Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/8–1750: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

top secret   niact

Paris, August 17, 1950—7 p. m.

852. Parodi and Alphand have just handed me supplementary French memo on rearmament dated today whose original text follows. It is being handed to other NAT diplomatic representatives here but is not to be made public. Following is verbatim text:

“1. In its memorandum of August 5¹ the French Government affirmed its decision to implement a supplementary defense program of 2,000 billion francs including among other things the equipment of 15 new divisions. An effort of this magnitude cannot be fully effective unless it is placed within the framework of a collective organization oriented in all branches pursuant to a common directive. As already stated, the French Government wishes to make its views in the matter clear.

2. Its conception is not inspired in any way by theoretical considerations. The nations signatory to the Atlantic Pact are confronted with a huge group of countries whose resources have been pooled. The Atlantic nations, on the contrary, have too often acted without coordination. Although the sum total of the credits that they are devoting to national defense equals the military budgets of the countries from which they can fear aggression, although their human and industrial resources are far superior to those of their possible adversary, the practical results as regards the magnitude and the effectiveness of the means on hand cannot be compared. It is clear, therefore, that the policy followed and the existing organization do not meet the urgent requirements of the situation and that they give rise to duplication, waste, and loss of strength, which unity in conception and execution alone can eliminate.

3. The French proposals are based on the experience of the last two wars:

In 1914, France had at first to carry almost alone the military and financial burden of the war. Little by little unity of organization became imperative and was obtained by the appointment of the Commander-in-Chief and the economic and financial agreements concluded between France, Great Britain, and the United States.

During the last world war, it was only in 1942 that unity of conception and direction was achieved thanks to the personal relations of two great statesmen, the conclusion of the lend-lease agreements and the establishment of joint agencies of execution.²

Today it is a question, in time of peace and to safeguard the peace, of establishing a collective system and of avoiding the heavy sacrifices resulting during the last two wars from inadequate and belated organization. The Atlantic Pact constitutes the permanent legal framework making it possible to ensure, on the diplomatic, military, and economic level, the coherence of forces and the distribution of burdens.

4. The object of our undertaking must constantly be called to the attention of public opinion: it is not a question of preparing for war, but of organizing a defense strong enough to preserve the peace.

The general policy of the Atlantic nations with regard to a possible aggressor should be discussed in common. The initiatives of any kind to be taken to this end by any one of us must, in so far as they concern the relations of all with the possible aggressor, be decided in common, either by our qualified representatives on the Atlantic Council or through diplomatic channels.

5. In the military field, the Atlantic nations must move quickly toward unity of command. Plans must be made for the constitution of an agency which, like the combined chiefs of staff in the last war, is capable of determining the general strategy from now on and of directing all operations according to a single conception. The French Government thinks that for this purpose the permanent group³ should henceforth function as a general staff. It would thus be in a position to become the organ of the High Command of all possible theaters of operation, avoiding the present division (cloisonnements). Every possible theater of operations, the limits of which would be fixed in advance by common agreement, would be placed under one command with a general staff which would be subordinated to the permanent group. The present regional so-called “planning” groups would thus be eliminated.

The permanent group would moreover be charged with determining the military means necessary for carrying out an effective common defense. It would collaborate for this purpose with the executive agency whose establishment is provided for in paragraph 8 below.

All the agencies, whether established under the Brussels Pact or the Atlantic Pact, which are at present duplicating work should also be eliminated.

In order to enable the Atlantic Council to provide for the measures necessary for ensuring the implementation of the coordinated defense plans in this sense, the French Government proposes that the Council of Deputies invite the permanent group, in consultation with the qualified representatives of the countries signatory to the Brussels Pact, to transmit to it at an early date, to be fixed, precise proposals for the reorganization of the military institutions of the Brussels Pact and the Atlantic Pact in the sense indicated above.

6. The concern for putting our resources to the best use should lead us to centralize and manage in the most efficient manner the greatest possible part of the means alloted by each country to defense needs, which implies:

(a) The establishment jointly of a general program including standardized arms and equipment to be produced, the forces to be raised, the substructures to be established, the stocks to be built up and, in general, all the expenses of common defense;

(b) The most rapid production possible of the arms and equipment which are the subject of the joint program, taking care to use to the fullest the production capacities of the Atlantic countries and to standardize, to the full extent necessary, the matériel used;

(c) The fairest possible distribution of the financial burdens of the common defense;

(d) Application of a joint policy looking to the distribution of raw materials and means of transport, as well as to the fight against inflation;

7. In order to attain the objectives thus defined, the French Government proposes the establishment of a “joint budget”. Concentration of the elements of financial contributions seems really the only means for establishing the collective organization which we believe indispensable.

