740.5/4–1351: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfurt 1
[1099.] Ref: Deptel 6625 to Frankfort,2 repeated London 4471, Paris 5182, April 2.
1. Regret reference telegram did not arrive Heidelberg in time for consideration at meeting. In view time factor following joint USDep, JAMAG, SUSRep message is being repeated Washington to give London staff views. Request OSR and military representative comment direct to Washington.
2. Questions asked paragraph 5 reference telegram and comments paragraph two touch on two points that have increasingly disturbed us. One concerns US evaluation of “adequacy” of NATO defense programs. Second concerns best means of approaching NAT countries for further increases in defense efforts, or shifts within currently planned programs, on which US views should be quite clearly formulated before we can appraise usefulness of specific conditions of aid.
3. Re “adequacy” of programs, US has tended use this term in two different senses. One involves US appraisal of what resources each country is capable of devoting to defense, given appropriate economic aid. An effort considered adequate in financial and economic terms may or may not be adequate in physical terms of raising, maintaining, and equipping forces and constructing necessary physical installations to meet requirements of NAT defense.
4. The second sense in which “adequacy” is used involves judgments as to effectiveness of qualitative and quantitative build-up of forces to meet requirements of MTDP. Here we lack authoritative statement of equipment requirements. Time-phasing is another important element. Can we say that a Dutch program designed to build up its forces to meet its DC–28 commitments by mid-1955 is adequate in the same sense as a Nor program to meet its commitments by the end of 1952?
5. ECC discussed in general terms at Heidelberg meeting the problem of evaluating adequacy of country programs in both senses and staffs are now attempting work out necessary procedures to effect a coordinated evaluation of political-military-economic-production aspects of country efforts. We thereby hope to be able to present comprehensive and coordinated regional recommendations as to adequacy of country efforts on a continuing basis. We probably will be unable [Page 136] to contribute much in this direction before the Foreign Aid Bill is presented to Congress, but would hope to have some useful evaluations as a basis (a) for congressional testimony in event one of us appears before Congress, and (b) for guiding further negotiations re defense efforts with other NAT governments.
6. Believe that, in future negots with NAT governments, US should be prepared with most specific recommendations practicable as to ways they can increase and improve forces and production. By this time most NAT governments have prepared defense programs which, on their own assumptions as to US end-item aid, they think will enable them to meet their DC–28 commitments by at least end of 1954. Approaches for greater increases should therefore be made in light of US positions as to the desirability of a general acceleration of plans to meet DC–28 commitments and on recommendations (preferably from NATO) for filling the gap between DC–28 commitments and MTDP requirements. We understand these questions are under study in ISAC and standing group, respectively. Apart from these two possible general bases for urging increased efforts, US can and should attempt to define specific production tasks (in cooperation with DPB) and to press bilaterally, as well as through the standing group and SHAPE for improvements in the quality of forces.
7. These problems relating to judgments of adequacy of efforts and the bases for urging further defense increases affect the questions mentioned paragraph 5 reference telegram.
- (a)
- Agree that US aid for NATO countries should include conditions requiring “reciprocal meeting of some sort of targets” before increments of aid are disbursed provided that targets are stated in general qualitative rather than rigid quantitative terms. Specific application of such conditions, adapted to fit special circumstances in each country, could be worked out as programs develop and aid is disbursed. Recognize that these comments not very helpful in meeting your present problem, which, presumably, is to formulate “conditions” that may satisfy congressional requirements. However, do not believe it possible, certainly at this stage, to reduce to concrete and quantitative terms the level and character of European defense effort which we should seek to obtain during coming fiscal year. Furthermore, believe attempt to formulate specific conditions in terms of performance that would apply across the board to all countries, and to write such condition in law, would dangerously tie our hands in administration, particularly from military point of view. Conditions that could be realistically applied to all countries uniformly would tend to be minimum conditions, reduced to lowest common denominator, and thus tend to encourage minimum, rather than maximum, effort.
- (b)
- If it is considered essential for congressional reasons to
propose legislative “conditions”, suggest consideration
following possibilities:
- (1)
- That recipients of US aid undertake sacrifices in support of their defense efforts which bear a reasonable relation, in the [Page 137] light of their capacities and resources, to those being borne by US;
- (2)
- That recipient countries adopt measures having comparable effect to those established in US for directing scarce resources into military uses;
- (3)
- That JCS endorse reasonableness of country plans for national military service, mobilization and training;
- (4)
- That US administrative authorities be satisfied that recipient country have taken all reasonable steps to carry out NATO commitments and recommendations NATO bodies (but note veto powers of all members such bodies). Even such conditions as these, which allow room for administrative discretion, could clearly embarrass administration of aid programs and even jeopardize attainment of US objectives.
- (c)
- Would be greatly preferable (if it would satisfy congressional requirements) to avoid “conditions” as such and substitute notion of qualitative criteria to be taken into account in allocating or administering aid. Such criteria might be drawn along lines suggested (b) above, reflecting US judgments, or incorporate NATO evaluations (by SG, WG of 12, and CD on matters within their respective competences), or both.
- (d)
- While believe it would be desirable to develop NATO judgments as to adequacy member country efforts wherever this is feasible, and that joint NATO evaluations of country programs would offer opportunity for healthy mutual examination of programs, believe such judgments and evaluations should be thought of as providing guidance to US administrative authorities responsible for aid allocations rather than as anything given binding effect of US by legislation. Especially in view of veto power over own actions of all members in NATO bodies, doubt whether incorporation of provision along these lines in legislation would offer much reassurance to Congress, whether or not legislation contained additional provision regarding US certification that total efforts were “adequate”.