Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/4–1851

Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, April 18, 1951—11 a. m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (15). Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, and Nitze were the principal State Department representatives, with Mr. Gleason sitting in for the NSC Staff. For the Joint Chiefs, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg attended, but Admiral Sherman was not listed as a participant.

[The first brief paragraph of the text deals with the question of Yugoslavia.]

Korea

Mr. Rusk: To take up the political side first, the general feeling abroad that the negotiating situation has somehow improved is, in our opinion, incorrect. There is, as you know, a considerable sentiment abroad that the dismissal of General MacArthur has opened the way for a peaceful settlement. We have told our friends abroad to be careful in their analysis of this problem. They have tended to regard General MacArthur as a block to a peaceful settlement, whereas we do not think that we have ever blocked a peaceful settlement in any way. However, the change in command is stimulating new approaches to the Chinese Communists. The Good Offices Committee is now trying to see whether it can get an answer from Peiping to the approach it made some weeks ago. Others are in touch with the Soviet Union to see whether the Soviets have anything to say. We do not yet know how to evaluate the North Korean statement.² At a first reading, it does not look promising. However, there are difficulties in translating this document, and we have not yet had a chance to study it carefully. There was an interesting editorial in Pravda this morning. It is the first official indication of the Soviet line on the dismissal of General MacArthur. The line seems to be that we set out to attack China and that when we found that this was an impossible venture we relieved General MacArthur in order to cover ourselves. The interesting thing about the editorial is that it says, in effect, that we are not going to attack China. The implications of the editorial may be more important than what it actually says.

Mr. Matthews: Of course, it is too soon to jump to conclusions.

General Bradley: Of course, the Soviets change a man when they change a policy.

Mr. Rusk: We should remember, however, that it was a little remark by Stalin which opened the way to the settlement of the Berlin blockade.³ The ambassadors of the nations participating in the Korean war have been fairly quiet lately. However, if the situation gets more complicated—if, for example, the Chinese Communists continue to withdraw and if we continue to move north—we are likely to have political problems once again.

General Collins: We may have trouble deciding what to say to General Ridgway.

Mr. Rusk: We will have no trouble with the ambassadors if the Chinese Communists do undertake a big offensive. We will not have a political problem if our forces build a defensive line. We may, however, have a large political problem if the Chinese Communists realize that they cannot obtain their political price for a settlement and act as they did in Greece. If they let the fighting peter out, what should we do? What are the implications for our ground forces? I remember that Gromyko, Hector McNeil, and I talked about the Greek problem.⁴ We did not get anywhere because the fact of our discussions became known prematurely, but it soon became evident that the Soviets were going to let the Greek campaign peter out.

We will also have a big political problem if the Chinese Communists launch a heavy air offensive. Governments of the other U.N. countries have pointed out the difficulties they will have in this eventuality. They will have to take governmental decisions. We will have to keep consulting them although we will not give an inch on our right to make a decision here if and when the attack comes and if there is no time for consultation. This raises the question whether your Air Force people in Korea could brief their colleagues from other governments on the air situation. For example, could you brief the Royal Australian Air Force on the air build-up so that the government of Australia would be kept currently informed? Or do you have to handle this problem through channels here in Washington?

In summary, there is nothing of significance to report on the negotiating situation. We have made contacts of various kinds, but there have been no responses to date. Secondly, if the Chinese Communists pull back, what course of action do we follow and what do we say about it to other governments? Thirdly, if the Chinese Communists make a big attack including air, what can we do to give the other governments advance information and what reaction do we make to the attack?

General Bradley: We have been considering here in the JCS whether we should give a complete new directive to General Ridgway which would cancel all his preceding directives. He is now operating under a directive to kill all the Chinese he can while taking prudent measures to protect the safety of his troops. If there is any chance of this thing petering out, it will require us to let them withdraw so that the fighting can peter out. If we kept after them they could not let the fighting come to an end. Of course, they could withdraw all the way to the Yalu. We could not follow them that far in any event because it would lengthen our line of communications too much. If the thing is to peter out, we have got to stop at some point.

General Collins: We have got to give General Ridgway political guidance. For example, from the political standpoint, how far north is it satisfactory for us to go? Are we going to stabilize and hold elections and create a government for Korea except for the part of Korea which we do not hold? One political factor which had been in Walker’s⁵ mind all the time was the course of the main railroad line. Because of the way this line is laid out, it is a very sensitive point and one which is hard to protect.

