S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 114 Series

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)1

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NSC 114/3

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on United States Programs for National Security

[Page 21]

References:

A.
NSC 114 Series2
B.
NSC Action No. 5753
C.
Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 18, 19514

The President on October 18, 1951, approved the recommendations of the National Security Council (NSC Action No. 575–a) with respect to the FY 1953 national security programs described in NSC 114/2, subject to certain additional reviews and understandings stated in Reference C. Subsequently, the President requested that the departments and agencies responsible for each of these programs, prepare for his information and for the National Security Council, current summary statements of those programs, as approved by the President for presentation to the Congress.

The enclosed current summary statements, prepared in response to the President’s request, reflect his decisions as to the objectives, nature, magnitude and timing of the FY 1953 national security programs, and supersede those contained in Part II of NSC 114/2. Accordingly, the enclosures are transmitted herewith for the information of the President and the National Security Council.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure 1]

Summary Statement No. 1—The Military Program (Prepared by the Department of Defense)

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The following is a statement of the military program for fiscal 1953 as approved by the President and submitted to Congress.

The Objectives and Minimum Tasks which the Program is designed to fulfill

1. The objectives of the Department of Defense program are:

a.
Protection against disaster; and
b.
Support of our foreign policy.

In the course of meeting these objectives, the Department of Defense program is designed to provide, at the least possible cost in manpower and national resources, a maximum deterrent to enemy aggression and, in case war occurs, give the nation a reasonable assurance [Page 22] of victory. However, imposed fiscal limitations will result in postponing until 1956 the full realization of the United States military capabilities originally planned for achievement in 1954.

2. In order to attain the above objectives, the forces listed herein are intended to carry out on an austere basis the following approved basic military tasks:

a.
To provide a reasonable initial defense of the Western Hemisphere and essential allied areas, particularly in Europe.
b.
To provide a minimum mobilization base while offensive forces are being developed.
c.
To conduct initial air and sea offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the enemy’s war-making capacity and to check enemy offensive operations until allied offensive strength can be developed.
d.
To defend and maintain the lines of communications and base areas necessary to the execution of the above tasks.
e.
To provide aid to our allies to assist them in the execution of their responsibilities.

3. The major wartime tasks to be performed by the several Services, and the timing and nature of the operations have generated the bases that have been used for the development of the forces required.

a.
Army and Navy forces, in view of their basic responsibilities, have been developed on the basis of tasks as set forth in NSC 68/45 and listed in paragraph 2 above.
b.
Since the Air Force is responsible for the air defense of the United States, by both defensive and offensive air operations, and since it is also responsible for strategic air warfare (both tasks being D–Day tasks), the forces of the Air Force have been developed to accomplish, under the basic tasks listed in paragraph 2, the following Air Force missions, listed in order of priority:
(1)
To defend, by both offensive and defensive air operations, critical areas in the Western Hemisphere, with particular emphasis on defense against atomic attack.
(2)
To conduct a strategic air offensive to destroy the vital elements of Soviet war-making capacity.
(3)
To assist in the direct defense of the NATO area and the defense of critical areas in the Far East, to include the defense and maintenance of essential lanes of communications and base areas.
(4)
To provide such aid to our allies as is essential to the execution of their responsibilities.
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The Nature, Magnitude and Timing of the Basic Elements Comprising the Program

4. a. The approved force levels to be maintained during FY 1953 are as follows:

(1) Army*

Major Forces, Active Army Reductions from NSC 114/2
Infantry Divisions 16*
Armored Divisions 2*—1
Airborne Divisions 2*
Infantry Regts/RCTs 11*
Armored Regts 5*
Airborne RCTs 2*
AAA Battalions 110*—7
Man-year Strength§ 1,552,000—73,000
End Strength Active Army§ 1,552,000—44,000
Army Reserve Forces End FY 1953
Ready Reserve not on Active Military Service
National Guard 362,000
Army Reserve 580,000
Total 942,000

(2) Navy

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Ships
CV/CVB 12
CVL 5
CVE 10
BB 4(3)
CA/LL/CLAA 19
DD/DDE/DDR/DL 248
SS 110(10)
Mine & Patrol 200
Amphibious 296
Auxiliaries 287
Aircraft
CV/CVB Gps 16
VS Rons 15
HS Rons 4
VP Rons 34
Marine Air Wings 3
ZP Rons 4
Marine Divisions 3
Total Strength
Active Navy 835,875 (End Year ’53)
Active Marine Corps 243,730 (End Year ’53)
Reserve Components
Navy 700,000 (End Year ’53)
Marine Corps 107,773 (End Year ’53)

(3) Air Force

Combat Wings
Strategic Air Forces
Heavy Bomber 7(1)
Medium Bomber 30(8)
Strat Rcn (H) 4
Strat Rcn 6(2)
Fighter Escort 10(2)
Air Defense Forces
Fighter Interceptor 29(4)
Tactical Air Forces
Medium Bomber 2(2)
Light Bomber 5(1)
Fighter Bomber 22(7)
Fighter Day 6(2)
Tactical Rcn 5(1)
Total Combat Wings 126
Airlift Units
Groups
Troop Carr (H) 4
Troop Carr (M) 13(1)
Total 17(1)
FY 1953
Air Reserve Forces 81,735
End Strength, FY’53 Active Air Force 1,061,000
[Page 25]

b. The target dates for the equipping and modernization of the above forces are as follows:

(1) Army

a.
Matériel. Under optimum conditions only can those active forces in EUCOM and FECOM (including Korea) be equipped with combat-worthy matériel by 30 June 1952; a minimum of training equipment only will be available for other elements of the active Army. This situation is created primarily by heavy consumption of equipment and munitions in Korea and extension of the Korean operation beyond the dates previously estimated with resultant depletion in reserve stocks; budgetary and expenditure limitations under a policy of limited mobilization; added impetus on MSP deliveries for NATO pursuant to the Presidential directive (a portion of this at expense of State-side forces); and production difficulties.
b.
Training. The target dates for completion of the training for major units are as follows:
  • By 30 June 1952—18 divisions
  • By 1 Nov. 1952—1 additional Inf. Div.
  • By 1 Dec. 1952—1 additional Inf. Div.

(2) Navy

The approved FY 1953 active forces will be in place and operational from 1 July 1952 (1 January 1953 for Marine Corps forces) on, at manning levels which are the best attainable within the budgeted personnel strengths and which will vary for different units from about 85 per cent to full war strength. Currently programmed modernization of the equipment of these active forces can be substantially completed with the funds provided in the FY 1953 Presidential budget and prior appropriations. However, because of policy decisions taken during the review of the FY 1953 Budget Estimates, dictated in part by the necessity for holding FY 1953 expenditures within prudent limits and in part by the desirability of maintaining expansible production capacity for an indefinite period of years, actual deliveries of modernizing equipment will not in all cases be completed before 31 December 1954. As a further result of the same policy decisions, the acquiring of mobilization reserves has been extended through a longer period with maximum long-range reliance placed upon the principles of industry capacity and production in being. Training, both individual and organizational, will be emphasized throughout FY 1953. In summary, although force levels remain constant, significant improvements in combat effectiveness at those levels are anticipated.

