Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/9–1451

Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] September 14, 1951.

I assume that you would wish to keep as brief as possible any discussion of Korea at the Tripartite discussions this afternoon and accordingly I give below a brief outline for possible use. It is a compression of what you said to Mr. Morrison.

(1) If we achieve an armistice, we envision promptly starting political discussions which would be confined to the search for political settlement of the Korean problem. Our political objective remains a unified Korea with maximum assurances against renewed invasion or subversion. Only if we secured a satisfactory settlement would we be willing to consider discussing other Far Eastern problems. We have not crystalized our thinking on the exact form of the conference but in general we believe that the UN should be represented by a small delegation or commission and that the ROKS should participate. We also believe that it would probably be necessary and desirable to have the Soviets and the Chinese Communists participate since they are Korea’s land neighbors.

(2) Unhappily, the prospect for an armistice is discouraging and hence we must consider courses of action to be followed in the event of a breakdown of the negotiations.

Such a breakdown, the responsibility for which would rest on the enemy, would probably have to be regarded as evidence of a willingness on the part of the Soviets to assume increased risks of an extension of hostilities. In light of the massive Communist build-up in Korea, we must expect a heavy offensive from the enemy.

We believe that General Ridgway should have complete freedom of maneuver on the ground, at least as far as the neck of Korea, and that he should be free of any restraints on bombing targets within North Korea, including the Yalu River dams. Prohibition against invasion of Russian or Manchurian air space would remain in force.

If, however, the enemy should launch a massive air offensive against our forces. General Ridgway would report immediately to Washington for instructions (enabling consultation) unless there were a breakdown in communications or some other emergency situation which required that he retaliate against the enemy air bases in order to protect his forces.

We should press on with the organization and training of ROK troops and continue the training of the Japanese police force.

Finally, in the UN field:

(a) General Ridgway should immediately make a full report;

(b) The UN should reaffirm its determination to resist the aggression;

(c) An effort would be necessary to secure additional contributions of troops; and

(d) The United States should press for additional economic measures against China, looking toward a complete economic blockade. The imposition of a naval blockade is probably politically infeasible; from the military point of view, however, a naval blockade of Communist China is both feasible and highly desirable. The US should seek agreement within the UN or unilaterally with as many nations as possible to prohibit their ships from calling at Chinese ports and to accept assistance from the UN in enforcing such prohibition.

1. The memorandum was transmitted through the office of Ambassador Jessup. A manuscript note on the source text by Mr. Merchant indicated that it was used as a talking brief by Mr. Acheson at the tripartite meeting on September 14; see infra.