795.00/6–3050: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State
priority
C–56942. From CINCFE Tokyo to JCS and State Department. I have today inspected the South Korean battle area from Suwon north to the Han River.2 My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand the conditions as they exist and to determine the most effective way to further support our mission.
The Korean Army and coastal forces are in confusion, have not seriously fought, and lack leadership through their own means. Organized and equipped as a light force for maintenance of interior order they were unprepared for attack by armor and air. Conversely, they are incapable of gaining the initiative over such force as that embodied in the North Korean Army.
The Korean Army had made no preparations for defense in depth, for echelons of supply or for a supply system. No plans had been made, or if made, not executed, for the destruction of supplies or material in event of a retrograde movement. As a result, they have either lost, or abandoned, their supplies and heavier equipment and have absolutely no system of inter-communication. In most cases the [Page 249] individual soldier, in his flight to the south, has retained his rifle or carbine. They are gradually being gathered up in rear areas and given some semblance of organization by an advance group of my officers I have sent over for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars, and antitank guns, they can only hope to retard the enemy through the fullest utilization of natural obstacles and under the guidance and example of leadership of high quality.
The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly and prosperous according to their scale of living. They have retained a high degree of national spirit and firm belief in the Americans. The roads leading south from Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to accept the Communist rule.
South Korean military strength is estimated at not more than 25,000 effectives. North Korean military forces are as previously reported, backed by considerable strength in armor and a well trained, well directed and aggressive air force equipped with Russian planes. It is now obvious that this force has been built as an element of Communist military aggression.
I am doing everything possible to establish and maintain a flow of supplies through the air-head at Suwon and the southern port of Pusan. The air-head is most vital but is subject to constant air attack. Since air cover must be maintained over all aircraft transporting supplies, equipment, and personnel, this requirement operates to contain a large portion of my fighter strength. North Korean Air, operating from nearby bases, has been savage in its attacks in the Suwon area.
It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea. Every effort is being made to establish a Han River line but the result is highly problematical. The defense of this line and the Suwon–Seoul corridor is essential to the retention of the only air-head in central Korea.
The Korean Army is entirely incapable of counteraction and there is grave danger of a further breakthrough. If the enemy advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic.
The only assurance for the holding of the present line, and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of US ground combat forces into the Korean battle area. To continue to utilize the forces of our air and navy without an effective ground element cannot be decisive.
If authorized, it is my intention to immediately move a US regimental combat team to the reinforcement of the vital area discussed and to provide for a possible build-up to a two division strength from the troops in Japan for an early counter-offensive.
[Page 250]Unless provision is made for the full utilization of the Army–Navy–Air team in this shattered area our mission will at best be needlessly costly in life, money and prestige. At worse, it might even be doomed to failure. [CINCFE.]
- Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 78, states that this message was received—in the Department of Defense—an hour before midnight on June 29.↩
- See footnote 1 to the unnumbered telegram from Seoul, June 29, received at 9: 50 a. m., p. 227. General MacArthur had arrived back in Tokyo shortly after 10 p. m. (Tokyo time) on June 29 following his trip to Korea. According to the account given by Major General Whitney, this message was drafted by General MacArthur during the plane flight from Korea to Japan; see Whitney, MacArthur, p. 332; see also Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 45.↩