Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

190. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida¹

Washington, June 16, 1954, 2050Z.

05142. Refs: A. LINC 3908; B. LINC 3909.²

1. Guidance provided ref A makes excellent sense to us even though³ it appears from here you may be overly optimistic specifying 18 June as date completion pre-D-day air supply and activation minimum commo capability.

2. We agree generally with your analysis of situation as set forth ref B and have no policy objection to scheduled timing. Agree specifically that crux whole issue continues to be position WSBURNT armed forces concerning which we must have clearer favorable indications before kick-off.⁴ This supersedes all other reasons for additional delay although achievement some degree operational readiness would appear essential prerequisite for action.

3. If evidence concerning position of military indicates it solidly behind regime there is no doubt in our mind that Calligeris’ forces in exterior and if possible in interior must be restrained from mounting attack since attack under these circumstances would result in certain defeat accompanied by most harmful consequences affecting all aspects WSBURNT problem. This is one thing we must avoid and all efforts must be devoted to this end including imposition of specially devised restraints upon Calligeris, etc. For use in arguments to convince Calligeris and associates it should be brought home to him that his own inability to produce reception parties, etc. reveal great weakness and possibly non-existence his claimed internal organization and he should be told that all support will be withdrawn if he persists. At same time the alternative course envisioned in Lynade’s paper⁵ should be forcibly advanced as the only conceivable course of action under the circumstances. Calligeris should be assured of continuing support on this basis and no other.

4. Meaning of paras 4 and 5 ref B not clear to us, and in present form seem somewhat inconsistent with para 3. Para 5 could be read as meaning that failures of adequate readiness preparations and other foul-ups are justification for committing all resources to action. Please clarify.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 12. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
2. Neither printed. (Both ibid., Box 6, Folder 1)
3. The words “even though” were inserted by hand and Wisner’s handwritten initials appear next to the line in the margin.
4. Influencing the army leadership was considered so critical that field officers were instructed in radio broadcasts to “Emphasize in above broadcast in every program that army our friend, on side of people and Christianity, against communism. Even if a few officers or men, temporarily obeying orders from their commie superiors, should turn against liberation movement, do not consider entire army our enemy, appeal to soldiers honor, common sense, love of fatherland, Christian faith.” (Telegram from PBSUCCESS Headquarters to Broadcasting Unit, June 16; Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 92, Folder 2)
5. The paper was not found.