Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 87
Memorandum of Teletype Conference, Prepared in the Department of the Army
Nr. DA TT–5193
Subject: Truce Negotiations.
Conferees:
| Washington: | Tokyo: |
| Gen J L Collins JCS | Gen M B Ridgway CinC |
| Gen C L Bolte CSA | Lt Gen D O Hickey CofS |
| Mr L Merchant State | VAdm C T Joy COMNAVFE |
| Mr C E Bohlen State | Maj Gen L C Craisrie Dep CGFEAF |
| Mr P H Nitze State | RAdm L[A]A Burke NAVFE |
| Lt Col J B Matthews G3 | Brig Gen E F Hammond SigO |
| Capt (USN) H M Briggs ACOFS NAVFE | |
| Col D T Galloway JSPOG | |
| Col G W Hickman Jr JA | |
| Col F W Moorman SGS | |
| Brig Gen EK Wright G3 |
Washington
DA–1
[Page 947]Top Secret
To Gen Ridgway from Gen Collins:
Re your C 51575 and C 51500 State & JCS feel that every effort should be made to arrange a meeting of principal negotiators as soon as possible in order that the real intentions of the Communists may be revealed. We fear that present discussion, limited to Liaison Officers, is not likely to lead to any such indications or in fact to any further meeting of principals. We therefore suggest that you give consideration to proposing an extraordinary meeting of principal negotiators at a bridge over the Imjin River or other suitable place in vicinity of front lines.
It is believed here that great importance would attach to initial position adopted by UNC Delegation at such a meeting. We feel that it would be inadvisable to resume negotiations as to a demilitarized zone on old bargaining position as indicated in your C 51500. To do so would constitute in effect reversion to original UNC negotiating position of last July and retrogression from position established in sub-delegation meeting August 22. Many advantages would accrue to picking up at point where talks broke down August 23. However in order to avoid prolonged discussions as to factors involved in establishing a demilitarized zone we feel that Adm. Joy should at once make a proposal in writing and on a map as indicated in Par 1, JCS 82085.1 If the Communists do not arbitrarily reject our proposal but indicate they need time for consultation, the principals might then proceed to discuss site for next meeting.
(End DA–1).
Tokyo
FEC–1 TT 5193 26 Sep 51.
Confidential.
To JCS from CINCUNC.
1. The following message was delivered to UNC Liaison Officer by Communist Liaison Officer at Pan Mun Jom at 0700I this date:
“Colonel Kinney,
“Senior Liaison Officer,
“United Nations Command Delegation.
“Your message received at 6:30 P M September 25 is noted.
“Under instructions from our Senior Delegate, I proposed to your side, at the Liaison Officers’ meeting on September 25, that the Armistice Conference be resumed at 10:00 AM September 26. The Delegation of our side is prepared to meet with the Delegation of your side in the Kaesong Conference Room at 10:00 AM September 26. I am waiting for an answer to this proposal from your side.
[Page 948]“As you are aware, my commanders have proposed to your Commander-in-Chief that Delegations of both sides should resume negotiations in Kaesong immediately without the need to discuss conditions for resuming the Armistice Negotiations. I am only authorized to consult with you about the date and time for resuming the Armistice Conference. Should your side be averse to resuming the Armistice Conference at 10:00 AM September 26, it is requested that you inform me to that effect specifically, and I shall be prepared to continue to consult with you at 9:00 AM September 26, about the date and time for resuming the Armistice Conference.
“Chang Chun San Senior Liaison Officer, Delegation of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers.”
2. UNC Liaison Officer is replying to the above message as follows:
“I shall meet you at 1000 hours today in accordance with my message to you last night”.
3. See my msg C–51563.2
(End FEC–1).
Tokyo.
FEC–3 TT 5193 26 Sept. 51.
Confidential
Ref para 2 FEC–1.
Upon receipt of notification that UNC Liaison Officers were coming to Kaesong at 1000 hours today Colonel Chang replied by radiotelephone as follows:
“Since you did not come at 0900 AM I am prepared to meet with you at 1000 AM today to discuss date and time for resumption of Armistice Negotiations by the Delegates of both sides at Kaesong”.
(End FEC–3).
Washington
DA–2
Top Secret
From Gen Collins to Gen Ridgway.
Purpose of this telecon not to reach decisions reference resumption of negotiations but to exchange ideas that may serve as basis for later decisions and instructions. When you have had time to consider material in DA–1 we would like your views.
(End DA–2).
