Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III

740.5/8–1650

The Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance (Burns)

top secret

[Washington,] August 16, 1950.

Dear General Burns: The various interested officials of the Department of State have concurred in the principles set forth in the attached paper subject to consideration by the Secretary subsequent to his return. It is known that the Secretary is in general agreement with the concept advanced in this paper, but he has not had the opportunity of examining all of the conclusions and recommendations of this particular paper.

It is our desire to reach early agreement with the Department of Defense on the subject matter covered in this paper and that the general concept be approved by the President. The urgency of the situation, the scheduled departure of Mr. Spofford for Europe, and the desire to approach the French and British Governments sufficiently prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers scheduled next month to allow consideration there, all indicate that no time should be lost in arriving at the necessary decisions. Subject to approval by the Secretary, we therefore desire to place this matter before the President by the beginning of next week at the very latest.

Department of Defense concurrence or comments would therefore be appreciated at the earliest possible date. Representatives of the Department of State will stand available for joint discussion of the substance of this paper if that should prove desirable from the viewpoint of your Department.

Sincerely yours,

H. Freeman Matthews

[Enclosure]

Establishment of a European Defense Force

estimate of the situation

The creation of a more effective defense system in Western Europe is of critical importance. The inability of the Western forces to protect this vital area of Western civilization from possible Soviet aggression, though realized as a security matter, has now created a problem which is rapidly becoming acute in the psychological and political field. Thus, while a greater measure of defense capability is needed for possible protection of this area, it is becoming equally important to prevent the dangerous trend towards a fear and resignation psychosis that could in the last analysis through loss of confidence and of political strength result in destroying the moral tissue without which there can be no security effort.

The efforts of the Western European countries, with assistance from the United States, to resist the spread of Communism in Europe have been on the whole admirable. Communist Party strength, and hence Soviet control, in Europe west of areas under complete Soviet control has steadily declined. Even in Germany, a divided country on the very edge of the Iron Curtain, the will to resist Communism and make a free choice towards the West has been particularly strong. Again, in Germany, the Western Powers hold the initiative vis-à-vis Soviet influence more clearly today than at any time in the past several years, in spite of a more vehement and vigorous attack recently directed by the Soviets against this area. It is only the threat of crude force and the fear of possible Soviet occupation that can deprive the West of its present initiative. Hence we can conclude that there is no lack of will to fight amongst the peoples of Western Europe provided there is the confidence that is inspired by the feeling that they have at least a chance of success in the defense of their countries.

We have embarked on a program through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Military Assistance Program of building up European and Atlantic defense forces to provide both real strength and the confidence that such strength inspires. The long delay in the completion of such programs has become increasingly more apparent since the launching of Communist aggression in Korea and the failure of U.N. forces to rapidly cope with the North Korean aggression. The fact that the staunch defender of the Western cause, the United States, could not promptly turn back the threat to South Korea has caused many in Europe to contemplate their own fate if the present forces in being in the Soviet Union were turned upon them. They have not forgotten the greatness of American military strength in two wars in Europe and do not doubt our long range capabilities. However, this trust in the eventual capability of a mobilized America cannot dispel their hopelessness when they feel, and perhaps rightly, that their Western Civilization could not survive another occupation—and this time at the hands of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, it has become increasingly more apparent to each nation in Western Europe that their individual efforts, regardless of the proportion of their national income they expend for military production, cannot effectively defend their own borders. Since the Korean invasion the urge for a “common defense” has rapidly multiplied. The will to sacrifice for the common defense seems to be accepted in all quarters. Likewise, the need to increase the industrial and military potential of the West through some acceptable solution for the contribution by Germany to European defense is becoming more apparent.

The Department of State has opposed, and still strongly opposes, the creation of German national forces. This view is supported by the United States High Commissioner for Germany and by the U.S. Ambassadors in the major Western European countries. Such a move is strongly opposed by France who is assuming more and more the position of leadership on the Continent.

