762A.6/8–351: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy), at Frankfurt1
top secret
Washington, August
11, 1951—8 p. m.
1091. Reurtel 1094, Aug 3, rptd Berlin 80, Bonn 80, London 85, Heidelberg 63, Paris 90, Moscow.2
- 1. While Dept in suggesting possibility staggered stockpile did not have data re present estimated airlift capabilities and Berlin mil and Allied civilian requirements provided in reftel, this info does not in Dept’s estimation affect principle that modified staggered stockpile wld, in conjunction with even limited airlift, give Berlin greater staying power than wld six months balanced stocks. Batter plan evidently contemplates untenable situation at expiration of six months period which nothing less than full-scale airlift cld alleviate, whereas augmented fuel and certain food stockpiles wld extend period in which larger airlift might be mounted or settlement made.
- 2. If, however, you believe that changing program now wld have dislocating effect on present plans, agreements and commitments and adversely affect fulfillment of stockpiling aims generally, Dept suggests that you proceed with six months program while reserving US position and exploring possibilities of increasing stocks coal and certain foodstuffs beyond half-year level as proposed in last para reftel. Dept will review problem in light ur further comments.
- 3. Shld it be anticipated that completion of six months program wld leave no funds available for increased fuel, food stocks, Dept suggests that consideration be given to possibility later obtaining necessary amts through sale to Berlin population of higher priced, [Page 1933] small volume, items in six months stockpile which cld be most easily airlifted.
- 4. Present classification due to discussion airlift capabilities.
Acheson