[Page 26]

(3) Air Force

Combat Wings 30 Jun ’52 30 Jun ’53 30 Jun ’54 30 Jun ’55 30 Jun ’56
Strategic
Heavy Bomb 6 6 7 7 7
Medium Bomb 20 22(14)** 27(10)** 30(1)** 30
Strat Rcn (H) 4 4 4 4 4
Strat Rcn (M) 4 4(3)** 6 6 6
Ftr Escort 7 8 10 10 10
Air Defense
Ftr Intercept 20 25 28 29 29
Tactical
Medium Bomb 0 0 0 2(2)** 2
Light Bomb 4 4(3)** 5(4)** 5(3)** 5
Ftr Bomb 11 15(1)** 22 22 22
Ftr Day 0 4 6 6 6
Tac Rcn 4 4(3)** 5(1)** 5 5
Total 80 96(28) 120(15)** 126(6)** 126
Support Forces
(Flying)
Air Lift Units Groups
Troop Carr (H) 3 4 4 4 4
Troop Carr (M) 12 12(1)** 13 13 13

Assumptions and Policies upon which the Program is Based

5. a. The assumption that hostilities in Korea will end on or before 30 June 1952.

b. The policy that the defense build-up, as reflected in the FY 1953 Budget, will be achieved within a framework of partial mobilization which would concurrently:

(1)
Develop forces possible to be maintained and equipped for so long as a period of tension may exist;
(2)
Permit the active forces of the U.S. and our allies to achieve a high state of training and initial equipment as soon as feasible;
(3)
Permit the expansion of our basic industrial potential concurrently with an expansion of essential armament capacity;
(4)
Achieve a high level of production of long lead-time military items as soon as feasible;
(5)
Maintain a continuing level of military output from living production lines over as long a period of time as feasible;
(6)
Safeguard and increase the economic and fiscal strength of the nation as the essential foundation upon which an indefinitely sustained military program must rest.

[Page 27]

Cost of the Program

6. a. The following schedule shows the estimates of the cost of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Defense Department portion of the MSAP Program for FY 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953 (Request) by major categories.

Category Distribution of U.S. Armed Forces Costs and MDAP Program

Fiscal 1950, 1951, 1952 and Fiscal 1953 Request

(Millions of Dollars)

Major Cost Category 1950 1951 1952 1953 Request
I. Military Personnel Costs 4,558 8,154 10,385 10,933
II. Operation & Maintenance 3,749 11,443 12,051 12,223
III. Major Procure’t & Produc’n Costs 2,567 22,696 29,431 21,807
a. Aircraft (1,894) (9,655) (14,941) ‡‡(14,059)
b. Ships & Harbor Craft (45) (769) (1,945) (1,150)
c. Other (628) (12,272) (12,545) (6,598)
IV. Acquisition & Construction of Real Property 348 2,426 3,994 ††
V. Civilian Components 739 844 703 852
VI. Research & Development 612 1,175 1,471 1,711
VII. Industrial Mobilization 94 312 143 81
VIII. Establishment-wide Activities 380 1,131 1,224 959
Total 13,048 48,182 59,403 48,566
Proposed Legislation 1,500 3,500
Total U.S. Armed Forces 13,048 48,182 60,903 52,066
MDAP Allocations to Defense 1,282 4,985 5,106 5,350
Total U.S. Armed Forces & MDAP Allocation 14,330 53,167 66,009 57,416

b. If Korean hostilities do not end by 30 June 1952 it will be necessary for the Department of Defense to utilize such funds as may be available to support sustained hostilities. This may require the submission of a supplemental appropriation request during FY 1953.

c. The build-up of the military program has been stretched out so as to be accomplished within an expenditure limitation of $85.6 billion for the 18-month period from 1 January 1952 through 30 June 1953. This $85.6 billion covers expenditures of Department of Defense funds and the military portion of the Mutual Security Assistance Program. It reflects the Presidential decision that expenditures for FY 1953 for these programs should be less than $60 billion, and adds to this amount the $25.6 billion half-year unexpended portion of the $43.3 billion of expenditures estimated for FY 1952. The funds appropriated for military assistance will be utilized [Page 28] in such a manner as to permit the most advantageous over-all production program which can be attained, taking into consideration the combined needs of the U.S. forces and our allies.

d. Production goals for the current year remain about the same as previously planned, and it will be necessary to double the output of hard goods and construction during the year in order to achieve these goals. Production rates during calendar year 1953 will be somewhat lower than the schedules contemplated in 114/2. Under the present program, maintenance of production on a high plateau will result in greater production subsequent to 1953 than was previously scheduled and a correspondingly higher mobilization base in the event of an emergency.

e. The obligational authority included in the cost table set forth in paragraph 6 a above, for the U.S. Armed Services and MDAP, will result in expenditures of approximately the following amounts in FY 1952 and 1953, (in billions of dollars):

Hard Goods & Construction Other Total
FY 1951 6.8 13.9 20.7
FY 1952 24.0 19.3 43.3
FY 1953 38.0 22.0 60.0

[Enclosure 2]

Summary Statement No. 2—The Mobilization Program (Prepared By the Office of Defense Mobilization)

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[Note: The reports submitted by the Director of Defense Mobilization to the President, beginning on January 1 and April 1, 1951, and monthly and quarterly thereafter,6 should be utilized for a fuller exposition of this summary analysis. The Budget Message to Congress of January 19527 also contains detailed exposition of the fiscal 1953 program which is not repeated herein.

The mobilization program in the over-all sense was not explicitly considered in NSC 114, or in its annexes, since they were closely [Page 29] related to the federal budget presentation. The mobilization program (as distinguished from direct military expenditures) is largely being carried out by private industry, and direct governmental expenditures are a small part of the total program.]8

I. Concept of a Mobilization Program During Cold War

1. The mobilization program, as it was originally conceived in late 1950 and as it will continue into fiscal 1953, has been built on four concepts:

a.
To attain current production rates of military equipment adequate for American forces in being, to aid NATO allies and friendly nations in accordance with our commitments, and to provide adequate military reserve stocks.
b.
To develop carefully planned capacity for output of military matériel in full-scale war, to be held in reserve either as idle capacity in existing plants, as side-by-side plants with those now active, or as dual-purpose plants used, prior to full hostilities, for other products and readily convertible.
c.
To expand our sources of materials, processing and fabricating facilities, and basic industries so that a current program of military production can be conducted alongside a normal civilian economy and so that an enormously expanded military effort could be supported immediately without waiting for further expansion of the industrial base.
d.
Consistent with the foregoing objectives, to maintain a healthy and growing civilian economy as a valuable source of national strength to meet the possible shock of full-scale war.

2. These objectives, as formulated for the guidance of the Executive Branch, have not been altered. Reconciliation of specific conflicts between the objectives, the refinement of precise quantitative goals within each objective, and pressing for the accomplishment of these goals, have required and will require the bulk of the mobilization agencies’ efforts in fiscal 1953.

3. The term “mobilization base” includes both the second and third objectives, and “industrial base” the third only. In this discussion the term “military matériel mobilization base” will be used to describe the second objective. “Industrial base” will be used in discussing the third objective. In fiscal 1953 the distinction will become of greater importance because the problems involved in attaining selectively the two objectives will be more clearly separable than in the first eighteen or twenty months of simultaneous and rapid pushing ahead on many fronts.

II. Current Military Production

4. In terms of the planned military strength in the United States and in other countries of the free world, particularly in the NATO [Page 30] area, the flow of many items of current munitions production (the first objective above) is not yet great enough. Production of particular items will attain the rate necessary and level off at various times, and new models will of course always be coming in. For the program as a whole, expenditures should level off at the end of calendar 1952 and continue level at least two years.

5. In determining the point to which expenditure rates should be raised a choice was involved between short-range and long-range strength. It was necessary to decide on a position on a range between two extremes. One extreme would be to build up strictly military strength as fast as possible by freezing the models and techniques and pouring out today’s arms today even though many categories would rapidly become obsolescent. The other extreme would be to minimize current production. An intermediate position would be a broader and more sustained build-up of current output while concentrating on research, development, and the mobilization base. We would then concurrently be producing substantial amounts of equipment, developing our resources, our techniques, and our production lines for the newer weapons of the future, and keeping our civilian economy as strong as possible for the long pull.

6. Because we and other free nations were girding to defend ourselves, not to attack others, we knew we could not choose the day on which our stock of weapons would be put to test—nor can we now.