We have long conceived, however, that an effective European integration, including Western Germany, would provide the basis for eventual German contribution to the common cause in Europe, even in the security field. The advent of the Schuman Plan for coal and steel and the general deterioration of the world situation has caused a rapid increase in the feeling to unite Europe in all fields possible, including the military. This situation can be further strengthened by evidence of a United States willingness to accept the responsibility inherent in full participation in the European defense effort. If such participation is forthcoming, it is believed conditions may now be favorable in Europe for creating a really effective European Defense Force which could assimilate a direct contribution by Germany in the common defense of Western Europe in a manner acceptable to all concerned. This involves in practice the voluntary surrender of a degree of sovereignty in the most vital of all elements of sovereignty, i.e., the security field. Such would follow from the establishment of an international Commander with real authority as the European Nations would, in such an arrangement, accept the fact that their own units would be utilized for the common defense of Western Europe as contrasted to the protection of individual boundaries. If properly handled a partial surrender of sovereignty in the military field could become a driving force toward further unification in Western Europe. It now devolves upon the United States to determine whether, along with the assumption of a greater measure of responsibility on our part, the European nations are prepared to accept such a major move for the common effort.

Full United States participation in European defense, the addition of German industrial and manpower potential to that of the West, a general increase in Allied troops in being in Europe, and public knowledge of the establishment of a command structure with real authority would not only provide an atmosphere of confidence but the morale to insure maximum contribution from all concerned.

This implies the formation of a European Defense Force of United States, U.K. and Continental military contingents, including those from Germany, under a Supreme Commander with full Command authority and supported by an international General Staff. It implies eventual German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It also implies central direction of production and procurement for military purposes under a concept of European-wide procurement which would at the same time maintain the dependent nature of German forces in that they would not be supplied in vital equipment from German industry. From the German viewpoint alone, if for no other reason, the Command, General Staff and procurement organization must necessarily be international in character to the extent that it is evident everywhere that there has been formed, not only on paper but in actual practice, a European Defense Force as contrasted to a voluntary assemblage of purely national forces. Combined informational media should be utilized to the utmost in insuring public knowledge of this overall motivating concept.

United States leadership would be essential for bringing into being such a European Defense Force. It seems essential that we take advantage without delay of the opportunity that may now be afforded towards increasing the effectiveness of our Allies in the present situation. The preliminary decisions required by this Government should be defined and dealt with so that our representatives will be in a position to explore such a concept at an early date with other governments concerned. Such decisions required by this Government are believed to be covered in the analysis below.

Basic Elements in the Formulation of a European Defense Force

A. Over-all Direction by Governments.

The European Defense Force would be subject to the NATO political and strategic guidance exercised through the existing NATO structure until more precise arrangements may be agreed to. Political guidance would be provided by the Deputies through the Standing Group. Strategic guidance would be furnished by the Standing Group reorganized along the lines of the wartime Combined Chiefs of Staff, serviced by adequate staff organization under a US Director. This involves delegation of increased authority to the Standing Group both by the governments represented on it and other governments. It is believed that all governments concerned are now substantially prepared for this step.

B. Command and General Staff Direction.

There should in due course be a single commander for the European Defense Force who shall have delegated authority from Governments for complete jurisdiction over the units comprising his force. This power would be similar to the type delegated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the last war to Generals Eisenhower and MacArthur. This is a vital step in the organization of the force. To obtain maximum effect for this concept an American commander should be selected for this post. The political value of a U.S. commander carrying with it the implication of full U.S. participation and the well-known feeling of responsibility which the U.S. holds towards its representatives will add an element of strength to the European Defense Force concept and be a clear indication of the full commitment of the U.S.

It is not believed that the European nations will interpose any objection to such an appointment. Any objection on their part would be made more difficult by the announced intention of the U.S. to materially increase its present forces in Europe, a measure which is of great importance in itself to effective strength in Western Europe. It is recognized that the keystone of European defense will center around what is now the Western Union grouping and which will be augmented by U.S. and German contingents. The overall commander must be close enough, both in location and organization, to perform command control of these units.

It is conceivable that in the actual war situation a single European commander may not prove the most efficient organization for the conduct of the European war. It may be necessary to split the European region as was done between SHAEF and the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean in World War II. Operations in wartime in the European Theater may not be mutually supporting and may be of a greater extent than a single commander can effectively control. However, during the period when the European Defense Force is being organized and trained, the psychological effect of a single commander far outweighs any considerations of a figure of lesser jurisdiction. As the plans of operations develop within the regional groups, the decision as to further subdivision of command can be easily determined.

The single commander should be serviced by an integrated staff. The composition of such a staff should be drawn from the nationals of the European nations and include full American participation. Since the general staff is without true command responsibility, there should be no hesitation to utilize German nationals on this staff without regard to level of position. This integrated staff should service the overall commander with all necessary staff support for field direction. It would not be burdened with procurement. The establishment of such a staff (Cossack¹ pattern of World War II), less German participation, appears to be a matter of urgency and should be initiated without awaiting action on all aspects of the problem as defined in this paper.

