795.00/4–1151
Memorandum of Conversation, by Robert E. Barbour of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Subject: Briefing of Ambassadors on Korea
| Participants: | Australia | —Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary |
| Belgium | —Mr. Rothschild, Counselor and Mr. Callebaut, Attaché | |
| Canada | —Ambassador Wrong and Mr. Herbert Norman | |
| France | —Mr. Daridan, Minister Counselor | |
| Mr. Millet, Counselor | ||
| Great Britain | —Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor | |
| Greece | —Ambassador Politis | |
| India | —Mr. Kirpalani, Minister | |
| Netherlands | —Ambassador van Roijen | |
| New Zealand | —Ambassador Berendsen | |
| Philippines | —Mr. de Castro, First Secretary | |
| Thailand | —Ambassador Wan | |
| Turkey | —Mr. Esenbel, Counselor | |
| Union of South Africa | —Ambassador Jooste | |
| United States | —FE—Mr. Rusk | |
| UNA—Mr. Hickerson | ||
| EUR—Mr. Allen | ||
| FE—Mr. Ogburn | ||
| FE—Mr. Barbour |
Mr. Rusk said that he had some very informal remarks based on first impressions of the day’s events which he would like to pass on [Page 331] to the members of the group. He said that under the arrangements by which the President had appointed the Commanding General, Unified Forces in Korea, he had relieved General MacArthur of this command and appointed General Ridgway in his place.1 This would mean, unfortunately, that General Ridgway would not be able to spend as much time in Korea as formerly since he would also be Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, Far East; etc., as well as the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command. From our point of view, it was extremely valuable to have one military leader in the field dealing with the related problems of Japan and Korea. It had been anticipated for several months that should there have been some development preventing General Ridgway’s being able to continue in command of the Eighth Army, General Van Fleet would take command. From this it would be seen that the appointment of General Van Fleet as Commander of the Eighth Army was not a decision made on the spur of the moment. Although General Van Fleet was not as well known as General Ridgway, he had had extensive military experience including the command of military operations in Greece and was known to be aggressive, hard-hitting, and capable.
Mr. Rusk said that the decision to relieve General MacArthur had been made with extreme regret. As a military leader he had served with distinction for 50 years and enjoyed great public confidence. It was therefore very regrettable that such a distinguished commander should prove unable to carry out the responsibilities imposed by both the United States and the United Nations. He said that we hoped that the personal discussion of General MacArthur would soon die down, permitting us to get down to the basic problems confronting us.
Mr. Rusk emphasized that it was very important to understand that the change in military leaders in the Far East represented no change of policy. On the contrary, the fact that General MacArthur had been relieved would indicate that the United States Government was determined to carry out its present policies. We still desire an early Japanese peace settlement. There was no change in our attitude toward the Peiping regime or in our determination to take a firm line with respect to threats to security elsewhere in the Far East. He said that he hoped that the change in command would not be misinterpreted; any speculation that there would be a change in these policies was groundless. We had requested our mission in New York to notify the Secretary-General of the UN of the change in the Unified Command, and Mr. Hickerson added that this was done in the usual routine manner.
With regard to the proposed statement on Korea, Mr. Rusk said that the question was whether a statement should be issued, whether it [Page 332] should be a statement of individual or joint objectives, or whether it should be held for further consultation and exploration with other groups such as the GOC. He said that it was the working level view of this government that there was no longer any particular requirement for a statement as such, but we might want to consult further on this subject. It was also possible that a talk to the American people might have to occur. If such a talk were given, the Administration would not speak as the UN and would leave the UN position in status quo, he stated.
Mr. Rusk said that any speculation that the relieving of General MacArthur represented a consolidation of our policies and interests in Europe rather than in the Far East was entirely unjustified. We had permanent problems in both areas, and the change in Tokyo was in no sense a shift in emphasis.
In reply to Ambassador Jooste’s inquiry as to whether a domestic address for the American people would be made, Mr. Rusk said that it was becoming increasingly evident that the people desired a statement on Korean policy and that one would probably have to be made.2 In any case we would be very careful not to jeopardize the UN policies with regard to Korea.
Ambassador Wrong believed that there existed an urgent need for a restatement of our objectives in Korea, particularly in view of the recent statements from Tokyo which seemed to contradict stated UN policies. The form in which such a statement might be issued was entirely immaterial. He also said that it was quite possible that the North Koreans and Chinese Communists had a sincere and deeply rooted distrust of United States and therefore of United Nations objectives in Korea, although the removal of General MacArthur might greatly clarify our aims. He asked whether it was not possible that in the near future some means might not be found to end the fighting through the Good Offices Committee or through some other medium. Mr. Rusk said we believed that any public or private approaches to Peiping now would probably have as little effect as other recent approaches had had. It was believed that the Communists would make at least one more military effort to achieve their goals before being willing to sit down and talk. He conceded to Ambassador Wrong that we should not fail to explore all possibilities but questioned the value of a spate of public offers. Upon Ambassador Wrong’s asserting that we should not overlook the fact that some substance had been given to Chinese fears, Mr. Rusk observed that while something might be done to diminish Chinese mistrust of us, something might also be done to diminish our mistrust of them.
[Page 333]Ambassador van Roijen predicted that his government would feel that the issuance of a statement such as the one discussed would be useful in order to redefine our aims in Korea and to ensure that nothing had been left undone to end the lighting.
Mr. Rusk Observed that it was very difficult to find a line on which a disengagement would be safe, particularly since we cannot announce the location of such a line without giving the other side a safe haven.
In reply to Mr. Kirpalani’s question whether the establishment of a definite UN line across the peninsula would have an effect on future operations, Mr. Rusk replied that it would largely depend upon the enemy’s capabilities, intentions and actions and upon other military factors which might exist at that time.
Ambassador Jooste inquired whether it was not true that the establishment of a unified Korea was more of a political objective than a war aim and whether it might not be that the North Koreans believed that the UN was trying to impose unification upon them by force. Mr. Rusk replied that the other side was aware that any serious attempt to settle the military situation in the vicinity of the 38th parallel would receive serious consideration. He said that we were still faced with basically irreconcilable aims. He also explained that while the political and military objectives differed, the serious effect which the formal abandonment of the principle of unification would have on the South Koreans would have a bearing on the military situation.
In answer to Ambassador Jooste’s question whether a restatement of the broad aims of the United Nations in Korea would not have an improved chance of eliciting a favorable reply from the Communists, Mr. Hickerson said that as was well known this had been done in January, and the Peiping Government had flatly rejected our offer to negotiate.