7. Therefore, the nation must be strong against an attack which may come at any time over an indefinite future. With such an outlook, our best defense program has seemed to be one of moderate production of current weapons, a continued development of the newer and better weapons, and creator of greater resources and more effective production lines, all at levels which a healthy civilian economy can build and sustain as a long-range program. We have thus placed emphasis on the intermediate position, even though it entails a calculated risk.

8. The result is a production plateau to extend through 1953 and 1954. Through most of fiscal year 1953, however, we must continue to push ahead to achieve the levels required by this “plateau”. Toward the end of the fiscal year 1953 the monthly rate for deliveries and construction put in place is expected to rise to about $3.5 billion. (The rate was $2.4 billion in March 1952). For hard goods only, the monthly rate is expected to increase from $1.8 billion in March 1952 to about $3.0 billion early in calendar year 1953.

9. Nevertheless, on some items, we are already facing the problem of how to schedule continued production to meet the requirements resulting from obsolescence and the need for replacement. [Page 31] For the program as a whole, obsolescence caused by technological advances in matériel could become (probably early in fiscal year 1954) the primary determinant of future production needs. The date of the turning point—from buildup to maintenance—may depend on policy determinations not yet made.

III. Attaining an Adequate Military Matériel Mobilization Base

10. Outbreak of full-scale war would require rapid expansion of production of military matériel above the rate to be reached in a period of partial mobilization. As our current production nears a plateau, increasing attention must be given during 1953 to making ready added production capacity for military end-items beyond current armament needs, as a protection in case of full-scale war. Careful planning, initiative in action, and substantial direct and indirect financial assistance must be the function of government in the attainment of the second objective.

11. Development and maintenance of standby or readily convertible capacity is a necessary but not sufficient step in preparedness. The capacity must be supported by a broadening and strengthening of our general industrial base on which it must rely for raw materials, additional facilities, and, indeed, manpower with the necessary skills and experience. The government’s function in all of this latter area is largely general guidance and direction.

12. The development of standby, partially utilized, or readily convertible capacity for direct military production involves special problems, techniques, and costs to the government not met in expanding and maintaining the general industrial base in an economy operating at a high and expanding rate such as we have had since 1950.

13. Planning for the military matériel mobilization base is only now getting under way. Both planning and action must be accelerated during 1953. The U.S. base must be reviewed in relation to current and future efforts to develop munitions production in the NATO countries and in other areas.

14. Following are some examples of current planning for the military matériel mobilization base. The Air Force had computed, as of early 1952, that a monthly production rate of 86 million airframe weight pounds is required under full mobilization to sustain all-out efforts in global war. This compares with a maximum production rate of 21 million pounds under the current schedule. Production for partial mobilization will in the main be on a one-shift basis. A large part of the increased capacity for full-scale war would be the result of moving to a three-shift operation. The Air Force proposes to arrange the needed additional capacity in three types of plant: (1) plants which are partly devoted to civilian production; [Page 32] (2) separate plants adjacent to civilian production plants; and (3) independent plants not used for civilian production. From 15 to 20 plants are in each category. Contractors are being asked to specify their tool requirements for such plants and to estimate the cost. Obviously, however, initial tool costs represent only one segment of the cost and planning problem involved in maintenance of this standby capacity.

15. The problem of what kind of supplementary industrial capacity to develop is illustrated by the example of the hull of the M–48 tank. Capacity is approved or proposed for only half the planned rate of 2,150 a month. Plant construction has been delayed until further tests on an eleven-piece hull to replace the one-piece hull have been made.

16. Mobilization agencies in accelerating planning and action in developing the military matériel mobilization base in 1953 will seek:

a.
to foster parallel and integrated planning action by the armed services.
b.
to develop facilities suitable for a rapid change to three-shift operations while meeting current requirements by one-shift or other types of reduced operation.
c.
to give particular attention to the manpower and training problem required for a rapid expansion of production both by adding shifts and utilizing the standby capacity.
d.
to acquire or assist industry in acquiring a reserve of machine tools and other production equipment needed for shift expansion or conversion. Particular attention must also be given to the replacement and modernization of tools as it affects the expanded operations.
e.
to assist in developing techniques for maintaining the military matériel mobilization base at maximum readiness; that is, in such condition that full production of military requirements may be obtained within the time that military reserve stocks would be consumed so that tactical operations will not be delayed for want of matériel.

17. In some areas of the economy, actions to achieve the desired military matériel base (second objective) merge into efforts to achieve the industrial base (third objective). The machine tool industry is a case in point. In World War II, and again in this emergency, military production waited while machine tools were designed and ordered and the industry geared up to the needs of military production.

18. To avoid such delay in the future, two things are necessary. Tools must be on hand and the tool industry must also be kept operating at a moderately high level. The problem is immediate because the backlog of orders for some tools is beginning to decline. The point at which this decline should be checked and stabilized [Page 33] must be determined. The initial step is a calculation of specific and realistic requirements by the military services and by important contractors, who have the primary responsibility for identifying the tools that will be needed in full-scale war. Continuing civilian requirements, availability of existing machine tools in the economy, and government-owned reserves, must be taken into consideration. Provision must be made in military budgets for the initial slice where that has not already been done. Congress, industry executives and the public must understand the difficult long-run objectives of the program and be ready to accept and support the necessary cost. Finally, orders must be placed on a realistic basis of needs, and assurances given of their firmness. The machine tool industry is only one of several industries for which rather specific support may need to be given in the coming years to sustain production somewhat above that required by the current demands for the defense build-up and the civilian economy.

IV. Attaining an Adequate Industrial Base

19. The over-all industrial capacity of the United States is the foundation on which current military production and the military matériel mobilization base, as well as a healthy civilian economy, must jointly rest. This capacity was twice as high early in 1952 as it was in 1940. Even more important, a large part of this expansion in the great basic industries has been accomplished since 1945. A major remaining task of the mobilization program is to supplement the enormous expansion which has already taken place. Private industries’ own capital has provided all but a small part of the total expansion. This will continue to be true. Guidance and direction is the function of government in developing an industrial structure capable of supporting a full war effort (the third objective) leaving until the actual war period only those minimum emergency additions which the indeterminate nature of certain full war requirements makes necessary.

20. Expenditures for new plant and equipment in 1951 were at a high level. While capital outlays in almost all manufacturing industry rose from 1950 to 1951, the increases were substantially greater among the defense-related industries. Certain of the defense-related industries, such as chemicals, electric power, and metals, are scheduling even greater capital outlays in the coming fiscal year. These actions are in accord with mobilization program objectives.

21. Two major tools have been used to channel the enormous flow of private capital in the directions desired. One has been the authority originally granted in the Defense Production Act of 1950, to permit an accelerated amortization of facilities in the determination [Page 34] of tax liability.§§ This permission to amortize the cost of added facilities in five years, instead of the ten to twenty-five or more years normally permitted under the corporate tax laws, may operate as a powerful inducement to make decisions to invest in new facilities. If the new facility will have maximum usefulness and earning power during the five years, the total tax liability for earnings from the investment during its life may be lessened. On the other hand, if the new facility continues to have earning power after the expiration of the five-year period throughout its normal physical life, total tax payments may be little altered, since payments in later years would be proportionately larger in the absence of the normal depreciation deduction. However, a future but real inducement to private corporate investors in new plants and facilities is the possibility that prescribed corporate tax rates may be lower after 1956 or 1957; in that event, the five-year write-off would become particularly attractive.

