Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

Athens Embassy Files: Lot 58 F7: 350 Greece (Sept.–Dec.)

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stephen T. Calligas of the Embassy in Greece

[Extracts]

Subject: Interview with the Prime Minister, Sophocles Venizelos

The P.M. called, at his request, on the American Ambassador at 10 a. m. today. The P.M. said he wished to discuss certain subjects with the Amb. personally, as he felt this would be in the interest of the cordial relations which he hoped he would have with the Amb, He was very anxious to avoid any misunderstanding with the Amb. whom he regarded with much sympathy and friendship. Mr. Venizelos said that he had heard from an American source that it was generally believed in American official circles that he did not like Americans and that he does not look upon them as friends. He wished to assure the Amb. most categorically that this rumor is perfectly untrue. On the contrary, he firmly believes that without American moral and financial support Greece cannot exist. It was he who caused the Porter Mission to come to Greece in 1947,¹ after his visit to the U.S. at the head of a delegation sent by the then Tsaldaris Cabinet.² He added that even as far back as 1944 and 1945, he earnestly believed in the necessity of American interest in Greece, and had always been a champion of that idea. The Amb. expressed his surprise, assured the P.M. that he himself had never heard of this rumor, and that he knew it was not the belief of anyone in this Emb. The P.M. said he was relieved to hear of this, and reiterated his firm conviction that it is impossible for Greece to get along without the moral friendship and material support of the U.S.

Mr. Venizelos then gave the Amb. a brief summary of the events of the last few months and explained that he had been prompted to form his first Cabinet in March 1950 because of the refusal of the King to give the mandate to General Plastiras. In so doing, Mr. V. thought he was actually saving the situation. He mentioned that he had told Amb. Grady at the time that he was perfectly willing to hand in his resignation if it was felt that his Cabinet was following a policy which was contrary to American policy in Greece. Amb. Grady had said that he was not suggesting that the Venizelos Cabinet resign.³

The P.M. said that another matter to which he wished to draw the Ambassador’s attention was the method used by the Embassy in transmitting important communications to the Government. He referred to the famous Grady letter⁴ back in March which had caused such a commotion. He remarked that while he received the letter at about 12:30 of that day, the Greek press has been informed in the morning that such a communication would be addressed to Mr. V. As a matter of fact, the press were given copies of the letter at almost the same time as the P.M. received it. He referred to a further example, and said that the newspaper Vima had carried information on a Saturday morning about the cut in U.S. aid to Greece, while the Government was not officially notified of this until the following week. The P.M. concluded that there must be a serious leak somewhere in the Mission. He explained that this situation had caused considerable embarrassment to the Government and could only result in the loss of its prestige in the eyes of the people.… The P.M. said he would be grateful if, in the future, any communication coming from the Embassy or the Mission were addressed to the Government before information is revealed outside. He went on to say that in accordance with democratic custom, it is only just that the press be kept informed of current events, but there are ways and ways of doing that. The Amb. assured the P.M. that he understood his position perfectly. It is the Amb.’s desire and intention that all official communications be addressed to the Government. The Amb. does not intend to have information reach the P.M. in a roundabout way; on the contrary he wishes to communicate with the P.M. personally every time there is reason for it. The P.M. expressed great satisfaction at the assurance given him by the Amb.⁵

The P.M. then referred to the reasons which had led to the fall of the Plastiras Government. He said that the General’s chief concern was how to release as many communists as possible. The P.M. said that he, too, was very much in favor of clemency, but this was definitely not the time to release communists, particularly after the Korean events. He pointed out that if in this rapidly deteriorating situation, all communists were to be released, Greece might eventually have to fight both an internal as well as an external war. At this point, the Amb. asked how many communists were under detention at present. The P.M. said he did not know the exact figure since there were many bandit prisoners who are also detained, but he believed there were some 16 to 17,000 in all.

