S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 153
Report to the National Security Council by the Executive
Secretary (Lay)1
top secret
NSC 153/1
Washington, June 10, 1953.
Note by the Executive Secretary to the
National Security Council on Restatement of Basic National Security
Policy
References:
- A.
- NSC Action Nos. 776–b and 8112
- B.
- NSC 20/4, NSC 68/2, NSC 135/3, NSC 149/23
- C.
- NSC 794
At the 149th Council meeting on June 9, 1953, the National Security Council
and the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy
Commission and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator adopted NSC 153 subject to the following amendments
(NSC Action No. 811):
[Here follows a verbatim repetition of the amendments to NSC 153 adopted at the 149th meeting of the
NSC, as printed in the memorandum of
discussion, supra.]
The President has this date approved NSC 153,
as amended and enclosed herewith as NSC
153/1, and directs its implementation by all appropriate Executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.
[Page 379]
The enclosed statement of policy summarizes and supersedes the basic national
security policies contained in NSC 20/4,
NSC 68/2, NSC 135/3 and Part I of 149/2. Continuation in effect of the
Objectives in the Annex hereto is also intended to constitute for the time
being a response to NSC 79.
The enclosed statement of policy consists of the following parts:
A. General Considerations |
Page |
1 |
B. General Objectives |
Page |
3 |
C. Courses of Action |
Page |
5 |
D. Annex containing “U.S. Objectives vis-à-vis the USSR in the
Event of War” as previously stated in NSC 20/4. |
Page |
10 |
[Enclosure]
Statement of Policy by the National Security
Council
top secret
[Washington,] June 10, 1953.
Restatement of Basic National Security
Policy
general considerations
- 1.
- There are two principal threats to the survival of fundamental
values and institutions of the United States:
- a.
- The formidable power and aggressive policy of the
communist world led by the USSR.
- b.
- The serious weakening of the economy of the United States
that may result from the cost of opposing the Soviet threat
over a sustained period.
- The basic problem facing the United States is to strike a proper
balance between the risks arising from these two threats.
- 2.
- In recognition of the Soviet threat, the United States has been
engaged in building up its own and free world strength, in order to
block Soviet expansion, make possible an affirmative foreign policy,
and deter general war, or if war comes, survive the initial shock
and go on to victory. This policy is based on the premise that
creation by the free world of situations of strength might lead the
USSR to modify its behavior, and that eventually the internal
conflicts of the Soviet totalitarian system, with positive effort
from us,
[Page 380]
might cause a
retraction and decay of Soviet power. This policy rejects both
preventive war and isolation.
- 3.
- A vital factor in the long-term survival of the free world is the
maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy. Efforts
to build up free world strength rapidly have resulted in a high rate
of Federal spending in excess of Federal income, at a time of heavy
taxation. Continuation of this course of action over a long period
of time would place the United States in danger of seriously
weakening its economy and destroying the values and institutions
which it is seeking to maintain. Accordingly, in recognition of this
danger, greater emphasis than heretofore must now be placed on
budgetary, credit, and fiscal policies designed to maintain the
strength and soundness of the U.S. economy. However, if a basic
change in the world situation should occur, these policies would be
subject to review.
- 4.
- This new emphasis does not imply a belief that the Soviet threat
to the free world is diminishing. On the contrary:
- a.
- The Soviet orbit has formidable and growing military,
economic, and political capabilities, including in
particular an atomic capability and a possible thermonuclear
capability which will probably become sufficient in the next
few years to damage critically the United States and its
allies.
- b.
- Although there is continuing danger of general war, the
most immediate danger facing the United States is that a
progressive and cumulative loss of positions of importance
to the United States (either as a result of deterioration
within the free nations, or of communist cold war actions,
or of a process involving both) could eventually reduce the
United States, short of general war, to an isolated and
critically vulnerable position.
- c.
- The increasingly destructive power available to the Soviet
Union, the development of over-all Soviet production
potential, and the allocation by the USSR of a much greater
proportion of its resources to war purposes, make it
impossible for the free world to assign the same weight as
in the past to its economic potential as the determining
factor in final victory.