22. Actually, the rapid amortization of new investment over the five-year period has operated to induce additions to capacity to an unexpectedly high degree.║║

23. There is thus a major responsibility to make any additional grants effective in attaining the correct proportions of added capacity over the whole range of American industries. This necessitates the establishment of balanced expansion goals. The Defense Production Administration will be actively engaged in fiscal year 1953 in the task of adjusting and approving expansion objectives. This task cannot be fully completed in the sense of covering each of hundreds of industrial segments. Such determinations of the objectives for expansion are made in cooperation with other government agencies, and after consultation with industry.¶¶

24. A second helpful tool of government, useful in guiding the rate and direction of expansion, is the quarterly allocation of materials [Page 35] going into industrial construction. This will also be used in the light of balanced expansion goals as those are established. As materials controls become less of a limiting factor on private industrial planning and actual construction, this tool will be dulled.

25. Some of the expansions planned by American industries in the next three years are very large. To a considerable degree they represent capacity sufficient to support a future war economy on the one hand, and on the other to support the current output of munitions, new capital investment in tools and equipment, and the requirements of a healthy civilian economy in the absence of full hostilities. The higher of these two requirements is theoretically controlling in determining an expansion goal. Except for some critical raw materials, official Defense full war requirements are often not available, and goals tend to be based on requirements of partial mobilization plus a high level of civilian activity, rather than full war.

V. Healthy Civilian Economy

26. The fourth objective of the mobilization program encompasses achieving the other three while at the same time maintaining a healthy and growing civilian economy as a valuable source of national strength.

27. The present security program is large, but the strain on the economy caused by the program so far has been surprisingly small. Though the impact in the coming fiscal year will be larger, it is well within our economic capabilities. Actually, a larger program would be economically feasible if it were militarily desirable and if political and public support for larger military appropriations could be developed.

28. Since the beginning of the mobilization effort, total gross national product has increased more than have governmental security expenditures. Through 1953 this relationship is likely to continue. Moreover, if total private investment declines as seems possible, more output will be available for personal consumption. Consumer expenditures in 1951, measured in real terms, were only slightly lower than in 1950, but higher than any other recent year. This decline was only partly, if at all, the result of shortages since the demand for many commodities did not keep up with output.

29. The requirements of the defense program, however, did noticeably affect some segments of the economy in 1951. Housing starts declined, less essential civilian construction fell, and passenger cars and other consumer durable goods production was reduced. Credit and other anti-inflationary controls and materials shortages were partially responsible for this decline but falling off in demand also played a part. Rising military requirements for materials, [Page 36] as well as for defense-supporting industries, made necessary, during the first quarter of calendar 1952, contractions in the output of consumer durable goods, and, in some instances, public and private investment, but significant expansion will be possible in the second and third quarters barring severe strike losses.

30. With the expansion of total output, as well as that for key materials expected in the next two years, consumer supplies can, in general, expand beyond any levels previously reached in this country. Such temporary curtailments in limited areas as may be necessary will not involve sacrifices for the general public which can be regarded as severe measured by levels of consumption in 1948–51.

VI. Expanding Production of Raw Materials

31. Underlying all four objectives is the need to provide assured sources of all essential raw materials. The United States is, in whole or in part, dependent upon sources outside its continental boundaries for many key materials—iron ore, manganese, petroleum, wood pulp, natural rubber, industrial diamonds, nickel and certain other alloying metals, copper, zinc, and lead, fibres, and some staple foodstuffs. For some materials, there simply is not enough in the whole free world to meet an unrestrained U.S. demand, including a satisfactory rate of stockpile building. Congress has provided authority in the Defense Production Act for a program of expansion. The program has been developed and is being carried out. When it is completed, it should take care of all but a few problems of shortages. However, shortages of many metals will last through calendar year 1952 and to a lesser degree into 1953, and in some cases it will be 1955 or beyond before requirements are met (i.e., nickel and certain other alloying metals). For a few commodities, such as copper, unrestricted requirements may continue to exceed supply for two or three years, although essential requirements may be met in the latter part of the current year. There will be no single date on which all shortages will be ended.

32. Major responsibility for implementation of materials expansion rests in the hands of private producers, both at home and abroad. Success of government efforts to extend the scope of exploration, the construction of new mining or processing facilities, and the immediate supply from existing sources depends heavily on the actions of private producers. Government stimulation is provided mainly through accelerated tax amortization, long-term contracts guaranteeing “floor” prices, grants for exploration, direct purchases of high-cost output for the stockpile and purchase-and-resale-at-loss operations in particular commodities. Increased emphasis is being and must be given to the expansion of secure foreign [Page 37] sources of supply by both private and governmental undertakings in order that the U.S. may meet its requirements for raw materials in the years ahead. Budget funds required are primarily working capital for the purchase and resale operations, which may or may not result in actual losses.*

33. To meet the four objectives of the present mobilization plan, larger amounts of some materials may be required, paradoxically, than under full war conditions. Sharp reductions in wartime civilian usage could bring this result. In other cases, however, the opposite would occur and demand would sharply increase. In these latter cases, conservation and substitution measures are crucial. Balancing the alternative of conservation possibilities with the concept of ready-but-not-currently-used facilities to increase output after war began (thus treating the problem as part of the second objective) will remain a key problem in planning for this group of materials during 1953.

34. Achievement of a satisfactory position in several materials, for which known and potential free world sources are inadequate under conditions of either defense mobilization or full war, requires efforts to channel demand away either by substitution or other materials (which may either be more expensive or technologically unfamiliar), or by conservation, i.e., use of smaller quantities to achieve the same results. Those cases where the current supply is reasonably adequate but long-run balance is doubtful, or where supply is inadequate under either situation, will receive major attention during the coming year.

VII. Guidance in the Distribution of Materials

35. To sustain day-to-day progress in the attainment of the four mobilization objectives, some government guidance is needed over the flow of materials, to meet current consumption needs, stockpile goals, and construction requirements. The Defense Production Administration is charged with basic responsibility for guiding the use of resources in the economy, and especially of the materials which have a central controlling role in the direction, volume, and pace of industrial output and of the expansion of facilities. In carrying out this responsibility, DPA has followed the policy that the determination of the security needs of the nation is a matter for the Department of Defense, and that the task of the mobilization agencies is to meet the material requirements of that program. In the event [Page 38] those requirements are so large as to interfere very seriously with essential industrial programs, the question would be taken to the President as to whether military or industrial needs would be cut.

36. So long as military demand plus the needs of the stockpile requires the diversion from civilian use of a substantial percentage of the total supply of particular materials the government must take responsibility for control. There are three reasons for this:

a.
There must be assurance that military needs are met. This is a relatively simple problem, once the program is determined, since military orders are readily identified for preferential treatment.
b.
There must be assurance that defense-supporting and essential civilian needs also are met. This is a complex problem involving the maintenance and expansion of industry, the stockpile, the materials sources themselves, the agricultural base, and the transportation and communication services.
c.
There must be a fair division of the remaining supply among less essential needs. This is a difficult problem in reconciling clashing interests, and the Government must perforce take primary responsibility for its solution.

37. Because of the easing of the materials situation in the Spring of 1952, consideration has been given in consultation with industry and claimant agencies to the future relaxation of the Controlled Materials Plan, which governs the distribution of steel, aluminum and copper. Top priority for essential defense projects would still be retained. The intention otherwise is to remove the demand-control aspect of CMP to the maximum extent possible, but to maintain standby control machinery ready for future use if needed. Maintenance of the control function as such is dependent upon extension, beyond June 30, 1952, of the necessary authority from Congress.

38. In addition to the controls exercised on the three commodities through CMP, the Government intervenes in a wide range of other commodities to insure their proper allocation, conservation and end-use. This is particularly important for the nonferrous metals which will continue to be in short supply.

39. Stockpiling—The development of a national stockpile is partially dependent upon the authority for general control over the flow of materials. The policy is now established that controls will not be completely abandoned in any case until stockpile needs are met.