Mr. Rusk: If we should say to you that the principal military mission for the indefinite future is to provide reasonable security to the Republic of Korea, would that kind of a mission be feasible? If this should be your mission, at what point could you break contact with the Chinese Communist forces?

General Bradley: The present line is about the best one we could have. It is the strongest line from the defensive point of view unless we went far north—which would so increase our line of communications as to offset the advantages of the shorter defense line on the ground.

General Vandenberg: From the point of view of the air force, we would prefer the present line, or, alternatively, the present line with the right flank moved up to Wonsan. Either of these two lines would give us the depth we need to carry out our air attacks.

General Bradley: The reservoir cuts out about ten miles from the present defense line. If there is any chance of a negotiated settlement or of a petering out, we should know it now for we are at a good place to stop.

Mr. Matthews: There is considerable difference between a negotiated settlement and a petering out—there will be no negotiations if the thing is allowed to peter out.

General Collins: In Greece the outside forces withdrew. If that happened here, I feel sure that the South Koreans could handle the North Koreans, but they cannot deal with the Chinese Communists. They are still afraid of the Chinese Communists.

Mr. Matthews: Do I understand you correctly that a breaking of contact, either at the present line or with the right flank extended to Wonsan, would not endanger the security of our forces?

General Collins: As now deployed, our forces can, I believe, hold whatever the Chinese Communists can throw at them. Before General Ridgway moved up his forces, there was a gap of about 90 miles on the west which worried us considerably.

General Bradley: He ran into heavy resistance in moving up in the west. Four Chinese Communist divisions and one North Korean division opposed him, and had to be driven back before he could clear up the area around Seoul.

Mr. Matthews: Do you have any idea what the purpose of the big smoke screen was?

General Bradley: Apparently it was to cover their withdrawal. We thought at first that it might signal preparations for an attack. They employed this tactic once before, but there has been no attack and so the purpose was probably to cover a further withdrawal.

General Vandenberg: We want to remember that the Russian Air Force is getting experience in tactics and technique. They are using this Korean war as they did the Spanish Civil War. They are bringing in one unit after another and then withdrawing them and bringing them back into the Russian Air Force where they can train others in what they have learned. The smoke screen might have been laid down to determine how it would affect our close support operations. In my opinion, there is still a large danger of an attack. I would like to address my remarks for a moment to Mr. Rusk’s point about lining up our allies. In my view, it will not help to talk with the Australian representatives here. Their air force general in Korea attends all our briefing sessions and must be in touch with his government. The problem we have here in Washington is to persuade these governments that we believe that the air build-up is being made with serious intentions. The U.K. is ready to sacrifice the brigade it has in Korea if that is necessary to save the British Isles from attack. However, we cannot sacrifice nine divisions for that purpose. We have got to insist that these governments look at the problem from our point of view. Even though they could afford to sacrifice the small units they have in Korea, we cannot afford to make such a sacrifice. As long as they continue to build air fields and to employ Chinese Communist forces, the enemy poses a serious threat. The Russians are edging into this thing little by little. There is talk now about a volunteer air force. That could be a Russian air force. The Russians have 4,000 aircraft in the area. They could use half of that if they thought it could do the job. They could mount an offensive which could seriously upset us. We need earnest efforts to persuade our allies that an air offensive could be serious. We cannot handle this thing on a wait-and-see basis as the U.K. desires. The Russians have the capability which we have got to take account of We hope that it will not be used, but we have got to know what we are going to do if it is used.

General Bradley: The British will not give you the answer you want. They are going to wait and see what develops.

General Vandenberg: But we have got to push them to give us an answer.

General Collins: I agree, but I don’t know how we can push them unless we are sure that they are adequately briefed. The British and the Australians are briefed, but I am not sure that the others are.

General Vandenberg: The British are the main obstacle.

General Bradley: The U.K. is now asking us for our order of battle in order to discuss this problem in the Cabinet. This request scares us on security grounds. Our present decision is that we should not provide this information. However, the British say that they cannot make up their minds without all the facts which bear on the situation.

