357.AK/4–1351: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

1401. For Hickerson from Gross. Re meeting with Grafstrom and Nervo re GOC. I met Grafstrom and Padilla this morning at their [Page 345] request. On afternoon April 12, Rau requested meeting with GOC at which he outlined following views:

March 17 Panikkar reported to New Delhi of his impression received from Peiping Vice Minister Foreign Affairs that Chinese Communist Govt might be interested in discussing possibilities peaceful settlement in Korea, but were deeply suspicious of motives of UN and US in Far East. At that time, according to Rau, Panikkar received indication in Peiping that there was no likelihood of change in the Peiping position or of further answer to Panikkar “for two or three weeks.”

Rau expressed view to GOC that developments of past few days, particularly relief of MacArthur and President’s speech, formed an excellent basis for new approach to Peiping by Panikkar, either on behalf of GOI or on behalf of Asia-Arab group as a whole. Rau was therefore prepared to recommend to GOI that Panikkar be instructed to make prompt approach to Peiping Foreign Office, pointing out to latter that developments of past few days should serve to remove doubt as to UN desire to terminate conflict in Korea and to remove suspicions as to designs of US or UN in Far East. Rau thought Panikkar might urge upon Peiping desirability of responding to Entezam’s unanswered communication of February 14. Rau also proposed to GOC that Panikkar might advise Peiping that Entezam was prepared to agree that a four power conference would be convened, consisting of US, UK, USSR and Chinese Communist Govt. Such a conference would seek to arrange a cease-fire in Korea. If a cease-fire were arranged and put into effect representatives of the four powers mentioned would proceed to next order of business, which would be to agree to the composition of a larger conference and to prepare the agenda for such larger conference.

Before taking any action, Rau wished reaction of GOC and requested latter to communicate with USG to ascertain our views.

I undertook to transmit foregoing immediately to Department and requested GOC reaction as of interest to Department.

Grafstrom and Padilla believe that some step is desirable, provided it is not of a public nature. However, they agreed with my personal and tentative reaction that it would be most undesirable and dangerous to go as far as Rau suggested. In other words, they perceived misleading and dangerous possibilities if Panikkar were to get into discussion, even on a most tentative basis, of questions involving the convening of a conference, its composition or its agenda. On other hand, GOC believes it might be useful for Panikkar, after pointing out that developments of past few days should wholly allay unfounded suspicions of Peiping, to urge Peiping to respond to Entezam’s communication. GOC feels this might be useful not only as an additional pressure upon Peiping but also because it will leave UN in stronger diplomatic position if such an approach were rejected by Peiping than if no such step were taken. I stressed and Padilla and Grafstrom agreed, that we should discourage public approach or public appeals at this time.

[Page 346]

GOC most anxious to obtain urgent reply and I agreed to see Grafstrom at Lake Success at 5:00 p. m. today. [Gross.]

Austin