40. Building war-reserve stocks of key materials, owned directly by the Government, rests on the assumption that supply sources outside the United States during full war would be subject to loss or crippling by enemy action, or that these sources plus domestic sources of supply in a full war period would be inadequate to meet enlarged demands. The stockpiling program of the Munitions Board antedates the 1950–52 mobilization effort. (The status of the [Page 39] stockpile is covered in the summary statement on the National Stockpiling Program (No. 5) below.) The stockpile goals will be given thorough review in the coming year, particularly to define various levels of urgency, to eliminate some materials, and to emphasize the particular materials where expansion or purchase programs should be stepped up.

41. In this review the “rating band” to which a strategic and critical material is assigned will reflect a judgment as to the supply position that would exist should total war come in January 1953. After the materials have been assigned to agreed rating bands, determination of the action to be taken beyond present expansion or controlled measures will be made. It is anticipated that these actions may include extra-ordinary programs to expand supplies, development of transportation facilities, encouragement of construction of additional processing facilities to prevent disruption of supply through destruction of one of the limited number of present facilities. The Defense Production Administration will be charged with responsibility to see that there is implementation of the action recommendations.

42. How the four objectives of the program are balanced has been strikingly illustrated in the management of the current purchasing for stockpiles in the past eighteen months. Where necessary to bolster current supply, particularly to permit carrying out expansion programs for new munitions facilities (the second objective) and for additions to the industrial base (the third objective), current output of some materials destined for the stockpile has been diverted to current consumption. In other instances, materials actually in stockpile have been released. The maintenance of a healthy civilian economy (the fourth objective) has also been taken into consideration in these decisions.

43. International Action to Meet Defense Needs for Raw Materials—It became clear, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, that some action in the international sphere was called for to support national efforts to channel the flow of scarce materials to defense and essential civilian needs. In early 1951, the International Materials Conference, (consisting of seven commodity committees, a central group, and a staff) was established. The raw materials selected for coverage by the commodity committees were those which required immediate attention because of the widespread need for them and the great apparent shortage. The seven committees are as follows: Copper-lead-zinc; Cotton-cotton linters; Manganese-nickel-cobalt; Pulp-paper; Sulphur; Tungsten-molybdenum; and Wool.

44. The first task of the committees was to review the facts of supply and demand. The second task of the committees was to determine [Page 40] what, if any, action should be recommended to governments to alleviate the difficulties revealed by a review of the facts.

45. In a number of cases the facts revealed such a disparity between available supplies and the requirements of the free world for defense and essential civilian purposes that the committees recommended distribution according to defense and essential civilian requirements. Sulphur, tungsten and molybdenum, copper, zinc, nickel and cobalt were thus recommended for allocation. These allocations are renegotiated periodically, usually quarter by quarter.

46. Other commodities studied by the committees were not recommended for allocation. Supply and demand in lead and manganese were judged to be about in balance; cotton and cotton linters, while in short supply last year, are now expected to be much easier; the Wool Committee did not agree on the scope of the wool shortage, nor on steps to alleviate it. The Pulp and Paper Committee has recommended small emergency allocations of newsprint to help the press of many countries of the free world continue in operation, but no over-all allocation of newsprint or pulp has been recommended.

47. The share of world supply recommended for the United States has, in every case, corresponded closely with the share the United States secured for itself in the days of free competition for supplies in the years 1948, 1949, and 1950. At the same time, the general acceptance by the governments involved of IMC allocation recommendations has helped to check what might have been runaway price increases in the short materials.

48. It seems clear that efforts to solve problems of shortage or surplus in raw materials must be developed on a basis of genuinely effective cooperation among a fairly large number of sovereign states and their industries. If such cooperation had not been developed, countries might have bargained the raw materials they held or controlled against the raw materials and manufactured goods they needed; but to do this on a narrow bilateral basis would have led only to holding back supplies, reducing levels of production and increasing international animosity. Instead of trading one specific commodity or resource against another, countries must “trade” all commodities in general cooperation for the defense of the free world. Leadership by the United States in supporting this principle will continue to be of prime importance in obtaining a fair share of the free world’s raw materials for the U.S. and in bolstering public support for mobilization in allied or friendly countries of the free world.

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VIII. Manpower

49. A primary problem in the manpower field in fiscal year 1953 will continue to be an accurate assessment of manpower requirements and supply for a mobilization program of varying size and for full war. Under current plans the active strength of the armed forces will increase by about 100,000 to 3.7 million men at the end of fiscal 1953. This further augmentation will not have a serious impact on the size of the civilian labor force. Furthermore, by the second quarter of fiscal 1953, the number of soldiers returning to the civilian labor force is expected very nearly to equal the number of men entering the armed forces. Thus, under the mobilization program currently scheduled, it may be said that the worst impact on the civilian economy of manpower withdrawals for the armed forces has already been felt. Civilian employment including non-defense and defense employment which is now over 61,000,000 will rise to between 62,000,000 and 63,000,000 in fiscal 1953. Civilian employment in defense industries will rise to over 7 million. Barring significant changes in the active strength levels of the armed forces and given the gradual acceleration of the defense production program in fiscal 1953, manpower resources appear to be adequate to meet both civilian and military needs during the year.

50. As time passes the increasing number of men who have been released from the services will swell the reserve forces. This could result in a situation where the main initial complements for expansion of forces in full war would be subject to direct call by the military. Thus it is important that a sound reserve call-up policy be developed which will recognize fully the civilian requirements for manning defense industries in full war.

51. The development of a military material mobilization base (second objective) will also require detailed planning to insure manpower needs can be met in both partial and full mobilization. Ideally, the second objective—literally achieved—would result in creation of a standby pool of skilled employees, trained and ready to step into the expanded production lines of a war economy. This is impossible policywise since it would necessitate idling of many employables for an indefinite period. Encouragement of specialized training programs for workers is a partial answer. Extensive knowledge of available skills potentially transferable from current employment also is a partial answer. Experimentation with the most effective short-period training methods is another.

52. Planning for future manpower needs, plus wide publicity for the resulting aims and plans, will continue in 1953 as a major preoccupation of the manpower agencies.

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IX. Stabilization of Prices and Wages

53. All four of the basic objectives are affected, and their success conditioned, by money costs. Cost-price increases could seriously handicap the immediate procurement program since they would in effect reduce Congressional appropriations and would also impair production incentives. Similarly, inflation could slow down the creation of the mobilization and industrial base by disrupting investment plans which are derived from multiple decisions made by private concerns.

54. After Korea, a speculative boom skyrocketed prices to very high levels; although wages lagged somewhat, they also rose rapidly. In January 1951, after it was recognized that monetary and fiscal controls were inadequate, direct controls were imposed. From that time retail prices remained relatively stable until September 1951 when they rose again slightly until February 1952, followed again by a slight drop. Wholesale prices, being more sensitive in reflecting speculative pressures, fell steadily from March 1951 to April 1952. Wages have risen steadily since Korea and have not shown signs of weakness as yet. However, average weekly hours in manufacturing have declined. Unemployment is still at exceedingly low levels, so that consumers’ disposable income has been maintained at a high level.

55. It is anticipated that in the absence of a further speculative buying crisis, the trend toward weakness which has developed in some markets will continue; but strong price pressures on industrial materials and fabricated products will also continue for the balance of fiscal 1953 and probably as long as military spending and private investment remain at presently projected high levels. Wages will probably continue to rise moderately.

56. When the decision to impose direct price and wage control was made and the general freeze instituted early in 1951, the price and wage structures had been badly distorted by the sudden speculative boom. The first task was to smooth out the imbalances at the lowest levels that were fair and equitable. This involved some rollbacks as well as some increases. In areas where that process is complete we have attempted to hold the line, except in cases of hardship, within general standards established to measure the merit of requests for ceiling increases. While these standards do not need to be and are not as rigorous as they were in full war, it is necessary that they be established at some level and held consistently in order to assure that no industry or business group gets special treatment.

[Page 43]

57. The standards developed to date include the “industry earnings standard”, the “product standard”, and the “essential supply” standard.