- d.
- In deciding whether or in what manner to exercise its
capabilities, the USSR is not restrained by moral
considerations, by constitutional procedures or by the
necessity of consulting with allies.
- e.
- Although the USSR has recently assumed a more conciliatory
posture in its dealings with the West, there is no basis for
concluding that the fundamental hostility of the
Kremlin toward the West has abated,
that the ultimate objectives of the Soviet rulers have
changed, or that the menace of communism to the free world
has diminished.
- Consequently the United States must continue to give primary
consideration to the threat of Soviet power. But the threat to the
U.S. economy cannot be neglected. At the same time, we must
recognize that increased emphasis on sound fiscal policy may involve
assuming
[Page 381]
increased risks
in relation to the Soviet threat, and will therefore increase the
importance of more careful balance and improved efficiency in the
various national security programs.
- 5.
- The Soviet orbit also has marked disadvantages and vulnerabilities
vis-à-vis the free world. Because the Soviet system relies heavily
on falsehood, compulsion and rigid centralized control machinery, it
has built up disillusionment and resentment in the USSR, and even
more in the satellites. For some period of time, the difficulties
and uncertainties involved in the transition from the old to the new
regime will increase these and other vulnerabilities inherent in the
Soviet system. The USSR is, and for the foreseeable future will
remain, inferior to the free world in available resources and
productive capacity. The Soviet orbit is also vulnerable to
developing U.S. atomic and thermonuclear capabilities.
- 6.
- In the light of all these factors, the greatest safeguard to the
security of the United States and the free world continues to be the
achievement and maintenance of integrated political, military, and
economic power providing the United States with an over-all strength
sufficient, together with our spiritual determination, to deter or
win general war, prevent or counter communist aggression, and permit
the exploitation of Soviet bloc vulnerabilities.
general objectives
- 7.
- One purpose underlies every national security policy: to maintain
the fundamental values and institutions of the United States, which
rest on the essential dignity and worth of the individual in a free
society.
- 8.
- To achieve this fundamental purpose, in view of the dual threat
facing us, we set the following objectives:
- a.
- To create and maintain sufficient strength, both military
and nonmilitary, to provide for the security of the United
States, assist in the defense of vital areas of the free
world, prevent or counter aggression, deter general war,
protect the continental United States, and provide the basis
for winning a general war if one should be forced on
us.
- b.
- To maintain a sound and strong U.S. economy based on free
enterprise.
- c.
- To maintain free U.S. political institutions supported by
an informed public opinion.
- d.
- To strengthen the will and ability of other nations of the
free world, individually and collectively, to deter or
oppose communist aggression and achieve internal
stability.
- e.
- To prevent significant expansion of Soviet bloc power,
even though in certain cases measures to this end may be
used by the Soviet bloc as a pretext for war.
- f.
- To delay and disrupt the consolidation of Soviet bloc
power and influence, and eventually to reduce such power and
influence to a
[Page 382]
point which no longer constitutes a threat to our security,
without unduly risking a general war.
- g.
- To establish an international system based on freedom and
justice as contemplated in the Charter of the United
Nations.
- h.
- To continue in effect U.S. objectives vis-à-vis the USSR
in the event of war, as set forth in the Annex to this
report.
courses of action
Maintenance of U.S. Strength
- 9.
- Achieve and maintain in readiness for as long as necessary to meet
the Soviet threat, the military forces which will permit timely and
effective military operations, in collaboration with our allies or
alone, as an essential element in our efforts to:
- a.
- Deter war;
- b.
- Deter or counter peripheral aggression wherever and
whenever necessary for U.S. security;
- c.
- Provide a reasonable initial defense and an adequate basis
for victory, in the event general war is forced upon
us.
- 10.
- Develop and maintain an offensive capability, particularly the
capability to inflict massive damage on Soviet war-making capacity,
at a level that the Soviets must regard as an unacceptable risk in
war.
- 11.
- Emphasize the development of a continental defense system,
including early warning, adequate to prevent disaster and to make
secure the mobilization base necessary to achieve U.S. victory in
the event of general war.
