Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/3–2951: Telegram

The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State ¹

secret

London, March 29, 1951—6 p. m.

Depto 687. Re Todep 318 Mar 22² and Ecato circ B–38 Mar 21.

1. Fol views, concurred in by SUSRep, are being forwarded without full OSR coordination in view stringency time schedule. From telephone contact OSR, understand they have similar views and that their comments to you will be forthcoming shortly.

2. Brief review of illustrative aid figures and supporting data leaves us with impression that different criteria were adopted in establishing assumed level of defense efforts and consequent appropriate level of econ aid for different countries. For example, in case of Neth and Ital very high levels defense effort have been postulated, which in case of Belg zero aid is based on assumption no increased effort over present plans. Why shld not Belg aid request be based on Belg defense spending approaching $500 million? On other hand, we share Neth mission view that assumed rate of $525 million for Dutch defense spending is unrealistic, and, assumed Ital defense expenditure similarly appears to us unrealizable.

3. In gen we urge assuming high but realistic rates of defense expenditure in computing need for aid and then insisting with recipients that assumed level defense effort is prerequisite for indicated amt of aid. If aid needed to support maximum defense spending is not requested and obtained, we may be unable offer aid in support of increases in defense spending if opportunities for such arrangements arise. If targets set are not reached, we wld not grant total aid voted.

4. We realize that presentation of even illustrative aid figures high enough to support maximum defense programs might create expectation among recipient countries, if figures leak or are made public, that indicated amts will in fact be granted for presently planned programs. It may be awkward to counteract this impression by giving out publicly actual def expenditure figures by countries on which aid estimates based and gen policy statements re relation aid to def effort may not carry sufficient conviction. Wld it be possible go step further by publishing total defense expenditure figure on which total recommended aid promised, with accompanying indication of extent to which aggregate Eur defense effort falls short of this level under plans to date?

Spofford

1. Repeated to Paris for OSR.
2. Telegram Todep 318 to London, repeated to Paris, not printed, concerned a balance-of-payments schedule and tentative economic aid figures for principal European countries for fiscal year 1952, prepared by the Economic Cooperation Administration (740.5/3–2251).