Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 2

740.5/11–2951: Telegram

The United States Delegation at the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting to the Acting Secretary of State ¹

secret

Rome, November 29, 1951—8 p. m.

Secto 114. Summary report of mtg between Acheson, Schuman, Eden and Benelux FonMins Nov 26. As chairman of Paris mtg Schuman opened by giving full description of provisions of German contractual arrangements. Benelux ministers showed interest in question of equality of treatment of their troops in Germany with that of occupying powers. After being reassured on that, they then raised question of EDC. They indicated they had been much disturbed by communiqué issued after mtg with Adenauer in Paris,² which made contractual arrangements contingent not only on subsidiary agreements but also on completion of EDC. They indicated that they felt this put undue pressure on them and gave Germany great advantage trading. They were told by all three occupying ministers that quite reverse had been intention and that we wanted to make it quite clear to Germans that they would not have contractual arrangements unless they agreed to satisfactory arrangements on other points.

Stikker took lead in presenting Benelux point of view of this issue, but was closely seconded by Van Zeeland and Bech. They explained that they had constitutional problems which did not affect France and Germany and they resented being put in position of blocking EDC. They repeatedly returned to this point during mtg, at dinner that evening, and in subsequent conversations. They indicated that they felt Paris conference was coming up with solutions which were too theoretical and which unduly involved their constitutional questions. They also indicated that they felt practical solutions cld and shld be found. In this connection, Van Zeeland brought up and was seconded by others desirability of widening membership of EDC. He said that it would be much easier for them if British and Scandinavians cld join in on some basis. Stikker subsequently indicated that what they had in mind was limited membership covering troops which were actually in SHAPE.

Secy, seconded by Eden and Schuman, pointed out that there was nothing new in situation and that it flowed inevitably from decision taken at Brussels last year. Therefore, it was none of our doing but was the result of force of circumstances. He further emphasized great urgency in completing EDC arrangements. He indicated that they must be completed for next mtg of NAT Council in January. Otherwise, we might lose Adenauer government and German participation in defense of west.

After dinner that evening in an informal get together with Secy, Stikker, Bech, Eden and Schuman much of same ground was covered again. Secy privately told Schuman that it was vital that EDC provisions be completed by end of Dec and that Schuman must push through himself, not leaving it to Alphand. Schuman indicated that he appreciated significance of this latter point. Secy also made it clear that it was up to Schuman to handle Benelux situation.

During various discussions it was brought out that it was vital for ministers themselves to get into discussions and get them out of hands of technicians. We understand that mtg of ministers has been called for some time in week of Dec 10.

For further description of Benelux views see statements made by Stikker and Van Zeeland at council mtg.³

For reports on the NATO Council meetings under reference, see Secto 93 and Secto 105, pp. 735 and 737.

1. Repeated to London, Paris, The Hague, Brussels, and Luxembourg.
2. Dated November 22, p. 1607.
3. For reports on the NATO Council meetings under reference, see Secto 93 and Secto 105, pp. 735 and 737.