The P.M. then referred to the present Cabinet and said that he was quite pleased with his collaboration with Messrs. Tsaldaris⁶ and Papandreou.⁷ He believed and hoped that this close collaboration would continue in the future. The Amb. added that he, too, had gained the impression from his first contacts with the two Vice Premiers that they were both anxious to make a success of this Government and that they looked forward to political stability. The P.M. assured the Amb. that no effort would be spared to that end, and that he hoped this Government would remain in office for the next three years. The Amb. remarked that this was the hope of the American Government. He added that both official circles as well as the people in the U.S. were quite worried at the rapid succession of so many governments in Greece since the war. The P.M. replied that it was in this spirit that he wished to bring a question to the attention of the Amb., since he feared it might be the cause of future friction in the Cabinet, and even bring about the resignation of the Govt. He said that a law had been passed by the Plastiras Govt, granting extraordinary powers to the then Minister of Coordination, Mr. Emmanuel Tsouderos. Furthermore, Mr. Tsouderos was assisted in his work by a Coordinating Committee, or a “brain trust” as Mr. V. called it, the purpose of which was to coordinate the work of the various Ministries, particularly on matters relating to the reconstruction effort, and to pass the laws which it considered necessary. The chief reason for granting Mr. Tsouderos such powers was that the General himself understood very little of economic matters. He, therefore, quite willingly gave his Minister of Coordination carte blanche in a surprisingly large number of sectors. The American Mission was very much in favor of such a Committee, and had strongly recommended that it be formed, with the exception, however, that it come under the immediate jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and not of the Minister of Coordination. As things stand now, the Committee still functions under the chairmanship of the Minister of Coordination, Mr. Stephen Stephanopoulos (a Populist, possibly Mr. Tsaldaris’ successor), and enforces decisions without the consent, or, very often, even the knowledge of the P.M. Mr. Venizelos added that this was hardly just since many of these decisions did not affect reconstruction or coordination questions only, but very often major economic problems as well. This was a question which would inevitably lead to discord. The P.M. had suggested that the Committee continue its normal functions but under the chairmanship of the P.M. The Amb. replied that he was glad to know of this, and that he thought the P.M.’s suggestion was fair and reasonable.⁸

The P.M. then referred to the actual size of the Greek Army. He said that it had been agreed between the Mission and the Govt. that by the end of 1950 the Greek Army would be reduced to 80,000 men. It has recently been decided, however, by both Marshal Papagos and General Jenkins that the Army should be increased to 120,000 men. Even counting for the fact that the Greek budget would not be burdened with the cost of the equipment of the Army, the extra expense in drachmas for this increase is estimated at some six hundred billions, which would necessarily have to come out of reconstruction funds. This, according to the P.M., is one of the unlucky aspects the present Govt, has to face. The Amb. said he was aware of this problem, and presented the P.M. with a letter⁹ which he had ready for him and which dealt with this question. The Amb. asked if this additional expense could not be procured through taxation. The P.M. replied that he was perfectly willing to increase taxation, but that he was afraid that additional taxes might have unfortunate effects. The Amb. pointed out that more taxes were again being demanded of the American people, and mentioned to the P.M. his own salary as an example. A full 20% of that salary never came to him. The Amb. added that he had not yet had the time to examine the financial side of this problem, but that he would do so as soon as possible. Mr. Venizelos said that a possible solution to the problem might be some kind of a military accord with Turkey and Yugoslavia. An understanding with Yugoslavia still presented great difficulties, but with Turkey seemed almost feasible. The P.M. had already instructed the Greek Ambassador at Ankara¹⁰ to approach the Turkish General Staff on the subject. The Turks did not seem to be displeased with the idea, but their reply as to whether they are disposed to begin negotiations with the Greek General Staff has not yet been received. The P.M. was hopeful that some arrangement could be reached, as a result of which it would not be necessary for Greece to increase her army. The Amb. said he was pleased to know of this démarche of the Greek Gov. and would appreciate being kept informed of further developments.

Another “unlucky” point which the P.M. raised was the Greek Brigade for Korea. Though this decision had been taken unanimously by the Greek Cabinet, it would, nevertheless, burden the budget with an extra thirty billion drachmas. The Amb. said that this decision had been received in the U.S. with great gratification, and that President Truman had expressed his appreciation of the gesture of the Greek people. He remarked that this question had still to be discussed with General Jenkins, and presented the P.M. with a communication on this subject.¹¹

The Amb. assured the P.M. of his fullest cooperation at all times, for which Mr. Venizelos expressed sincere thanks.

The interview terminated at 11:15 a. m.

S[tephen] T. C[alligas]

Athens, 27 September 1950.

1. For documentation on the activities of Paul A. Porter as Chief of the American Economic Mission to Greece with rank of Ambassador, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 1 ff.
2. For documentation on the activities of the special Greek Economic Mission to the United States, headed by Sophocles Venizelos, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. vii, pp. 180 and 190.
3. For Ambassador Grady’s views in this regard, see telegram 703, March 31, p. 356.
4. See editorial note, ibid .
5. After this point this paper bears the notation: “I also said this arrangement must work both ways.”
6. Constantine Tsaldaris, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Without Portfolio.
7. George Papandreou, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister Without Portfolio.
8. This paper bears a notation at this point which changes the period to a comma and reads as follows: “provided the Gov’t really made decisions.”
9. Dated September 27; enclosure 1 to despatch 547, October 4, from Athens, not printed (781.5/10–450).
10. Alexander Contournas.
11. Note No. 97 of September 27 from the Embassy in Greece to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not printed, is partly quoted in the editorial note, p. 435.