58. The industry earnings standard allows industry-wide price relief when the earnings to net worth ratio of an industry falls below 85% of that ratio in the three best years during the period 1946–1949. This standard uses the excess profits tax test and says essentially that so long as an industry as a whole is in the excess profits tax bracket it shall not be entitled to price relief. In the spring of 1952, this standard became an issue in the steel cases where it resulted in denial of ceiling increase requests which were made as a result of the wage increase recommended by the Wage Stabilization Board. The standard has been attacked on the ground that it does not allow sufficient incentive in cases where large expansion is desired and necessary and also that it applies a rigid dollar test to stockholder earnings in a situation where farmers and labor both are on escalators which allow increases with the cost of living and in the case of labor may also include an annual “improvement” addition to wages.

59. The product standard is designed to assure that no industry is forced below the break-even point in producing a particular product line. The essential supply standard is rarely used but can be applied to justify price ceiling increases where necessary to insure supply which is essential to the national defense.

60. Requests for wage increases are considered within the framework of several criteria. Under present policies wage increases are limited to compensation required because of increases in cost of living, correction of inequities in pay scales, operation of merit and length of service systems, establishment of health and welfare plans on a limited scale, and recruitment of workers into defense industries. The increases required by increased productivity or annual improvement clauses have also been approved where they existed before controls. A policy to allow annual improvements in new contracts may be approved in fiscal year 1953 or perhaps earlier.

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61. Since institutional factors of great complexity increase the difficulty of reducing wages to reflect possible price declines, serious profit squeezes can be anticipated during fiscal 1953.

62. Credit control measures taken to date include the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program which aimed at reducing credit expansion in the non-defense areas, and Regulations X and W which applied restraints on housing and consumer durables credit. In response to the softening markets in the Spring of 1952, in many construction materials and most consumer durables, the Voluntary Credit Restraint Program and Regulation W have been put on a standby basis.

63. The softness in some markets has also been reflected in the price control program by the development of a price ceiling-suspension policy. Its purpose will be to keep price controls flexible enough for the presently mixed and changing market situation. Ceiling suspension action will be taken where the market price is “materially below” ceiling and there is no prospect of a need to reimpose the control in the near future.

64. Stabilization activity in fiscal 1953 will center around developing further policy with reference to (a) the market softness which probably will continue, (b) the rising level of wages and its accompanying effect on profits and incentives for investment, and (c) changes in monetary and fiscal measures which may be required by changes in the total economic situation.

X. Protection of the Industrial Base in War

65. An integral part of future mobilization and defense planning will be the problems of potential damage to industrial and economic capacity under war conditions. This is a new element in American planning, as compared with the two World Wars. Calculation of claims upon scarce resources during future hostilities must include the potential drain of enemy-inflicted damage.

66. During fiscal year 1953, there will be a growing emphasis on this segment of mobilization planning, under the leadership of NSRB, ODM and the National Security Council. The Council itself has already taken action in one portion of this area through its Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, which is concerned, among other things, with preattack security and problems of sabotage and personnel risks. Another portion is the “emergency phase” planning and nationwide organization under FCDA, which is also concerned with a number of preventive and damage-reducing measures. Its work is discussed in summary statement on the Federal Civil Defense Program (No. 4) below. A final area of necessary planning and forethought will be the rehabilitation burden following upon attacks, once the immediate emergency phase of an [Page 45] attack has passed. Active development of these phases of the mobilization program will involve a new phase of consultation with communities, industry groups, and local governmental units in the coming year. Here also the problem is not primarily one of current budget appropriations by Congress (except for important portions of FCDA activity), but of integration of effort between private industries or services, local communities and governments, and the appropriate Federal agencies.

XI. Federal Budget Requests in Fiscal Year 1953 to Support the Mobilization Program

67. Just over 1.1 billion dollars in new obligational authority is being requested in FY 1953 to finance the mobilization program (see Table I). The great bulk of the funds requested ($900,000,000) is to increase the borrowing authority of DPA required to continue the expansion and purchase-sale programs being administered by DPA, DMPA, RFC, and the Department of Agriculture. Since some of this amount is for working capital needed in purchase and resale programs, net expenditure may ultimately be much less. A significant fraction is for administrative expenses of the mobilization agencies.

65. This authority plus related new obligation requests for mobilization activities in 1953 total 1.5 billion. This excludes expenditures by the Department of Defense, Department of State, Mutual Security Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, which are budgeted separately. It includes budget authority for the promotion of the merchant marine, defense housing, community facilities and services, and Defense Transportation Administration.

Table I

Direct requests for new obligational authority in the fiscal year 1953 budget are as follows:
Expansion of Defense Production $900,000,000
Other defense production and economic stabilization costs 236,960,000
Defense production activities (Natural resources) 5,500,000
Defense Production activities (Labor) 2,800,000
Total direct mobilization included in National Security Programs $1,145,250,000
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Related programs included in Budget estimate of National Security Programs
Promotion of Merchant Marine $72,543,000
Related defense programs not included in Budget estimate of National Security Program
Defense housing, community facilities and services 325,400,000
Defense Transport Administration 2,800,000
$328,200,000
Grand total direct and related defense mobilization activities $1,545,993,000

69. This direct cost of mobilization represents only a small fraction of investment and expenditure which has been flowing—and will continue to flow—into the mobilization-affected segments of the economy. Private investment is financing the bulk of the expansion of industry necessary to meet defense needs and maintain a high level of civilian production.

70. The aggressive action of private industry to expand capacity has been partly a response to the large and increasing volume of direct procurement by the armed services and partly a desire to take advantage of the provision in the Defense Production Act for accelerated amortization of plants and other incentives. Of equal, if not greater importance, has been the influence of optimistic expectations of the level of business activity over the foreseeable future. All segments of the economy have been affected to a degree. Gross private domestic investment rose to a new post-World War II high of 59 billion in 1951 (see Table II). In 1952 it is expected to decline and may fall further in calendar 1953 as the requirements of the total mobilization program for new capacity and new equipment are gradually fulfilled.

[Here follows Table II, setting forth the actual and projected movements of the gross national product, national security expenditures, and gross private investment between 1950 and 1953 (projected).

[Page 47]

[Here follows Summary Statement No. 3, a 12-page report on the Mutual Security Program prepared by the Office of the Director for Mutual Security. For documentation on the Mutual Security Program, see volume I, Part 1, pages 460 ff.]

[Enclosure 3]

Summary Statement No. 4—The Federal Civil Defense Program (Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)

