795.00/8–251
The Counselor of the British Embassy (Tomlinson) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Merchant)
secret
Washington, August 2,
1951.
Dear Livy, I enclose a copy of the telegram
about which I spoke to you on the telephone this morning giving the
views of our Chiefs of Staff on certain aspects of the negotiations at
Kaesong.
[Page 768]
With reference to the point made in the second paragraph the Foreign
Office will now be aware that Admiral Joy has, in fact, given broad
hints that minor concessions might be possible provided that the general
position taken by the United Nations negotiators is accepted as a basis
for discussion.
Yours sincerely,
[Enclosure]
Telegram From the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs (Morrison) to the British
Ambassador in Washington (Franks)
secret
[London,] August 1, 1951.
Korean Armistice Talks
The Chiefs of Staff agree generally with the discretion which General
Ridgway has been given to make concessions. They do not think that
it would be militarily sound to accept the northern edge of the
Kansas Line as the southern extremity of a demilitarised zone. The
Kansas Line is the main defensive position and they consider it
essential that there should be sufficient space between it and the
demilitarised zone to enable effective patrolling north of the Line
to take place.
2. If the negotiations should break down on this particular issue it
is essential that the responsibility should be placed on the Chinese
and North Koreans. As General Ridgway has discretion to make limited
concessions on the lines mentioned in your telegram under reference
it seems to me important that an indication of these intentions
should not be delayed so long as to lead the Communist negotiators
to the definite conclusion that Admiral Joy’s present proposals
represent our last word. The time when such an indication should be
given must, I fully realise, be left to the men on the spot but I
hope this point will not be overlooked.
3. Please speak to the State Department further on these lines.