FEC–2 TT 5193 26 Sep 51.
Top Secret
Official.
1. Appreciate this opportunity for exchanging views which at this time is highly important.
[Page 949]2. The subject of first priority is an acceptable arrangement for the meeting of the principal delegates. This must be accomplished before serious consideration of UNC position on item 2, Agenda, is pertinent.
3. I consider that the maximum concession that can be made toward effecting a meeting of the principal delegates is to propose a meeting of the delegates at some place between the battle lines (under no circumstances at Kaesong) for the specific and single purpose of discussing conditions mutually satisfactory for resumption of the Armistice talks.
4. Believe our 51500 failed to make clear that it was our intention in our first substantive meeting to present to Communists on a map a proposal which embodied those aspects most favorable to the Communists as presented in the sub-committee meeting of August 22nd.
5. This actually complies with a request made by Commies at subcommittee meeting at which they expressed confusion at the many alternative adjustments informally discussed by UNC sub-committee. It would in our opinion pick up discussion at point where talks broke down on 22 August.
6. To do otherwise would indicate to Communists that they gained great advantages by long recess they initiated.
7. Following seem to be determining factors in reaching decision on your proposal that at next succeeding meeting of the principals we furnish map depicting the demilitarized zone four kilometers in width with its median line as the present line of contact, and propose this as the solution.
First, to comply with your instructions that we must avoid agreement on any zone which endangers our retention of the Kansas line the four kilometer zone described above would be our absolute minimum position.
Second, since it would be the minimum position, it must be made clear to the Communists at or about the time this proposal is made, that it is a “take it or leave it” proposal. In other words, it will be an ultimatum on which we must be prepared to break.
(End FEC–2)
DA–3
Top Secret
Par 7 of FEC–2 indicates that you consider present front line with slight variations, the minimum position in advance of Kansas that will insure security of Kansas. This is contrary to impression we obtained from your C 69346 of 21 Aug. In JCS 82085 we left to your discretion the selection of the median line. We thought that even if you designated the present front you would still have several positions [Page 950] back of the present front, except along the Imjin River, which could provide adequate security for Kansas.
Will you please clarify this point?
(End DA–3)
Washington
DA–4
Top Secret
What site do you have in mind as alternative to Kaesong?
(End DA–4)
Washington DA–5
Top Secret
What conditions do you propose to insure neutrality of site and avoid recurrence of trumped-up charges of violations?
(End DA–5)
Washington
DA–6
Top Secret
We feel that single issue of our refusal to return to Kaesong area would be disadvantageous to us as definitive breaking point of armistice negotiations. We cannot tell whether or not Communists would in fact break on this point but we do not believe we should continue to insist on change of site as precondition for meeting of principal delegates to point where risk seems great that the Communists will break.
We share your concern for safety of UNC delegation but we must consider problem of insuring that world and US opinion accept as fact that Communists bear full responsibility for the final break if it comes. Some risk to UNC delegation necessarily present unless site is within UN lines which Communists would be most unlikely to accept. Moreover break of 23 August came on Communist charge of incident they fabricated and not because of threat to UNC personnel. Fact that UNC liaison officers have just met in Kaesong without any apparent lack of security also would be element in problem of presenting to public a new break based on our fears of danger to negotiators.
Accordingly we emphasize importance of full delegations meeting promptly under minimum safety conditions acceptable to you in order to get into hands of Communists in writing modified position on line of demarcation as indicated in par 1, JCS 82085.
(End DA–6)
Washington
DA–7
Top Secret
[Page 951]One factor in our respective attitudes on negotiating tactics at this time is estimate of Communist attitude to armistice. We take it that you are satisfied that “an early armistice is for the Communists a matter of urgency.” We here are still in doubt as to degree to which in fact Communists desire or feel need for armistice. Hence we think it important to ascertain their intentions by move on our part as suggested in DA–1.
(End DA–7)
Washington
DA–8
Top Secret
Because of transmission difficulties and your probable need for further time to consider points raised in DA–1 2–3–4–5–6 and 7 we are now terminating this telcon. You can cable your views in time for our consideration Wednesday Washington time.3
Again we wish to make clear that purpose of this telecon was to exchange ideas and not to reach definite decisions. We will furnish reply to your C 51575 after consultations with JCS, Sec Def & State tomorrow.
(End DA–8)
Tokyo
FEC–4 TT 5193 26 Sept 51.
Will comply with your instructions.
(End FEC–4).