- 12.
- Strengthen the defense position of the United States by
non-military measures, including development of a stronger civil
defense, feasible reduction of urban vulnerability, and preparations
to assure the continuity of government and essential
production.
- 13.
- Maintain the security of defense positions outside the continental
U.S. which are determined from time to time to be necessary to U.S.
security.
- 14.
- Maintain superiority in quantity and quality of special weapons
and sustain emphasis on scientific research and development.
- 15.
- Develop and maintain United States military forces and matériel
stocks at levels adequate to meet the needs of United States
security and capable of continued maintenance, but not designed to
meet any assumed date of greatest danger.
- 16.
- Continue, for as long as necessary, a state of limited
mobilization to develop military readiness, placing increased
emphasis on development and maintenance of production plant capacity
capable of rapid expansion or conversion to essential wartime
output.
- 17.
- While lessening dependence on large reserve stocks of end items,
create and maintain certain minimum essential reserve
[Page 383]
stocks of end items to
support effectively the war effort until war production reaches the
required levels.
- 18.
- Maintain the stockpiling programs and provide additional producing
facilities for those materials the shortage of which would
critically affect essential defense programs, and reduce the goal or
rates of acquisition of other stockpile materials in line with the
policy of decreased emphasis on fixed target dates.
- 19.
- Assure internal security against covert attack, sabotage, and
espionage, through methods consistent with the maintenance of a
vital and democratic society.
Maintenance of the Economy
- 20.
- As rapidly as is consistent with continuing our leadership in the
free world, and barring a basic change in the world situation,
balance Federal expenditures with Federal income and maintain
over-all credit and fiscal policies to assist in stabilizing the
economy.
- 21.
- So long as there is war in Korea, do not substantially reduce the
level of Federal taxation, although a change in form may be
made.
- 22.
- Eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the
Federal Government.
- 23.
- Minimize Federal expenditures for programs that are not essential
to the national security.
- 24.
- Maximize the economic potential of private enterprise by
minimizing governmental controls and regulations, and by encouraging
private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources
(e.g., nuclear power).
- 25.
- Maintain a high level of economic activity at relatively stable
price levels.
Maintenance of Free Political
Institutions
- 26.
- Assure the vitality and soundness of our free, democratic
institutions.
- 27.
- Undertake the clarification to the American people of the nature
of the communist threat, and the spiritual and material resources
which the free world possesses to meet that threat.
- 28.
- Build up a vigorous and informed public opinion, united in support
of the measures necessary to meet the Soviet threat.
- 29.
- Provide appropriate safeguards against subversion, through methods
consistent with the maintenance of a vital and democratic
society.
[Page 384]
Strengthening of the Free World
(In addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)
- 30.
- Develop the political unity, strength, and determination of the
free world by political and psychological measures designed to
promote internal stability in critical areas, reduce communist and
neutralist influence, combat anti-American propaganda, and encourage
the adoption and support of policies consistent with our national
policy.
- 31.
- Extend good offices where appropriate in resolving controversies
between nations of the free world, in helping to adjust colonial and
quasi-colonial relationships, and in moderating extreme nationalism,
with a view to aiding the orderly self-development of the peoples of
the free world rather than to preserving the status quo.
- 32.
- Encourage and assist the development of indigenous free world
armed forces, and regional defense and collective security
arrangements among free nations, capable of an increased share of
responsibility in resisting local communist aggression.
- 33.
- Increase emphasis on aid to countries of the Far East and Middle
East in the light of present threats to these countries.
- 34.
- Support and strengthen the NATO
countries as a principal element in the world defense against
communism; promote the establishment of NATO forces at levels maintainable over a period of
time; and decrease emphasis on early fixed target dates for the
attainment of such force levels.
- 35.
- Extend economic and military aid to free nations with due regard
to their contributions to free world defense, their ability to use
such aid effectively, and the effect of such aid on their political
and economic stability.
- 36.
- Concentrate aid on vital free countries, helping the weakest to
attain economic strength, and encouraging and enlisting the strong
to maximize their carrying of their share of the over-all defense
requirements.
