

5. The enforcement of all these agreed limitations and prohibitions by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The details of such disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex. Neither the United States nor any other nation can properly claim to possess a perfect, immutable formula. But the formula matters less than the faith—the good faith without which no formula can work justly and effectively.

“A New Kind of War”

The fruit of success in all these tasks would present the world with the greatest task, and the greatest opportunity, of all. It is this: the dedication of the energies, the resources, and the imaginations of all peaceful nations to a new kind of war. This would be a declared total war, not upon any human enemy but upon the brute forces of poverty and need …

This Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and reconstruction. The purposes of this great work would be to help other peoples to develop the undeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom …”

1. Copies were also sent to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. For text of NSC 112, “Formulation of a United States Position With Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments”, July 6, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 477.
3. For NSC Action No. 717, see footnote 6, p. 1108. For NSC Action No. 725, see footnote 6, p. 1114.
4. This was a covering memorandum to the May 26 memo of the Executive Committee on Regulation of Armaments, p. 1160.
5. This memorandum, not printed, transmitted the Report of the Panel of Consultants to the Senior Staff of the NSC. For the text of the Report, see p. 1056.
6. At its 161st meeting, Sept. 9, the NSC adopted the recommendations contained in paragraphs 7–b and 8 of this report; for the pertinent portion of the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, see p. 1210.
7. This paper does not deal with the problem of how to meet a Soviet proposal in the General Assembly for immediate Great Power discussions on disarmament, except to indicate that specific substantive proposals on disarmament in the General Assembly would not be the best method of dealing with the situation. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. See the editorial note, p. 1144.
8. Attachment B to Memorandum for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject “Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments,” June 3, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. RAC (NS) D–5a is printed under the date of May 26, p. 1160.]
9. Transmitted to the NSC Senior Staff by memorandum from the Executive Secretary, subject “Armaments and American Policy,” dated February 4, 1953. [Footnote in the source text. For text of the Report and its Annex, see p. 1056.]
8. Ellipses in this Annex are in the source text.