Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V

780.00/9–1850

Memorandum Prepared in the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

London, September 19, 1950

[Extract]²
secret

Memorandum of Informal US–UK Discussion in Connection With the Visit to London of the Honorable George C. McGhee Tuesday Afternoon, September 19, 1950

Topic for Discussion: GTI—Items 1 (except Iran) 2 and 3

Participants:	Foreign Office:
	Mr. M. R. Wright, Assistant Under Secretary of State
	Sir Anthony Rumbold, Head, Southern Department
	Lord Talbot de Malahide, Assistant Head, Southern Department
	Mr. H. S. Stephenson, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Trieste
	Miss R. M. B. Chevallier, Yugoslavia and Greece
	Mr. I. D. Adams, European Recovery
	Department of State:
	Hon. George C. McGhee
	Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper3
	American Embassy, London:
	Mr. Joseph Palmer 2nd4
	Mr. Edwin A. Willard5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cyprus (Not on Agenda)

The subject of Cyprus and enosis was then raised. Mr. McGhee said that although we did not wish to see this problem placed on the UN agenda, it was his opinion that we cannot stifle discussion on the union of Cyprus and Greece and that the question will in all likelihood, inevitably be raised. There are indications that the matter will be introduced by either Czechoslovakia or Egypt. Sir Anthony said that he thought the matter was not so pressing now as it had been and that his Government hoped to kill the question before it reached the point of debate. He admitted that debate might pacify the Greeks; but he added that we must keep in mind both the effect enosis would have on the Turks and the fact that Cyprus continues to have considerable importance as a military base.

Exchange of Views on Greek Political Situation (Item 3)

Both Sir Anthony and Mr. McGhee agreed that the present Greek Coalition Government was parliamentarily strong; but they also felt that if it fell, it would be necessary to hold majority elections. Mr. McGhee said it was not the US policy to intervene in Greece; but in the event that the Liberalists, the Nationalists, and the EPEK all were to secure relatively equal positions as the result of elections, it might be necessary for the American and British Ambassadors to intervene with the King if he were to show a tendency to keep EPEK out of power when all other indications were that this should not be the case.

Greek-Yugoslav Relations (Item 2)

The question of an exchange of diplomats between Greece and Yugoslavia was touched on briefly. Mr. McGhee agreed that both countries are highly dependent upon each other and that a substance of cooperation is required in order to build up strength against the Russians. On the face of it, the resumption of diplomatic relations is a good thing, but it is more important to see that trade relations are re-established. Sir Anthony pointed out that Mr. Ernest Davies⁶ had almost been successful in helping to effect an exchange of diplomats and that his efforts had been interrupted by the Yugoslav position on Macedonia and the resignation of the Plastiras. Mr. McGhee said it is the US policy to desire an improvement in Greek-Yugoslav relations, but an active pursuit of this objective should wait until the chances of success appear more auspicious.

Both Mr. McGhee and Sir Anthony agreed that UNSCOB should continue to exist with its present terms of reference as the simplest and most effective way of maintaining vigilance over the Greek situation; and, additionally, everything should be done to resolve the question of the 10,000 Greek children who are now in Yugoslavia. Sir Anthony noted that in this respect as well as in respect to trade relationships, a resumption of diplomatic relations would be of great help.

The question of a Bulgarian invasion of Greece was discussed; and Sir Anthony said that if this occurred, he believed that the Greek army could resist successfully. On the other hand, if Bulgaria should invade Yugoslavia, Sir Anthony did not believe that Greece would declare war on Bulgaria. If Bulgaria were to invade Greece, it was Mr. McGhee’s opinion that a pattern of UN forces, similar to those now in Korea, would have to be employed, once it had been determined by UNSCOB that Bulgaria was, in fact, the aggressor.

Both Sir Anthony and Mr. McGhee agreed that there would appear to be three possibilities of action within Greece: (1) the guerrilla threat, with which Greece herself could cope; (2) an open Bulgarian attack upon Greece, in which event the UN would probably be called upon to act; and (3) a Russian attack upon Greece, in which case the whole issue of war and peace would arise. However, both agreed that none of these eventualities is likely, for the moment at least, to occur. Any such activity is closely linked to the military question of who is responsible for taking action; and beyond taking the matter to the Security Council, any assistance would largely depend upon what forces were available in the area.

1. The authorship and date of preparation of this memorandum are not indicated on the source text. It is one of a set of memoranda covering the various agenda items discussed by Mr. McGhee during his visit to London, September 16–23; regarding that visit, see the editorial note, p. 192. Copies of this paper were sent to the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, as well as to the Embassies in Greece and Turkey.
2. For the remainder of this memorandum, see p. 1316.
3. Acting Deputy Director, Office of Near Eastern Affairs.
4. First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom and Consul at London.
5. Attaché at the Embassy in the United Kingdom.
6. Ernest A. J. Davies, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.