Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/9–1751

Memorandum for the Files by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)

top secret

[Washington,] September 17, 1951.

Just before his departure for Ottawa,¹ the Secretary outlined to Mr. Matthews and Mr. Nitze certain ideas he had regarding a new approach by General Ridgway to the Communists regarding the resumption of negotiations. The attached draft message in this sense was approved by Mr. Matthews on the morning of September 15, whereupon Mr. Nitze and I went over to discuss it with General Bradley. General Bradley expressed himself as being in agreement with it and arranged to have copies distributed to the other members of the Joint Chiefs with a view to their considering it on September 17. General Bradley expressed the view that if this produced no tangible results we should at the end of about a week’s time then take the step General Ridgway has recommended of withdrawing the immunity from attack which the Kaesong neutral zone now possesses.

Meanwhile, General Ridgway has transmitted to the Communists his message of September 17, which to a considerable degree appears to compromise the utility of the attached draft.²

Livingston T. Merchant

[Attachment]

Draft Message by Ridgway to Nam Il

secret

We have had a great deal of controversy on alleged violations of the neutral zone. We on our side have made every effort to prevent any violation of the neutral zone and to trace every bit of information which would shed light on whether forces under the UN Command have been responsible for any violation. In the one instance where we have found such information, I reported it promptly. The tone of the accusations from your side and the nature of the evidence advanced in relation to the charges made lead us to doubt whether you have a similar point of view.

The important thing, however, is to get on with the armistice negotiations. If you on your side will affirm your determination to guarantee the neutrality of the neutral zone, there is no reason why negotiations should not proceed. For my part, I will repeat my guarantees that we will take every measure to insure that no forces under control of the Unified Command violate our agreement with respect to the neutral zone. Everyone on our side is fully informed of my orders and understands my desire to proceed promptly with negotiations.

We have suggested that a new locus for negotiations be found, or that joint teams continuously inspect and report on any alleged violation. These suggestions have not been accepted. I now repeat them.

I propose that our representatives should meet, either to settle on new arrangements for further meetings or else to renew discussions of the issues involved in arriving at an armistice. I await your reply.

1. See footnote 1, p. 906.
2. Telegram Tosec 14, September 18, to Mr. Acheson in Ottawa, not printed, informed him of the Department’s view that General Ridgway’s message of September 17 to the Communist commanders had undercut the utility of the attached draft message. General Ridgway’s message had been sent before the Joint Chiefs of Staff could consider the draft message. (740.5/9–1851)