Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, European Security and the German Question, Volume III, Part 1

740.5/11–751

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Commander in Chief, United States Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, to the Minister in the United Kingdom (Holmes)¹

top secret and personal

London, 7 November 1951.

1. In accordance with your request, and with Admiral Fechteler’s permission. I am furnishing herewith, for forwarding to Mr. Acheson, a brief of the highlights of the conversation which took place during Admiral Fechteler’s luncheon with Mr. Churchill on 5 November. Admiral Fechteler has requested that, in forwarding this information to Mr. Acheson, the latter be informed that these highlights of the conversation have been taken from notes hurriedly dictated immediately after the luncheon, and that as yet Admiral Fechteler has not had an opportunity to review his notes in the light of a more mature recollection of statements made at the luncheon.

2. Mr. Churchill greeted Admiral Fechteler by saying that he, Mr. Churchill, wanted to meet Admiral Fechteler in order to assure him that there was nothing personal in Mr. Churchill’s objections to the assignment of Admiral Fechteler as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic.

3. At luncheon, Mr. Churchill launched immediately into the subject of the Atlantic Command. What apparently disturbed him most was the matter of insuring British authority over the approaches to the British Isles. Admiral Fechteler assured him that, under the agreed terms of reference, the control of those waters would remain the sole responsibility of the British.

4. Mr. Churchill insisted that he saw no necessity for an over-all single commander in the Atlantic, and harked back to the command arrangements between the British and U.S. in the Atlantic during World War II, an arrangement which Mr. Churchill thought had been quite satisfactory then and would be for any future war. At this point in the conversation, Admiral Fechteler gained the impression that the shipping losses we had sustained in World War II in the Atlantic and the narrow margin by which we had won the submarine war had perhaps escaped Mr. Churchill’s memory. When an opening occurred, Admiral Fechteler emphasised the fact that whereas the Germans possessed about fifty submarines in 1940, the Russians now have over two hundred. He further told Mr. Churchill that under the proposed organization of the Atlantic Command the British would control shipping in the Northeastern Atlantic; i.e., northeast of the line running generally from the southern tip of Greenland to the northern boundary of Portugal.

5. Mr. Churchill said that his present plans are to be in Washington 12–15 December, going to Canada first. He intimated that the Atlantic Command question would not be resolved until he had talked with the President.²

6. As Admiral Fechteler was taking his departure, Mr. Churchill said that the former’s assurances as to British authority and responsibility with regard to British home waters had removed his principal objection to the Atlantic Command plan, but that he still was not convinced that an over-all Allied Commander in the Atlantic was necessary.

1. The author of this memorandum has not been identified from the source text or from Department of State files. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Admiral Fechteler.
2. In telegram 1034 from London of November 13, p. 706, Spofford informed the Embassy in France of Churchill’s “intention to reserve matter” of a Supreme Command in the Atlantic “for discussion with Pres in Jan.” The subject was further debated and discussed during the Home meetings.