secret
1.
The Civil Defense Program9 is designed, through the use of an organized and trained civilian population, to minimize the effects of enemy attacks and to insure the retention of our productive capacity and will to fight. FCDA is approaching its objectives through two phases: (1) the planning and developmental phase and (2) the operational phase, which arises during a period of civil defense emergency.
2.
The Federal Civil Defense Administration, as a result of continuing study and analysis, as well as the recent availability of final 1950 census data, has revised its list of target areas used for civil defense planning purposes. The present list, announced on February 4, 1952, includes 191 target areas, of which 67, including 89 principal cities, have been designated as critical target areas from the standpoint of atomic attack. The civil defense plan contemplates organization not only for effective defense of these areas but also for the possibility of attacks on other areas throughout the Nation by atomic, biological, chemical and other weapons. In brief, the plan provides for individual and community self-help, for aid to be made immediately available from neighboring communities when needed through the operation of mutual aid agreements, for mobile support forces to move in on orders from unaffected areas, and for fixed support facilities in the unaffected areas to furnish aid to casualties and refugees.
3.
Progress toward a state of operational readiness is being made, although it is admittedly uneven in the several States and localities, and among the several programs within the total civil defense plan. Local organizations are being staffed, volunteers being recruited and trained, supplies and equipment being procured, mutual aid compacts being concluded, and mobile and fixed support [Page 48] forces and facilities being organized. Perhaps the best index to hard, material progress, however, is the Federal appropriation record, because of its direct relationship to civil defensive strength. That record is summarized in the accompanying table,10 and shown in relation to the estimated total non-recurring program cost. It will be noted that the latter item has increased, largely as a result of the addition of 13 new critical target areas, as indicated in par. two above. For fiscal 1953, the FCDA submitted an original budget request in the amount of $1,041,149,950. Following the President’s approval on October 18, 1951, of NSC Action No. 575–a,11 and in compliance with the directive inherent in that approval, the FCDA submitted a supplemental request which, together with the original submission, would have made possible the procurement of all of the non-recurring items in the total program except a few on which delivery could not reasonably be anticipated during fiscal 1953. The Budget decision to limit the combined requests to a total of $600,000,000, however, necessitates that the completion of this part of the program be substantially deferred, as set forth below.
4.
The table reveals that by the end of fiscal 1952, less than 5% of the required protective items can be in place. If the total amount requested in the Executive Budget for fiscal 1953 is appropriated, an additional 30% of the needed program items can be procured. Under the best of circumstances, however, more than 65% of the total program must be deferred until fiscal 1954 or later. In more specific terms, by way of example, the several programs will have achieved the following degrees of readiness by the end of fiscal 1953, assuming that the requested appropriations are forthcoming:
a.
Medical supplies will be adequate to carry 2,000,000 surviving casualties through two weeks, although only half the necessary improvised hospital equipment will be available. The total program makes provision for two weeks’ care of 5,000,000 living casualties surviving the first 24 hours after attack.
b.
Slightly more than one-half the needed portable pipe, water purifiers and chlorinators and mobile generators will be stockpiled.
c.
60% of the necessary cots, blankets, and cooking equipment will be available.
d.
The national attack warning system will be in place, and each of the 191 target areas will have bell-and-light and radio alert facilities to transmit the alert to an average of ten points within each target area. Two-thirds of the necessary sirens and other public warning devices will be installed.
e.
Necessary organizational equipment for communications will be in place in the 67 critical target areas, in State Control Centers, [Page 49] and in some of the remaining target and support areas. More than one-half of the total requirement, however, will remain to be met.
f.
2350 fire pumpers will be in place, out of an estimated 6000 needed. Fire wardens will have 420,000 portable extinguishers of an estimated 800,000 needed.
g.
Rescue teams will have available 1725 equipped rescue vehicles, and an additional 2025 sets of rescue tools. The estimated requirement is 9600 equipped vehicles.
h.
Through the use of presently adequate facilities, the modification of the maximum number of existing facilities, and a small amount of new construction, protective shelter will be available to 18,150,000 people who need it. No adequate shelter will be available to an additional 15,350,000 people who are normally to be found in areas of likely bomb damage.
5.
Although Federal expenditures by the end of fiscal 1952 will equal less than 5% of the total requirement, there are some hopeful signs in other quarters. States and localities have appropriated nearly 20% of the total amount to be required from them. Approximately 15% of the total estimated requirement for volunteers has been met (exclusive of those who have merely registered, or indicated a willingness to serve). There has been increasing evidence of interest on the part of industrial leaders in adequate civil defense measures in their plants, although it is too early to point to substantial specific accomplishments. A major gain has been the rapidly increasing public awareness of civil defense, the rate of increase in less than a year being unprecedented in the experience of one opinion research group. A major danger, however, has been the growing public faith in the ability of military measures to provide complete security. Morale-building magazine articles and public statements on radar, intercept squadrons, and wonder weapons are giving growing numbers of people a false sense of security and are hurting the civil defense effort. Balancing the gains and losses, however, there is noticeable progress in civil defense. It is reasonable to anticipate, assuming that the funds requested in the Executive Budget for 1953 are appropriated, that the civil defense program will be approximately one-third complete by June 1953, in terms of both material items and trained volunteers. The rate of completion thereafter can only be speculative, depending on the availability of funds.

[Here follow Summary Statements Nos. 5 and 6. Statement No. 5 is a 3-page report on the National Stockpiling Program compiled by the Department of Defense. Statement No. 6 is a 5-page report on the Foreign Information Program prepared by the Department of State. Neither is printed.]

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[Enclosure 4]

Summary Statement No. 7—Foreign Intelligence and Related Activities (Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency With the Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)

top secret

Foreign Intelligence

1. Insofar as possible the intelligence programs of the intelligence agencies and CIA are tied into the President’s over-all program for Fiscal Year 1953, although in many cases indirectly. It should be noted, however, that many of the functions and programs of intelligence must be of a continuing nature quite apart from the specific aspects of any given over-all annual program. Thus the departmental intelligence agencies and CIA, which compose the Federal Intelligence Community, must make certain that the substantive objectives controlling their collection, research, and estimating activities are properly related to the problems posed by the Soviet world and to others which confront the National Security Council. These activities must be so developed and related that the resources of each provide maximum support for the attainment of these objectives. Many intelligence programs have an intimate bearing on one another or are a composite of departmental programs and activities so that the strengthening of our habits and means of collaboration is in a sense a major part of the intelligence program.

2. As a matter of convenience and means of giving an appraisal of the extent to which intelligence programs may achieve their goals for Fiscal Year 1953 within the resources available the following are analyzed below separately:

a.
National Intelligence Estimates;
b.
Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates and intelligence programs for departmental needs;
c.
Current intelligence; and
d.
The collection of intelligence information.

3. National Intelligence Estimates: These Estimates, under the arrangements developed since October 1950, are today the authoritative intelligence opinion of the Government. Through the support of the programs for research and collection discussed below, and with the existing resources employed directly in the estimating program, it is expected that continued improvement in the quality of our National Intelligence Estimates can be expected during the period under discussion.

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4. Research in support of National Intelligence Estimates: “The achievement of the standard of research in support of National Intelligence Estimates, which is our goal, must be viewed in terms of years rather than a limited period such as FY 1953. This achievement is dependent on a sharper definition of the essential research required, on new methods of cooperative effort, and in certain cases on increases in staff.

a.
Political intelligence research: The political intelligence programs of the Department of State are oriented towards the urgent problems confronting the NSC and the policy makers in the Department, towards research-in-depth into the situations out of which the immediate problems arise, and towards new demands for specialized intelligence products, notably in the psychological warfare field. Adjustments have been made, and will continue to be made, in organization and in priorities with a view to meeting these objectives. However, it remains true that the intelligence production resources of the Department are insufficient to meet urgent and specialized needs and at the same time to maintain the research effort essential in the longer term if intelligence efforts directed at immediate problems are to have a sound basis.
b.
Military intelligence as a result of Korea and the threat of hot war is faced with increased demands of an operational nature. At the same time it is faced with responsibilities in support of National Intelligence Estimates. The Military Services will also bear the brunt of the increasing demands of NATO and its commands for tactical and strategic intelligence. Despite efforts to rationalize intelligence research activities to meet these demands, the resources presently allocated to these activities will not permit such demands to be met as they should.
c.
Economic intelligence: It is expected that the coordinated program which has been launched for the systematic analysis of Soviet and satellite economies will have made considerable progress during this period. It should provide a better, though by no means complete, appraisal of the long-range capabilities of the USSR and should suggest possible avenues of U.S. counteraction by exposing economic vulnerabilities. By the end of FY 1953 the cooperative research in this area under the guidance of the Economic Intelligence Committee should have made satisfactory progress toward defining the major problems, identifying the available and relevant information existing in the Government, developing new methods of research and producing a substantial number of studies which will provide a firm foundation for National Intelligence Estimates and reliable departure points for continuous survey and appraisal of Soviet economic activity. The needs of intelligence support for economic warfare have not yet been clearly defined though it is believed they will be of a magnitude beyond the existing resources of the intelligence community.
d.
Scientific and technical intelligence, to a certain extent like economic intelligence, is a responsibility of the agencies in respect of their individual needs. The intelligence community is seeking to define clearly the areas of responsibility in this field and will develop mutually satisfactory arrangements for pooling of resources requiring [Page 52] joint effort. This planned cooperative attack on vital scientific and technological intelligence problems should result by the end of FY 1953 in considerable improvement. Notable success in these respects has already been achieved in the coordination of atomic energy intelligence.
e.
National Intelligence Survey: The production schedule for NIS has been revised during the last year to take into account changed world conditions. It is expected that the goals established for the coming year will be substantially met with the existing resources available for this program. This year’s program will be the equivalent of eight complete country national intelligence studies. This will leave approximately 60% of the high priority areas to be completed.

