State-JCS meetings, lot 61 D 417, Jan–June 1951
Draft Record of a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Pentagon Building, Washington, March 7, 1951, 11 a.m.1
Present
| General Bradley | Mr. Matthews |
| General Collins | Mr. Nitze |
| Admiral McCormick | Mr. Perkins |
| General Twining | Mr. Ferguson |
| General Bolte | Mr. Marshall |
| Admiral [Sherman?] | Mr. Tufts |
| Admiral Davis | Mr. Lay |
| General White | Mr. Gleason |
| Admiral Wooldridge | |
| Admiral [Duncan?] | |
| Admiral Lalor | |
| Colonel Carns |
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Medium Term Defense Plan
Mr. Nitze: Mr. Cabot recently wrote me a letter concerning the deficiencies in the MTDP and the position which the U.S. Government should take regarding the meeting of these deficiencies. I replied to him in a letter giving the views of the Policy Planning Staff.2 With your permission, I would like to read excerpts from this reply in order to make sure that our views are not in conflict with your own.
(At this point Mr. Nitze read to the group the two questions addressed to him by Mr. Cabot and most of his reply. These documents are on file in Mr. Nitze’s office.)
General. Bradley: We have at last received the long awaited costing study, and are very disappointed with it. It seems to represent a mere addition of nine sets of national figures. The principal conclusion to be derived from it is that the European countries want us to do most of the job. In fact, it shows that they expect us to foot about 90 percent of the total bill. We simply cannot do that. Mr. Herod [Page 83] has got to get busy on this problem with General Eisenhower. He can use the personnel of the ECA organizations and other U.S. personnel in Europe to find out what other European countries can produce. With the information thus acquired I think he can develop a production program. The present study is impossible, and, in my opinion, should be burned.
Mr. Nitze: It is our view that before a satisfactory European production program can be developed, the U.S. Government will have to give Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt considerable guidance.
General Bradley: I agree with that. We know that the U.S. cannot furnish more than $4 to $5 billion per annum for two or three years. If the forces called for in the MTDP are to be ready by 1954, it follows that the U.S. can furnish, say, $12 billion, and Western Europe has got to do the rest. On the basis of guidance along these lines, Mr. Herod has got to work out a production program for accomplishing this task.
Mr. Nitze: There are a number of problems on which it seems necessary to have a U.S. view if our people are to do an effective job. We have to know what the requirements are, what production is possible, and what financial burdens can be carried by the European Governments before a sound program can be worked out. It is for this reason that we made the two points in our reply: (1) it is important to make progress on the present job, and (2) it is important to prepare a coordinated program here of what the European countries must do. Such a coordinated program would have important influence on the work of ECA and State.
General Bradley: I agree that it is necessary for the European countries to make a good start on their present programs before they are confronted with the question of expansion and acceleration. Even on these present programs they are asking that 90 percent of the burden be carried by us and expect to carry only 10 percent of the burden themselves.
Mr. Nitze: We realize that that is not possible. Another element of this problem is the length of time during which the defense of Western Europe will be in doubt. What do we do during this period?
General Bradley: We have accelerated our own program with the view of completing it in 1952. It is unrealistic to expect the Europeans to do the same thing. It is not physically possible for them to complete the necessary production in that time. In my view, 1954 is the earliest date at which the Europeans can develop the forces called for by the MTDP. It will take them two or three years in some instances to set up production lines.
General Collins: At a minimum it will take them 18 months to set up a tank line.
[Page 84]General Bradley: There is no doubt that it will take a long time. For one thing, we have got to furnish a lot of machine tools and other equipment required for the production process.
Mr. Nitze: This corresponds to our own point of view. It leads to the question of what we are going to do about our own security in the meantime. I think it has a bearing on the Spanish problem, the Yugoslav problem, the problem of the air defence of the U.K., and the problem of building up stockpiles in the U.K.
General Collins: Moch is a very able man, and has given a real impetus to the French production program. The French have developed a pretty good light tank. Some of its features are better than our own. The French can move along on this fairly rapidly, but they cannot do it within the time limits that we would like.
Mr. Nitze: They should attempt to meet their present programs, and perhaps to give some increased emphasis to the deficiency in the air. In the meantime, perhaps we could do more to assist Spain, Yugoslavia, and the U.K.
General Collins: I hope you will excuse me for a few minutes. I am trying to stop the limitation to 3½ million men. That would have a profound effect on what we are now discussing. All that you in State can do to help Mr. Herod will greatly increase Western European ability to meet its present targets. I have thought for some time that Mr. Herod should have a stature comparable to General Eisenhower’s. His task involves very touchy problems. It is very important, in my opinion, to give him all possible political support.
