Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 70: Telegram
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)1
operational immediate
JCS–82085. Reur C 69346 and JCS 99477.2
1. If present discussions on arrangements lead to a renewal of substantive talks on terms of armistice in Korea this may provide us with an opportunity to start negotiations off on a somewhat different line. Specifically, we believe that it would be advantageous for UNC delegation to put forth in writing proposal that a demilitarized zone not less than four kilometers in width should be established, with the median line specified by you on an accompanying map. JCS feel that this median line should be established definitely by you to avoid quibbling over what is the line of contact since this shifts daily.
[Page 925]2. After discussion with State we feel there is genuine negotiating and propaganda advantage in introduction at first substantive mtg of a new proposal rather than return to reiteration of our previous position, which would in all probability merely provoke a reiteration of Communist position. These considerations are based upon experience with Communist negotiators in other conferences. There is generally apt to be a period of fluidity folg a Communist initiative such as in this case Kim Il Sung’s ltr to you suggesting resumption.
3. Furthermore, experience has shown that oral proposals or explanations are not apt to influence the govt or govts directing Communist negotiators and that proposals in writing are the only sure way of getting clearly to source of decision what we have in mind. If rejected by Communist delegation, text of your written proposal could be made public and would be convincing evidence of reasonableness of our position in these negotiations as contrasted with Communist intransigence and bad faith.