Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

693.94/12–2651

Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State

[Washington,] December 26, 1951.

I understand that the British Ambassador, under instructions, has objected to the action which I took in Japan in relation to the future attitude of the Japanese Government to China. It was, I believe, suggested that what I did involved some violation of the understanding reached with Morrison on June 19, 1951,¹ which recorded our decision “to proceed without any Chinese co-signature to the presently contemplated multilateral Treaty of Peace” and which further stated that “under international law, Japan’s future attitude toward China must necessarily be for determination by Japan itself in the exercise of the sovereign and independent status contemplated by the Treaty.”

The facts are that Senators Sparkman and Smith, the ranking Democratic and Republican members of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meeting with me in Tokyo on December 10, said to me and also to Prime Minister Yoshida that there would be serious difficulty with respect to ratification of the Peace Treaty and with prospective implementation of the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty in a sense favorable to Japan, unless the Japanese Government made clear that it intended to pursue foreign policies in Asia which were generally compatible with those of the United States, particularly in relation to China.

I explored this subject with Prime Minister Yoshida who indicated that his Government did intend to align its foreign policies in Asia, with those of the United States; that his Government desired formally to re-establish peace with the Nationalist Government of China which had the seat, voice and vote of China in the United Nations and which was recognized by most of the members of the United Nations. Also, Japan has important and economically indispensable trade relations with Formosa. He pointed out that the Japanese Government had already, on November 17, 1951, established a Japanese Government Overseas Agency in Formosa with the consent of the Nationalist Government of China, this being the highest form of relationship with other countries which is now permitted to Japan.

As regards the Communist regime in China, Mr. Yoshida pointed out that it is actually condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor, that the Sino-Soviet Treaty made in Moscow is virtually a military alliance against Japan and that there is ample evidence to show that the Communist regime in China is backing the Japanese Communist Party in its program of seeking violently to overthrow the Constitutional system and present Government of Japan. In view of these facts, Prime Minister Yoshida confirmed what he had previously told me, that the Japanese Government had no intention of concluding a bilateral treaty with the Communist regime of China.

Senators Sparkman and Smith suggested that the substance of Mr. Yoshida’s statement should be put into a form which could be used in the Senate ratification hearings and Prime Minister Yoshida indicated that he was disposed to do so, hoping, however, that the United States would seek to bring about accord with the United Kingdom so that his Government would not be subjected to conflicting pressures.

I kept the British Ambassador, Sir Esler Dening, promptly and fully informed as to what I was doing. This contrasts with the fact that it now appears that Sir Esler had, himself, been advising the Japanese Government against any form of recognition of the Chinese Nationalists, and doing so without any notification to us. (See Mr. Eden’s letter of November 20, 1951, to Mr. Acheson²)

Also it may be noted that although Mr. Acheson’s letter to Mr. Eden of November 21² indicated “our decision to leave these inter-related problems for discussion in Tokyo next month between Dulles and Sir Esler Dening”, Sir Esler was instructed not to have such discussions with me, thereby making it impossible to take advantage of my presence in Tokyo to arrive at a joint position with the Japanese Government.

I am clearly of the opinion that 1) what I did in Tokyo involves no violation of the letter or spirit of my agreement of June 17 with Mr. Morrison.³ Also, when it was decided not to invite any representative of China to the San Francisco Conference but to leave China relations to future Japanese action, it was taken for granted by the British Government that Japan would in fact align itself with United States policy in this respect.

The Morrison–Dulles memorandum of June 17 was never designed to prevent Japan independently acting in its own interests. It was designed merely to assure that SCAP’s authority over the Japanese Government would not be exerted to influence Japan’s foreign policy.

Since the Dulles–Morrison agreement of June 17, over six months have elapsed, and nearly four months have elapsed since the Treaty was signed. During this period SCAP has substantially restored sovereignty and independence of action in foreign affairs to the Japanese Government. That Government is dealing directly with many other states, and negotiating bilateral agreements, as for example, with the United States and Canada (fisheries), Korea (general), Indonesia (fisheries and reparations), the Philippines (reparations) and India (bilateral peace). The position contemplated to be taken by Japan as regards China is in no slightest degree influenced by pressures from SCAP. Such pressures as they are, are inherent in the relationship of Japan to the United States and upon the basic fact that Japan, unable to defend its own sovereignty which is in mortal danger, must and does rely upon the United States; and it is inconceivable that under these circumstances Japan should pursue foreign policies which cut across those of the United States. Japan could not expect, under these conditions, to receive favorable consideration on many matters requiring Congressional approval and the purpose and spirit of the Morrison–Dulles memorandum would be violated if it were interpreted as preventing Japan taking action indispensable to her own self-interest.

It was from the beginning recognized by the British Cabinet that the formula proposed as regards China would almost inevitably lead Japan to align herself with United States policy. Because of that fact, the formula was first objected to by the British Cabinet. They made the counter proposal that Japan should be deprived of the right to deal with China and that this right should be vested in a group of countries roughly corresponding to those of the Far Eastern Commission. This formula was proposed by the British Cabinet as necessary to prevent Japan from following the United States line. This counter proposal was rejected by me in a long conference which I had with Mr. Attlee and following that, the British Cabinet accepted the formula which would leave Japan free in this matter. The comments of the British press at the time, particularly the Labor press, shows that there was no doubt in their minds as to what the result of this formula would be.

It is totally unrealistic, and would be utterly destructive for the welfare of Japan, to expect Japan to refrain from aligning its Far Eastern policy roughly with that of the United States.

The United Kingdom could plausibly argue with the United States that its policy is wrong and should be changed. It does not, however, make any sense for the British to contend that the United States should assume all the burdens of defending Japan’s sovereignty and strengthening Japan economically, and territorially (in relation to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands) in order that Japan may thereby more effectively thwart United States policies in Asia.

The Senate will demand to know whether Japan intends to embark upon any such course. If so, it would make it utterly impracticable to realize the benevolent program which we have in mind for Japan.

John Foster Dulles

1. In an index titled “China Papers,” in Lot 54D423, the document of June 19 printed under its title of “Chinese Participation and Formosa” is listed as the “Morrison–Dulles Agreement.” For text, see p. 1134.
2. For text, see telegram 3095 from Paris, November 23, p. 1409.
2. For text, see telegram 3095 from Paris, November 23, p. 1409.
3. Possibly a reference to the document mentioned at the outset of this memorandum. However, no version of it dated June 17 has been found in Department of State files.