Mr. Nitze: I have had a further conversation with Sir Oliver Franks. He is disturbed about how to report to his government. In our first conversation, we indicated that we had not yet decided to react in the event of an attack; and, in our second conversation, we indicated that we had decided to react. I told him that the U.S. is responsible for the unified command and that the lack of a decision is tantamount to a decision that we would not react promptly. I also told him that because of our responsibility we had to be in a position to decide what reaction to make. He then said that he thought that he could present our point of view to his government, but he was disturbed that a decision had been taken in advance of the receipt of British views.

General Collins: Has the difference between our commitment and their commitment been fully exposed?

Mr. Nitze: Yes, it has been.

General Collins: That is important because in my view General Vandenberg’s point is valid. We do have a big commitment whereas the others do not.

Mr. Nitze: We are in a better position with the British now that we have informed them that we are not going to leave a gap in this matter of deciding how to react. We are prepared, of course, to discuss the best way of reacting with them if we can.

General Bradley: We told them that we were thinking about it before we took our decision, but we cannot wait if an emergency arises.

Mr. Matthews: However, if there is time, it would be very helpful if we consult. It will be helpful to the U.K. if they can say that the decision was a joint one.

General Bradley: If the attack comes during the day, we could get a decision here in 30 minutes.

Mr. Nitze: We should preserve our right to make a decision, if necessary, but we should also consult, if possible. It is very important to have the U.K. with us, particularly if we get into a general war.

General Vandenberg: If they try to get the enemy’s order of battle in the air from us, there are a couple of points which ought to be clarified. I feel that the British have been looking at this from a ground point of view. There is a different perspective when the problem is looked at from the point of view of the air forces. If a concerted attack is made, it can do heavy damage in four to five days even if it peters out thereafter. Regardless of whether the order of battle shows 800 planes versus 2,500 planes, we have to remember that 800 present a real threat until we take retaliatory measures. Eight hundred planes can inflict destruction and disruption until they are knocked out. Therefore, the figures carried in the order of battle are not so important as they seem at first thought.

Mr. Nitze: I have been somewhat annoyed by the position the British have taken regarding passive defense measures. I don’t know quite what to say in order to get that point off the record.

General Bradley: They have made quite a point of that.

General Vandenberg: It would take a good deal of time to disperse our forces, to build new fields, to obtain more anti-aircraft, and so forth. Probably these measures are four to five months from completion. If the attack with the forces now being built up is imminent—if it comes in two to three weeks—there is very little we can do to improve our defensive measures in that period of time.

General Collins: We should ask the U.K. for anti-aircraft. We cannot send any more.

General Bradley: There are only two anti-aircraft batteries in Korea and in addition to our own. One is a light British battery, and one is a light Turkish battery. We have about nine battalions and four extra batteries.

General Vandenberg: That is about what they have around Andung.

General Bradley: It does seem to me that we need to prepare a new directive for General Ridgway which would cancel the others. One of the main questions we have to deal with is the question whether we stop about where we are now in order to let them peter out if they so desire.

Admiral Davis: He is already under instructions not to cross the 38th parallel in force without referring the matter to Washington.

General Bradley: We can say that we are about on the 38th parallel now. Our casualties are very light in view of the fact that we are still killing quite a few Chinese Communists.

Mr. Nitze: From the political standpoint, it looks as though the present position is about as good a one as we can have. I do not know about military factors—the morale problem and so forth—but from the straight political standpoint it is a good position.

General Bradley: General Ridgway has sent us a message requesting us to grant him certain authority in the event of a Soviet attack against the Far Eastern Command.⁶ We have always agreed that we should get out of Korea in that contingency. General Ridgway asks for authority including authority to withdraw and to redeploy the forces engaged in Korea for the defense of the Far East. His request includes all U.N. forces. It thus raises a new question for we have never considered what we should do with any forces other than our own.

General Vandenberg: Where are these forces going to go? The Navy will have a terrific problem in the event of a forced withdrawal. It will increase the Navy’s problem if it has to take these forces to Okinawa or some other distant point.

General Bradley: We cannot commit U.N. forces to the defense of Japan without the permission of other governments.

General Collins: If I were General Ridgway, I would pull out the U.S. troops first and would use the other U.N. troops to cover the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

Mr. Matthews: I would not favor an approach to other governments on this problem at this time.

General Collins: I agree.

General Bradley: We are planning to inform General Ridgway that he should inform us of conditions at the time and await instructions prior to ordering the withdrawal of his forces. We are also planning to tell him that pending further instructions we cannot plan to use U.N. forces outside of Korea.