- 37.
- Emphasize, in connection with the mutual security program,
longer-term programs for improved planning, procurement and
production base.
- 38.
- Increase emphasis on off-shore procurement of military material,
designed to increase the capability of our allies to support their
own defense.
- 39.
- Emphasize (a) sound and stable economies in the free nations, as
well as increasing productivity; and (b) substantial, equitable
defense contributions by each of the free nations.
- 40.
- Pursue international economic policies which stress trade, raw
material development, increased capital investment by private
enterprise, and sound financial relations.
- 41.
- Lower trade barriers and encourage reciprocal trade on a mutually
favorable basis consistent with the over-all national
interest.
Prevention of Soviet Expansion
(In addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)
- 42.
- Develop and maintain our capability and willingness to commit
appropriate forces and matériel in collective, and if necessary,
unilateral action against local communist aggression in key
areas.
- 43.
- Increase emphasis on: (a) bringing the Korean war to a final
settlement acceptable to us; and (b) aiding in the prosecution of
the war in Indo-China to a favorable conclusion, without direct
intervention except possibly in the event of Chinese Communist
aggression or of other basic change.
Reduction of Soviet Power (In
addition to relevant courses of action in other sections)
- 44.
- Without taking undue risks, place the maximum strain on
Soviet-satellite relations and try to weaken Soviet control over the
satellite countries.
- 45.
- Utilize political, economic, propaganda, and paramilitary
operations, including controls on East-West trade, against the USSR
and the Soviet orbit, in order to delay the consolidation of Soviet
bloc power, stimulate internal conflicts and reduce the Soviet bloc
military and economic potential.
Establishment of International
Order
- 46.
- Continue active participation and leadership in the United Nations
for realization of the principles and purposes of the
Charter.
- 47.
- Develop sound negotiating positions and be prepared to enter into
negotiations with the USSR if they offer promise of achieving
acceptable modus vivendi, or if, for other
reasons, they appear to be desirable; but recognize that only
enforceable agreements are meaningful and that the value of
negotiation in the foreseeable future may be primarily to influence
world opinion.
[Page 386]
Annex
U.S. Objectives Vis–à–Vis the USSR in
the Event of War
(The following paragraphs are taken verbatim from NSC 20/4, approved in November, 1948. These
paragraphs are currently under review by the NSC Planning Board.)
- 1.
- In the event of war with the USSR we should endeavor by successful
military and other operations to create conditions which would
permit satisfactory accomplishment of U.S. objectives without a
predetermined requirement for unconditional surrender. War aims
supplemental to our peace-time aims should include:
- a.
- Eliminating Soviet Russian domination in areas outside the
borders of any Russian state allowed to exist after the
war.
- b.
- Destroying the structure of relationships by which leaders
of the Ail-Union Communist Party have been able to exert
moral and disciplinary authority over individual citizens,
or groups of citizens, in countries not under communist
control.
- c.
- Assuring that any regime or regimes which may exist on
traditional Russian territory in the aftermath of a war:
- (1)
- Do not have sufficient military power to wage
aggressive war.
- (2)
- Impose nothing resembling the present iron curtain
over contacts with the outside world.
- d.
- In addition, if any Bolshevik regime is left in any part
of the Soviet Union, insuring that it does not control
enough of the military-industrial potential of the Soviet
Union to enable it to wage war on comparable terms with any
other regime or regimes which may exist on traditional
Russian territory.
- e.
- Seeking to create post-war conditions which will:
- (1)
- Prevent the development of power relationships
dangerous to the security of the United States and
international peace.
- (2)
- Be conducive to the successful development of an
effective world organization based upon the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.
- (3)
- Permit the earliest practicable discontinuance
within the United States of wartime controls.
- 2.
- In pursuing the above war aims, we should avoid making irrevocable
or premature decisions or commitments respecting border
rearrangements, administration of government within enemy territory,
independence for national minorities, or post-war responsibility for
the readjustment of the inevitable political, economic, and social
dislocations resulting from the war.