Lot 54D423
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
This morning following the Cabinet the President received me with General Bradley and Mr. Lovett.1 General Marshall was testifying on the Hill. The subject under discussion was my memorandum to the President of June 28, 19512 regarding the request of the JCS that the draft treaty with Japan should be changed so as to give the United States a perpetual veto over the possibility of the treaty coming into force between Japan and any other signatory.
[Page 1164]The President asked me to state the problem, which I did.
He then asked General Bradley to state the objections of the JCS. General Bradley placed these entirely upon the dangers and difficulties which might arise if the treaty came into effect while the war in Korea was continuing, with the result that we could not have freedom of the use of Japanese facilities for the war.
The President asked me to comment on the General’s statement. I made the points which were already made in the memorandum of June 28, pointing out that in this case as in so many others the United States could not rely on mere arbitrary authority to control other people, but had to do it by persuasion and that since the other signatories of the treaty would be very largely associates of ours in the war, it seems to me that there is very little risk that they would not act sensibly and cooperatively.
The President then asked Mr. Lovett if he had any views to express. Mr. Lovett said that General Marshall had asked him to say he hoped that the President would consider the matter very fully. General Marshall’s own view was that on this question the State Department’s advice should be pretty nearly controlling. He pointed out on behalf of General Marshall that at the present time the other nations had complete freedom of action to make treaties or not as they chose. He thought that the Department and Mr. Dulles had accomplished a great deal by having them waive their rights for nine months after the Japanese ratification. He doubted very much whether an attempt to renegotiate this would be successful and that it might on the contrary do harm.
After listening to us, the President said that he had thought about this question both before and after receiving the memorandum. He believed that we had proceeded in the best way open to us and that it would be a mistake to attempt to extend our legal powers over our associates. He, therefore, decided in favor of the draft treaty as it stood and he added that he had already read the treaty three times and was taking it home for study and that he was enthusiastic about it.