Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 43: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, July 9, 1951—3:28 p. m.

JCS 95864. From JCS for CINCUNC eyes only. Personal for Ridgway.

1. Ref JCS 95841,¹ State Dept has received msg² from Sebald indicating that he is proceeding to Munsan at your request to act, together with Amb Muccio, as your pol advisers.

2. Consider here that such arrangement may have serious drawbacks even though we understand they will not participate in actual discussions. While we do not want to take any action which will hamper you in your negotiations, we believe every effort must be made to confine discussions to mil matters connected with armistice terms.

3. We feel that presence of Sebald and/or Muccio would invite impression that talks are to go beyond mil basis. The time for political participation is after conclusion of armistice.

4. In addition, Sebald has been thoroughly associated with SCAP and strictly Japanese subjects; we are most anxious not to connect Japanese Peace Treaty with Korean problems.

5. We do not concur in the presence of Muccio or Sebald at Munsan. However, if you consider pol adviser essential at this stage, suggest you consider use of Bond³ and Lightner⁴ who could be designated as liaison personnel and therefore would not attract the same attention or publicity as would Sebald or Muccio.

1. The text of this message, sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway at 11:13 a.m. on July 9, read as follows:

   “Consider it questionable for you to use Sebald or Muccio as advisers at this stage of negotiations. Full msg follows.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 42)

2. Not printed.
3. Niles W. Bond was First Secretary and Consul at Tokyo in the Office of William J. Sebald, the Political Adviser to SCAP.
4. E. Allan Lightner was Counselor of Embassy at Seoul.