5. Current intelligence programs are of course related to both operational and strategic needs of the departments and the President and are keyed to the responsibility of intelligence to provide warning of imminent attack by hostile powers and of situations abroad affecting U.S. security. For purposes of this warning the collaborative efforts of the current intelligence resources of the departments and CIA are brought together through the IAC Watch Committee. It is expected that by the end of FY 1953 the individual and cooperative efforts should be more sensitive in the detection of hostile threats as well as current trends which necessarily have a bearing upon National Estimates and policy matters.

6. Collection: The guidance for those resources devoted to collection activities both overt and covert should be materially improved by virtue of the foregoing programs although the nature of the Soviet society will greatly limit our achievement. Programs are being designed to exploit more effectively existing U.S. governmental and other available sources of overt foreign intelligence information which have hitherto gone unexploited. Although by far the greatest quantity of intelligence information can be collected by overt means, much of the most critical information needed can be obtained, if at all, only by clandestine means. The objective here, because of the difficulty of the target, namely, the Soviet orbit, must be to define clearly the most important targets. United States efforts in clandestine operations are relatively new and the number of personnel trained and qualified as is necessary for successful operations is small. Clandestine intelligence, therefore, must be viewed in the long perspective of 15 to 20 years and our objectives for the Fiscal Year 1953 call for the elimination of marginal targets and greater concentration on the significant targets, the building up of operational bases and nets which inevitably require a great deal of time and are frequently faced with setbacks arising from counterespionage activities of the enemy or detection and exposure of our effort. It is recognized, of course, that the military [Page 53] services have urgent tactical intelligence requirements which also require the use of clandestine collection activities. By the end of this period considerable strides will have been made toward isolating the most essential elements of information which must be collected by covert means giving proper attention to priorities. There has been some success in the collection of intelligence on the Soviet and satellites by clandestine technological and scientific means. The achievement of greater success in this field is to a great extent dependent on the establishment of arrangements for cooperative concentration of efforts.

7. With respect to the foregoing discussion of U.S. intelligence programs, it should be noted that our intelligence system is confronted by certain limitations which will inevitably result in a margin of uncertainty both in our estimate and in our ability to give early warning of attack. These limitations arise from the security consciousness and practices of the Soviet State; the high state of war preparations of the Soviet; their flexibility in making decisions and the speed with which, under their system, such decisions can be implemented. It should be emphasized that the best collective effort of which the United States intelligence community—or any other—is capable cannot guarantee adequate advance warning of a surprise attack.

Related Activities

8. Related activities which have been undertaken or are planned in support of the President’s programs will require increasing financial and manpower resources. Related to other programs the financial requirements are not large. However, their size in relation to the intelligence aspect of the CIA budget is such that special methods of presenting it to Congress may have to be developed. A major difficulty with respect to manpower arises from the difficulty in recruiting and training officers for this work. Personnel needs will require increased reliance on Armed Service personnel.

[Here follows a concluding Summary Statement (No. 8) dealing with the Internal Security Program prepared jointly by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.]

  1. Copies to the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Commerce, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Defense Mobilization, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.
  2. For documentation on the NSC 114 Series, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, pp. 1 ff.
  3. See footnote 1, p. 5.
  4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. i, p. 237.
  5. For documentation on the NSC 68 Series, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. i, pp. 126 ff.
  6. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  7. Reductions, resulting from budgetary and expenditure limitations, in force levels contained in NSC 114/2. [Footnote in the source text.]
  8. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  9. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  10. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  11. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  12. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  13. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  14. A portion of these units will be maintained at reduced strengths dependent upon the situation during FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  15. Includes West Point cadets. [Footnote in the source text.]
  16. Includes West Point cadets. [Footnote in the source text.]
  17. FY 1953 Presidential Budget provides for 270,000 to be in pay status. [Footnote in the source text.]
  18. Number in parentheses indicates units, within total number, to be maintained at reduced strength. [Footnote in the source text.]
  19. Number in parentheses indicates units, within total number, to be maintained at reduced strength. [Footnote in the source text.]
  20. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  21. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  22. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  23. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  24. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  25. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  26. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  27. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  28. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  29. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  30. Number in parentheses indicates units which will not become combat effective until after FY 1953. [Footnote in the source text.]
  31. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  32. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  33. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  34. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  35. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  36. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  37. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  38. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  39. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  40. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  41. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  42. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  43. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  44. The total above represents the numbers of units equipped by the designated times. The number in parentheses, included in the total, represents the numbers of wings which will not be modernized by that time. [Footnote in the source text.]
  45. Includes $3,500 for the extension of lead time for aircraft procurement from an average of 18 months to an average of 24 months. [Footnote in the source text.]
  46. Included in 3,500 figure under “Proposed Legislation”. [Footnote in the source text.]
  47. The reference reports of the Director of Defense Mobilization are in the President’s Secretary’s file at the Truman Library.
  48. President Truman’s Annual Message to Congress on the Budget, Fiscal Year 1953, of Jan. 21, 1952 is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1952–53 (Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 63–117.
  49. Bracketed note in the source text.
  50. Outlays under certificate are currently running at over 30 percent of the country’s total investment by manufacturers in new plants and equipment. [Footnote in the source text.]
  51. As of May 1, 1952, the total value of industrial investment thus aided exceeded $19.5 billion. Another $7.0 billion in applications were pending at that time. The Treasury is now preparing more detailed estimates of the “cost” of the rapid amortization program, in terms of lowered revenue. However, rough calculations, based on the value of certificates issued as of the end of the month of March 1952, show a probable revenue loss of $600 million this fiscal year (1952) and $1 billion loss in each of the next several years, up to perhaps five years. Varying certain assumptions in such a calculation can alter the results substantially. [Footnote in the source text.]
  52. Expansion goals to be reached between 1953 and 1955 have been established by DPA for just under 100 major commodities and products. Important commodities for which goals have been set include steel, pig iron, manganese, chrome, lead, and a number of nonferrous metals. Aluminum, copper, and numerous other commodities are still under study. [Footnote in the source text.]
  53. For fiscal 1953, an increase of $900 million in borrowing authority to cover raw materials and other expansion requirements has been requested of Congress in addition to the existing borrowing authority of $2.1 billion. Ultimate costs to date of the total expansion program are estimated at only $200 million, but a much larger sum is tied up in working capital funds. [Footnote in the source text.]
  54. In a recent major dispute in the oil industry, the Wage Stabilization Board recommended something more than could be justified under the specific wage policies established heretofore. It was made on the ground that it was “fair, equitable and not unstabilizing.” It should be noted that in its disputes function the Board has not been required to keep within established specific policies.

    The oil recommendation taken together with that in steel will undoubtedly act as something of a target for future negotiations, although every effort has been exerted to make clear to labor and industry that every case must be considered separately on its own merits and only after the fullest free collective bargaining possible. [Footnote in source text.]

  55. Further documentation on the Civil Defense Program is in the NSC 131 Series, “Evacuation of Civilian Population in Civil Defense,” May 19 and June 12, 1952 in the S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 131 Series.
  56. Not printed.
  57. See footnote 1, p. 5.