Mr. Perkins: Mr. Herod has got to organize an international staff, and that will take some time. It seems to me that the U.S. should get its ideas straight—on a unilateral basis—so that we can inject our ideas into the process over there as rapidly as possible.
General Collins: The MDAP groups have a great deal of information which Mr. Herod should receive, and which he could use in developing his own program.
Mr. Nitze: It will take a great deal of time to organize a multilateral staff for the production problem, and for this staff to produce results. It seems to us that these results can be accelerated if the U.S. can furnish Mr. Herod a coordinated program representing our own view of what the Europeans must do. For example, someone needs to give Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt a firm view as to what the Belgians should produce.
General Collins: By invitation of Moch, the Army is sending a group over to evaluate certain new French weapons. We have a favorable report on the French light tanks. They also have a new bazooka and a new recoilless rifle which we are going to look at. This group could discuss with French authorities the limitations on French [Page 85] production. If it were desirable, the group could pass on its views to Mr. Batt and Mr. Herod.
(At this point General Collins left the meeting.)
General Bradley: To sum up, it appears that we should not try at this time to allocate the additional efforts required to fill the gap. We should try to get the present programs well underway. When we have made some progress, we can talk about plans to fill the gap. This should not be postponed until the present program is completed, but only until it is well underway. By this time General Eisenhower will be able to give us a lot of help. He will be able to work with us and with Mr. Herod and others with responsibilities in this field. At the present time we should give whatever guidance to Mr. Batt and to Mr. Herod that we can. We should inform them that Western Europe has got to do most of the production job, and that the U.S. cannot furnish more than $4 to $5 billion a year in assistance.
Mr. Nitze: We will quickly run into serious financial problems in Europe.
General Bradley: But we will not get more appropriations than that from the Congress. There has already been a shift in view on the “hill” which may be of serious proportions. Last September the “hill” was asking why we did not mobilize 6 to 7 million men, but now opinions have changed and there is an increased feeling of security. In my view, we are likely to get only $2 to $3 billion dollars next year. If so, it will be very tough for Western Europe to complete its plans in two to three years. I do not see myself how we can give much more guidance than this to Mr. Herod and Mr. Batt.
Mr. Nitze: We have been told by a number of Europeans that it is a mistake to deal with them in terms of generalities. I have myself been urged to recognize the importance of being specific about what it is we want them to do. It presents them with a much easier domestic problem if we tell them that we want a certain number of tanks then if we tell them that they must double their production and their appropriations for military purposes.
General Bradley: Isn’t that exactly what Mr. Herod was set up to do?
Mr. Nitze: Yes, but I think he needs guidance from us.
General Bradley: He needs guidance from the Standing Group also. We here in Washington are not in a position to tell them exactly what to produce. That job has got to be done over there. The ECA missions in Europe are better able to do it than we are.
Mr. Perkins: We do need to work here on the financial requirements.
General Bradley: The program is laid out in general terms in DC–28. General Eisenhower will eventually be able to make this more specific.
[Page 86]Mr. Nitze: Would the costing study provide details as to the number of tanks and other items of equipment which the French and others should produce?
General Bradley: To obtain that information all that is necessary is to take the forces they are planning to create and to apply the data from the tables of organization for each country. We are not familiar with the details of this problem. It might be possible to give the costing exercise to Mr. Herod after deleting the price and value computations.
Mr. Perkins: Shouldn’t we look at the T.O. to make sure that it is satisfactory to us?
General Bradley: It is hard for us to know what the T.O. should be. We would greatly resent it if they made suggestions to us for the revision of our T.O. I think we will have to take the approved T.O. of each country as the basis for our work. I am not sure that I understand exactly what it is that you think that we should furnish to Mr. Herod. I don’t see how we can go beyond DC–28, and what we can attain by multiplying four figures by the T.O.
Mr. Perkins: An example of what I am talking about is that we are now asking the Belgians to increase their defense budget by 500 million francs. They want to know what they should produce.
General Bradley: That is Mr. Herod’s job it seems to me.
Mr. Nitze: There are also heavy financial problems when we get into this problem of costs. We have got to have some ideas about the division of the financial burden before we can deal successfully with the production problem. I recognize that the present costing exercise is no good, but we might convert these costs into European currencies in order to get a basis for proceeding to a study of the financial problems.
General Bradley: If the present costing figures should leak, they would do far more harm than good. I think, however, that we could give the requirements data from the costing exercises to Mr. Herod. Perhaps this should go from the Standing Group to Mr. Herod.
Mr. Perkins: I am not sure how valid the individual cost estimates are. On many items of equipment U.S. costs were used because the Europeans did not know what their own costs would be.
General Bradley: We will look into this question of supplying lists of equipment to Mr. Herod without the costing data.
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