Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/4–951: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, April 9, 1951—11 p. m.

Depto 740. Dept pass Ottawa. Deputies 26th mtg April 9.

1. Gen Gruenther, SHAPE Chief of Staff, in off-record discussion explained SHAPE command structure and headquarters organization.² Emphasized international spirit and policy of keeping down number of Americans. Fundamental problem is judgment of how near operational SHAPE shld be in order effectively to meet possible crisis yet keeping staff to minimum. Emphasized importance early action on infrastructure, particularly airfields for tactical air support, which now almost entirely lacking where most needed. Mentioned disquieting intelligence reports on increasing offensive effectiveness of satellite armies and cited problem whether Korea-type satellite attack or Yugoslavia wld send balloon up or not. Subsequent comments by Deputies indicated Gruenther forthright realism made pronounced impression and increased confidence in present and future of SHAPE. His and Wright’s visit indicated clearly importance of frequent personal contact between mil and CD.

2. In discussion Canadian proposal on NATO reorganization (D–D (51) 86) (revised)³ Portuguese Deputy read long statement Salazarian in tone expressing reluctant concurrence in principle of council of govts but proposing amendments to effect Deputies action on any matter considered “vital” by any three Deputies be considered provisional pending ratification by council and that words “standing group” in 11(c) be replaced by “mil agencies of NATO.” He argued that Deputies not close enough to home situation to make binding decisions in matters of “vital importance.” Also felt Deputies allowed insufficient time for governmental consideration before acting. While believing contact between SG and CD shld not be direct since former not broad enough to represent mil interests of all NAT members, he suggested his amendments wld permit action on Canadian proposals now while deferring decision on mil agencies and relationships.

Canadian pointed out that it was generally agreed to leave mil agencies alone pending further experience and that all actions of CD are reported to council for approval at each of its sessions. French held Portuguese proposal wld paralyze CD. Neth (a) felt it most important that matter of “vital importance” not be removed from Deputies competence or doubt cast on definiteness of decisions in such cases, (b) pointed out present draft made clear supremacy of council in providing CD is to formulate issues requiring decision by council, (c) believed interpretation of “guidance” as synonymous with “direction” made textual change unnecessary although agreed minute still desirable. UK held that whole purpose of CD was to take binding decisions between council sessions. These arguments against Portuguese proposals generally endorsed by Italy, Denmark and US. Portuguese got no support.

France, UK and Netherlands, Belgium and Canada saw great difficulty in accepting US suggestion to describe Deputies as responsible to all ministers concerned with NATO matters in their respective govts (Todep 352⁴). They considered that this is matter of national organization inappropriate for international action and already implicit in text of Canadian proposal.

Belgian Deputy observed that Canadian proposal as revised did not limit scope of council.

French announced concurrence in US text para 4.

CD agreed attempt finalize text April 16 is [for?] final consideration by govts and definitive adoption by CD.

3. Discussion of Balkan satellites and NATO civilian budget deferred to next mtg, April 11 when initial consideration will also be given SHAPE budget. French again urged interim action to meet current SHAPE operating costs pending solution more difficult cost-sharing problems.

Spofford

1. Repeated to Paris for the Embassy and OSR, to the other NATO capitals, to Frankfurt, to Heidelberg for Handy, and to Wiesbaden for Norstad.
2. For further documentation on the NATO command structure, see pp. 460 ff.
3. Not printed; apparently a revision of the draft paper transmitted in telegram Depto 693, March 30, p. 107, as amended by suggestions in telegrams Depto 711, April 3, p. 114, and Todep 352, supra.
4. Supra.