Editorial Note
In his memorandum of September 18, 1951, “Summary of Negotiations Leading Up to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace with Japan,” Mr. Fearey stated in part:
“On April 25 there arrived in Washington a group of British technical experts who with their opposites on the United States side succeeded during the following week, under the chairmanship of Mr. Allison, in marrying in one tentatively agreed joint draft the United States March draft and a longer British draft circulated in early April to the British Commonwealth Governments. The British draft, though not an agreed Commonwealth document, was in large degree the product of overall Commonwealth thinking evolved through a series of Commonwealth meetings on the treaty. … The joint draft, dated May 3, left undecided the major policy differences then existing between the United States and the United Kingdom Governments (primarily Chinese representation, disposition of Formosa, and disposition of Japanese owned gold and assets in neutral and ex-enemy countries), but successfully reconciled the United Kingdom concern for a technically precise and comprehensive treaty with the United States desire for a document sufficiently simple and brief to be widely read and understood.” (694.001/9–1851)
For the United States “March draft” and the joint draft of May 3, see pages 944 and 1024, respectively. The Department’s copy of the British draft of April 7 is not printed.
The talks concluded May 4. The chief British negotiator was Charles H. Johnston, Head of the Japan Department of the Foreign Office, who was assisted by legal and economic advisers from London as well as members of the British Embassy staff. On the American side, Mr. Allison was assisted by, among others, U. Alexis Johnson, Arthur Ringwalt (First Secretary of the Embassy in London), and Messrs. Hemmendinger, Fearey, and Fraleigh. (Memorandum from Mr. Allison to Mr. McDermott, May 4, 1951, Lot 54 D 423)
Detailed minutes of these negotiations have not been found in Department of State files, nor has indication been found that such notes were taken by either team. However, working copies of the American and British drafts which formed the basis of negotiation and which bear extensive marginalia are in Lot 54 D 423. Also, an unsigned, undated document titled “Check List of Positions Stated by U.S. and U.K. at April 25–27 Meetings” is in file 694.001/4–2751. It is not [Page 1022] printed because it is impossible to follow without reference to the British draft, which is omitted because of space requirements.
In a memorandum of May 10 to General Ridgway, Ambassador Sebald stated in part:
“The principal differences between the two drafts are as follows:
- (a)
- The new U.K.–U.S. draft more nearly approximates in form and in attention to detail the model of traditional peace agreements, as for example that agreed upon in 1947 by the Allied Powers and Italy.
- (b)
- Regarding territorial provisions the U.K. has substantially followed the earlier U.S. draft but has reserved its position on a clause providing for Japan’s renunciation of rights and claims to Formosa and the Pescadores (Article 2 of new draft).
- (c)
- Regarding Japan’s security the U.K.–U.S. draft contains a new provision (Article 7), which has been made subject to further U.S. consideration, that all Allied Forces shall be withdrawn from Japan no later than 90 days after the coming into force of the Treaty, but that nothing shall prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory pursuant to bilateral agreements made between one or more of the Allied Powers and Japan. The security provisions of the U.K.–U.S. draft also provide in the same Article that Japanese property in use by the Occupation Forces at the time of the coming into force of the Treaty shall be returned to the Japanese Government within 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.
- (d)
- The U.K.–U.S. draft contains more specific though probably not more stringent provisions regarding the continuation of pre-war Japanese treaties, economic relations with Japan, and claims against Japan.
- (e)
- The U.K.–U.S. draft also omits from the Chapter on Final Clauses a specific provision that Japan will not make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any state which would grant that state greater advantages than those granted under the present Treaty.” (Tokyo Post Files: 320.1 Peace Treaty)