The joint budget would progressively assume charge of as much as possible of the military expenses which, according to present methods, are dispersed in the national budgets; it would be credited with contributions that would be paid into it by the different states, as well as with the proceeds from special receipts that might be voted by all the parliaments for the defense of the peace. It would favor the carrying out of collective credit operations. Finally, it ought to assure an equitable equalization of the burdens among the participating states.

Thus the expenses of joint defense fixed by the participating countries would be covered under conditions of effectiveness and economy very much superior to those resulting from the individual administrative activities carried on at present.

The French Government must however, emphasize that the joint budget is merely the instrument of the policy which it wishes to see applied by the Atlantic nations and does not represent an end in itself. If some other financial system will permit attainment of the same objectives, the French Government is ready to examine the methods thereof with the participating countries.

8. The application of such policy demands the setting up under the control of the Atlantic Council of an executive body endowed with the broadest possible powers of decision. Such executive (body) would be charged with all the missions described in paragraph 6 above. However, save in exceptional cases, it would not itself be empowered to place orders or make payments. Such operations being reserved, within the framework of decisions taken, to the national administrations acting as agencies of the executive (body).

9. The European countries of the Atlantic Pact can and must supply a large part of the joint production effort. They have at their disposal unused resources of labor and productive capacity. However, the defense policy must not lead to abandoning the constructive action undertaken by the European countries during recent years in order to free trade, create a single market, specialize production and coordinate investments. It should, on the contrary, confirm this development, hasten the realization of the European community and improve the productivity of its economy.

10. The French Government must recall to mind the fact that the defense effort cannot be carried out except on sound economic bases. The financial stability of the European countries, the maintenance of a sufficiently high standard of living for their people must be considered as a capital element of their defense potential. The Atlantic nations must take care that the economic and social consequences of the effort undertaken do not give to a possible adversary advantages perhaps more certain than those which they might expect from the exploitation of his military means.

Furthermore, certain currencies must not run the risk, because of this effort, of becoming more devalued than others. Confidence in European currencies which, in many cases, has been established only recently and still precariously, must be safeguarded.

The countries of Europe cannot let themselves drift into a policy of inflation such as the adversaries of the Atlantic Pact are hoping for and predicting. Specific pledges in this respect should be signed by the different countries.

It is necessary that through an appropriate monetary agreement among the countries participating in the pact, the stability of national currencies with respect to one another and particularly their stability with respect to the strongest of them, the United States dollar, be guaranteed. The guarantee machinery adopted should obviously not result in causing any one country to support the burden of an inflationary policy which might be followed by another participating country.

11. It goes without saying that the institution of the necessary collective organization should not have the effect of permitting any country to defer the efforts which it is in a position to make immediately. That is why the French Government hopes that the priority armament program which is being worked out may be executed with the greatest possible speed and that a temporary system may be set up for covering these urgent expenses. It should not be forgotten, however, that this immediate program must, subsequently, be integrated into the general program and that the institution of a collective organization, which is an essential task, must be decided upon and undertaken without any delay.

12. The French Government is extremely anxious to know whether the Government of the United States and the other governments which are members of the Atlantic Pact are in agreement with the above-mentioned principles.

The organizations necessary for carrying this out can be studied as soon as the principles themselves are decided on. That is why a prompt reply appears necessary.

The French Government has, at the same time, made known through the present memorandum certain possible methods of execution. It would be ready, naturally, to discuss them as soon as an agreement is reached on principles and to consider any other arrangements which would permit the attainment of the object agreed upon.”

Sent Department 852; repeated information London 242.

Bruce

1. For additional information on the memorandum of August 5, see editorial note, p. 1382, and despatch 564 from Paris, September 1, p. 1383.
2. For documentation on the decisions reached by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at Washington in January 1942, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Washington, 1941–1942, and Casablanca, 1943, pp. 1 ff.
3. A marginal notation on the source text indicates that the French Embassy considered this to mean the NATO Standing Group.