Admiral Davis: General Ridgway is just trying to get himself lined up to meet any emergency which may arise.

Mr. Nitze: Your proposed reply sounds all right to me.⁷

Mr. Matthews: I agree.

General Bradley: Should we extend our briefing to governments other than the Australian and British governments? Would this involve a sacrifice of security? What is your view, General Vandenberg?

Mr. Nitze: I think that the whole problem will fall into place if we get the British in.

Mr. Matthews: I don’t think there is much pressure from anyone else.

General Vandenberg: I think we should concentrate on trying to get the British to understand our problem.

Mr. Nitze: Shall I press Sir Oliver in further meetings with the British to consider this problem?

General Bradley: I am not sure we should press him yet. I think we ought to wait until he gets some new instructions.

General Vandenberg: Air Marshal Tedder can see the implications of this problem, but his government holds him under a tight rein.

General Bradley: The British Chiefs cannot recommend a course of action to the government until the nature of the attack is clear.

General Vandenberg: The British Chiefs also understand the difference between their commitment and ours, and since they have important political objectives which they are trying to accomplish, they are just sitting back.

General Collins: We have to maintain our position that we can take whatever decision is necessary. We cannot be in the position that we have to consult with our allies for Congress would “blow its top” if we were under any such limitation. Does the U.K. understand that?

Mr. Nitze: We all agree that we have to maintain our right to decide. We should try to get an understanding with them of the conditions under which we would have to react even though they will still want to consider the problem of reacting in light of the specific situation.

General Bradley: If this happens, we ought to be able to get in touch with them in 20 minutes, and Sir Oliver should be able to get us an answer in an hour’s time if the attack comes at the right time of day. We should consult with them if we can. If we can get ahold of everyone, we should do that. What we now have is authority to act in an emergency. If the President is in the White House and if the Secretary of State is in his office, we will, of course, check again with them. We can assure the British that we will consult with them if it is at all possible, but we must make clear that we will not be able to wait 24 hours.

General Collins: Another problem is that even if their answer is in the negative, we are still going to have to react.

Mr. Nitze: That is right. But, of course, we will have to recognize the consequences. If we decide and act unilaterally, we are going to have to face the consequences of unilateral decision and action.

General Collins: Those consequences aren’t too bad. In the event of war, we are going to have to carry the load out there in any event.

Mr. Nitze: But it does affect the use of U.K. bases in the event of general war.

General Collins: If general war comes, the U.K. will come into it.

General Bradley: We might just have a Pacific war.

Mr. Nitze: Sir Oliver has expressed his personal view that an attack on Japan would mean a general war.

General Bradley: I suggest that the JCS consider the problem of a new directive to General Ridgway, and that you in State also think about it. Then we could get together late this week or early next. General Ridgway is edging forward rather fast. He is not going to run way up north and leave his flank exposed, but I think he is going to need a new directive soon.

1. The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants. A complete set of these meetings is in the files of the Policy Planning Staff: Lot File 64D563.
2. Reference is to a communication, dated April 15, to the President of the U.N. Security Council from North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Hen En (U.N. document S/2092/Corr. 1). This message, after a lengthy list of alleged atrocities committed “by the Americans and Syngman Rhee followers”, concluded with a demand that the United Nations settle the Korean question in conformity with the wishes of the World Peace Council, which, at its meeting in Berlin in February, had called for the settlement of the Korean problem on the basis of withdrawal of all foreign troops and a conference of all concerned countries. For documentation on the World Peace Council, see the compilation on United States response to the Communist peace offensive in volume iv.
3. For related documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 643 ff.
4. For documentation on these talks, see ibid., vol. vi, pp. 227 ff.
5. Reference is to Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker, Commanding General U.S. Eighth Army in Korea, who had died in an accident on December 23, 1950.

6. The text of General Ridgway’s telegram C–60308 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated April 17, read:

   “Request JCS grant CINCFE the following authority in event of Soviet attack against the FEC: a. To initiate withdrawal at my discretion of UN Forces from Korea; b. To utilize redeployed UN Forces in defense of the FEC” (JCS Files)

7. The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway’s message of April 17 was sent out on April 19. In it, in addition to the above points, he was informed that he should not plan on using other than American and ROK forces against a Russian attack pending further instructions. See James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, a volume in the series United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 383.