Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 72: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
flash

C–51347. Ref your JCS 82147.1

1. In my detailed analysis of the Communist msg of 19th Sep it appears obvious that the Communists desired to establish certain principles and facts and to induce a reply which could be made to appear as agreement thereto by the UNC. The Communist msg contained the fol explicit and implied statements:

a.
The UNC is guilty of violations of the Kaesong Neutral Zone Agreement prior to 10 Sep in the air and on the ground.
b.
The above violations (by the UNC) made it impossible to cont the progress of the Kaesong negotiations.
c.
The UNC is at last willing to assume a responsible attitude toward violations of the Kaesong Zone which attitude it had not assumed heretofore.
d.
The UNC is responsible for the delay in the armistice talks.
e.
Incidents occurring prior to 10 Sep must be settled in a responsible manner through an organization to be established for that purpose. (This refers to alleged violations rejected by the UNC which we consider closed issues.)

2. The foregoing is the prelude to the phrase: “If you agree” which precedes the Communist proposal for a meeting of liaison officers, and has major significance. Careful study of the Communist msg convinced me that merely to agree to a meeting of liaison officers would involve the UNC in tacit agreement with all points of the entire msg.

3. The meeting of liaison officers to set the “hour and date” of resumption of meetings was to be contingent upon my agreement with the Communist requirement, inter alia, that an appropriate organization [Page 930] review the “unsettled” incidents. The Communist msg implies that past incidents must remain a live issue until the UNC accepts responsibility for them. This would thus be a continuing source of vicious propaganda against us. Since all alleged incidents occur within en-held territory, he has the continuing opportunity to manufacture evidence, human and material. I consider it absolutely essential that the question of cont indefinitely the inves of these past incidents be turned down in most emphatic terms. My msg made it clear that I was not agreeing to any such review. In effect, my msg represents a counter-proposal which rejects the principle of review of incidents which I consider closed.

4. I earnestly recommend your reconsideration of the directive in para 2 of your 82147. In my opinion the omission of the second and third paras of my proposed msg will completely abrogate the position Ave have established and will assist the Communists in their efforts to maneuver the UNC into the position desired by them.

5. With reference to para 1 of your 82147. The date of 24 Sep was proposed as the earliest date by which, in my opinion, the Communist liaison officers could be instructed by their delegation in view of the fact that my msg was in effect a counter-proposal rather than an acceptance of their terms.

6. With reference to para 5 of your 82147. My representatives have been carefully instructed in this regard and the way will be kept open for any nec shifts to alternative measures.

7. Rqst your comment earliest.

  1. Dated September 21, p. 927.