Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 2

UNP Files: Lot 59D237

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Berry) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] August 21, 1951.

Subject: India–Pakistan Relations—Kashmir, for Review at the NSC.¹

The following is for use in a review of the Kashmir problem for the NSC:

During August there has been no relief of India–Pakistan tension. This tension became acute when, with Indian approval, plans were announced to form a constituent assembly in Indian-held Kashmir to determine the future “shape and affiliation” of the state, and culminated in mid-July with the concentration in the Punjab of 90,000 Indian combat troops separated by ten to twenty miles from 46,000 Pakistan combat troops. (This is in addition to Pakistan–Azad and Indian troops facing each other along the cease-fire line in Kashmir and on the borders between East and West Bengal.) Contrary to statements by Mr. Nehru, our military intelligence reports that India has reinforced its strength in Kashmir. Although both Prime Ministers have said they will not launch an attack on the other country, their recent speeches have been more bellicose than before, and both have pledged never to give up Kashmir.

Although we doubt that either country desires war, under this tense situation it is possible that some untoward incident might lead to hostilities. India now occcupies the most desirable part of Kashmir and is confident of its strength; the Government of Pakistan is aware of its comparative military disadvantage but is under pressure to resort to war to prevent a fait accompli in Kashmir. Elections for the constituent assembly will be completed by the end of September. These elections will probably precede somewhat Dr. Graham’s report to the Security Council on the results of his current efforts to help solve the Kashmir impasse. It is likely therefore that a crisis in India-Pakistan relations will come in mid-September.

We are considering means whereby the probability of armed conflict may be reduced, including the use of either the present military observers in Kashmir or the machinery of the UN Peace Observation Commission to observe the military situation in the Punjab and the sending of Presidential messages to Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan if the situation worsens and no alternative arises. We believe Security Council action is unnecessary at the moment because a Council meeting at this time might hamper Dr. Graham’s possible success through a further hardening of attitudes by the participants and because action already taken by outside countries (Tab A) might have had some restraining effect.

In case of hostilities we would urge an immediate cease-fire resolution by the Security Council.

We are not sanguine that Dr. Graham will succeed in effecting a demilitarization of Kashmir through agreement between India and Pakistan, but his report may contain recommendations which offer hope that some progress toward a settlement can be made. We are inclined to believe that if, by the end of September, Pakistan has hope of progress toward a settlement with UN support, Liaquat Ali will be able to resist those in Pakistan who favor gambling all on a military adventure.

Continuing effort is being devoted to consideration of future steps, including in particular what should be done if Dr. Graham does not succeed in obtaining agreement on demilitarization. No decision has been reached as yet on this. We continue to desire the UK to “take the lead”. (Tab B lists certain possibilities.)

We do not contemplate additional UN action with regard to India-Pakistan relations while Dr. Graham is on the scene as the agent of the Security Council and so long as it appears that both governments remain disposed to avoid open conflict.

Tab A

Action Recently Taken by Outside Countries With Respect to Kashmir

1. UK discussion with India and Pakistan when the troop movements become known in mid-July.

2. An offer by Menzies of Australia of good offices which was accepted by Liaquat and rejected by Nehru.

3. An expression to both governments of our deep concern.

4. A further approach by the UK urging a withdrawal of troops in the Punjab and intimating the availability of British good offices.

5. Expressions of interest by both the Burmese and the Indonesians in an easing of tension. (Quashed by Mr. Nehru)

6. A Canadian expression of concern to Nehru on August 10.

7. A proposal by France that it associate itself with US–UK in future efforts to relieve tension.

8. Expressions to us by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand of their concern and their wish to help in removing the threat of war.

9. A reported Iranian approach to India and Pakistan.

Tab B

Possible Future Lines of Action—Kashmir

1. A resolution by the Security Council embodying the recommendations which Dr. Graham may make or a variant of them.

2. General Assembly consideration and expression of opinion in regard to the approaches previously taken by the Security Council and the General Assembly’s attitude on the assumptions and attitudes of both parties. We cannot assume, however, that General Assembly opinion adverse to the Indian position would, of itself, exert sufficient pressure to cause Nehru to adopt a more reasonable attitude. Consequently, it may be advisable to couple this with other action.

3. A request to the International Court of Justice to render an opinion regarding the legality of the act of the Maharaja of Kashmir in acceding his state to India. We are doubtful of the wisdom of this step since considerable time would elapse before a decision would be made, other action might be blocked pending a decision, and despite tentative opinions of our own legal experts and those of the UK, a decision adverse to our purpose might be rendered. However, we may find it advisable to follow this step as a last resort.

4. Action toward solving the Kashmir dispute through the intercession of other Asian nations outside the United Nations.

5. An attempt by the United States and the United Kingdom to seek an entirely new approach to the problem. The two countries might be asked to defer for a period such as ten years, the determination of the accession of Kashmir, under conditions involving a combination of some of the following elements:

(a) A partition of Kashmir by religious majority areas leaving the Vale under UN administration.

(b) An India–Pakistan condominium over all or part of the state.

(c) A United Nations trusteeship over all or part of the state.

(d) An India–Pakistan or United Nations Development Authority to provide for economic development particularly through the use of water resources.

(e) A joint India–Pakistan water commission to administer plans for the best joint use of water both in the Punjab and in Kashmir.

1. At the 100th meeting of the National Security Council on August 22, with President Truman presiding, the NSC discussed the subject of relations between India and Pakistan in the light of an oral report by the Secretary of State. No policy decision was made as a result of the discussion. (NSC Action No. 529, S/S–NSC (miscellaneous) files, lot 66D95)