740.5/3–1451: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State 1
Depto 634. Re Depto 626 and Todep 293 (of which we are pouching copy to MacArthur).2 At yesterday’s mtg I outlined position given in Todep 293. No objection was raised to US language given in first para of numbered para 2 except on deletion reference to Finance Mins. Belg indicated ad referendum acceptance in principle of Can proposal. There was some argument over deletion of reference to FinMins from agreed minutes and considerable argument over relations between civ and mil agencies.
On question of FinMins UK felt strongly they shld be mentioned. He stated Chancellor of Exchequer much interested in NATO and Brit Cabinet had accepted abolition DFEC on understanding FinMins as well as DefMins might attend Council mtgs. Hoyer-Millar commented that while US apparently felt Council delegations shld ordinarily be composed of 2 mins, UK felt it shld be either 1 or 3. US expressed view Foreign and DefMins have primary responsibility but that FinMins or others cld clearly be included when govts felt agenda made it desirable. UK generally supported by Dane, Fr, Ital and Neth. Dane suggested as compromise that words “such as FinMins” be inserted after “competent mins” in last sentence of US language. After mtg Starkenborgh suggested it be made clear in some manner that FinMins were not being omitted as such but that specific mention was being made of DefMins since def committee stipulated by treaty was being incorporated into Council.
On civilian-mil relations US strongly urged no changes be made in mil org pending further experience with MRC in present form. Can stated reorganization of Council was basic object of their proposal, that mil aspects were intended primarily as basis discussion by mil side NATO. While his govt wld prefer to see mil side streamlined now to permit decisions be made more quickly than under system requiring mil committee action, Can willing try present arrangements for while in view US opposition to change. If continued existence of mil com were found to delay taking of mil decisions, Can Govt might later reopen matter. Ports referred to his govt’s continued insistence that deps and SG communicate through MRC rather than direct.
Neths felt US language in para 3 Todep 293 increased power SG and tended to give it in effect responsibilities of mil com thereby reducing status of MRC. US referred to desirability of periodic personal [Page 99] contact between chiefs of staff and felt mil com useful for this purpose. US maintained effectiveness of MRC cld not be judged without further experience and said SG members making definite effort to make present procedure work satisfactory in practice.
Can commented off-the-record that SG had originally been conceived as executive agency and permanent working staff of mil com but that members of SG had tended to take into their hands all of mil com’s authority and to use mil com merely as cloak. He nevertheless thought present arrangement cld work provided SG consulted frequently, sufficiently and seriously with members of MRC individually or collectively. Fr agreed important thing was reorganization of Council and that consideration of changes in mil org shld await further experience.
Starkenborgh admitted he had not heard any recent criticism of SG. He nevertheless felt command and SHAPE staff appointments reflected unduly predominant role for SG countries. Belg indicated dissatisfaction, whether founded or unfounded, existed over relations with SG. US commented any scheme for centralizing authority wld have some unsatisfactory aspects but that appropriate means must be found between need for consideration of natl points of view and need for quick and effective collective action. He reiterated SG members making real effort this respect.
Neths inquired as to significance of words “political guidance” in language para 3 of Todep 293 rather than “political direction” (C 5–D/11 final). If it were polite way of saying “direction” he wld be satisfied but language of DC–24/33 made him skeptical. Fr and UK reiterated Council in C 5–D/11 had used words “higher direction of integrated force as regards polit considerations upon which strategic decisions shld be based.” US said authoritative clarification on this point wld be necessary and he wld not attempt personal interpretation. Neths stated basic question was whether or not supreme control wld be civilian rather than mil. Chairman requested reactions of govts be given next week after which he hoped drafting committee cld begin revising D–D1/1.4 UK and Neths stated Cabinet consideration would probably be necessary by their govts.
- Repeated to Paris.↩
- Telegram Depto 626, March 13, not printed, summarized the discussion of various subjects considered in the March 13 meeting of the Council Deputies (740.5/3–1351). Telegram Todep 293 is printed, p. 95.↩
- See footnote 6, p. 70.↩
- The reference here is to Council Document D 1/1, September 17, 1949. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iv, pp. 330–337.↩