C. Field Forces.

The field forces which comprise the European Defense Force should be composed of national contingents. The national contingents will comprise insofar as possible all national forces of the European countries concerned. No such national units committed to the European Defense Force should be withdrawn by any nation without common consent.

The organization of Army Group, Field Army and Corps (and the comparable units of air and navy) should present no difficulty and is a matter for decision of the over-all commander. For maximum efficiency it may be desirable not to carry the international aspect of the force below the lowest completely balanced ground, air or naval fighting unit. The German contribution presents a special problem. It is considered that a maximum rank should be established for German commanders at about the division command level. German units of division strength should be integrated with non-German units in corps and higher units. The German contribution to the European Defense Force would be in terms of ground units only, with other nations providing naval and air contingents, including the tactical air force. Germany having no overseas commitments would have no loophole under which she could withhold her contingents.

As regards internal use of EDF forces, withdrawal of national units from the European Defense Force should be considered only in the event of a crisis effecting the security of the entire area.

D. Production, Procurement and Supply.

The field of production, procurement and supply vitally effects the concept and its organization should parallel the international character of the European Defense Force. This is essential to insure practical implementation of the balanced force and common defense principles. Supply of these forces should be based upon the general theory of contribution in proportion to national capabilities. Responsibility and authority for the direction of production, procurement and supply of major items should be centralized to provide leadership and insure against wasted and misdirected effort.

This should be done within the framework of the NATO Military Production and Supply Board by setting up an executive group, highly qualified in the production field, supported by an integrated staff oragnized on the lines of a war production board for Europe. In view of the large U.S. contribution which will be made in this field and the power which resides in such contributions in appropriated dollars and counterpart ECA funds, the director of this group should be an American. Also, as an American, it is obvious that he would be less susceptible to charges of favoritism in making European allocations. One of the general principles in the production field, and this is of great importance, is that production and procurement should be so adjusted that the heavy weapons, ammunition and spare parts for essential ordnance material would not be produced in Germany. Such a concept would in a very practical way more effectively tie Germany to the West. Final determination of requirements for the European Defense Force would be determined by the Standing Group.

E. National Security Organizations.

The national security organizations of contributing nations will continue as presently organized with such defense ministers, national general staffs and national supply agencies as exist. However, the national general staffs shall be outside the command channel between the supreme commander and the units of the nation concerned in the EDF. They will continue to exercise command relationships to such national forces not a part of the EDF as provided in the exceptions noted in paragraph B. Within Germany there should be no general staff but a federal ministry should be established to organize recruitment of the German national units. This federal ministry would be in the nature of and in general perform the functions which the Army Service Forces (U.S.) performed during World War II. It will be a procurement and service agency without command responsibilities.

Certain conditions must be accepted in considering a German contribution to the European Defense Force. The federal ministry will organize the recruitment of individuals within Germany which initially will be raw blocks of manpower not organized in combat units. These groups will be turned over to the European supreme commander for organization and training. Such training should logically be done in Germany since the rationing and pay of individuals would be done by the German Government. However, such training could be done in other western European countries, if facilities exist and if deemed politically more desirable. After completion of training into effective units, the German contingents would logically be positioned in Germany. This means in effect that German units will be organized, probably will be trained and will be garrisoned in Germany. It is of utmost importance that the European character of these units be emphasized throughout. The ordinary detail of such matters as insignia, flags, uniform characteristics and titles of military rank should advance the European concept wherever feasible.

F. Equipment.

The rapid provision of the necessary equipment for the European Defense Forces is vital, not only for its effectiveness in combat but as a psychological factor in furthering the concept of real strength being extended to Europe. This is particularly true in the case of Germany, although undoubtedly true as well in France and the low countries. A paper force without equipment could give little real lift. The U.S. should immediately review its programs to determine what equipment can be diverted as a matter of priority to the initial supply of the European Defense Force, which could later be supplemented by procurement on a North Atlantic wide basis, in which Germany would be included.

conclusions

1. The United States should accept the concept that the formation of a European Defense Force, of international character, involving increased US, UK and Continental forces (including those of Germany) is in the security interests of the United States.

2. To insure the international aspects of such a force it would have to operate under a single commander and be served by an international General Staff. As a step in this direction, and to meet an immediate requirement in its own right, there should be appointed at an early date a Chief of Staff for Western Europe (for an eventual Supreme Commander) with adequate international staff. A priority mission of this staff would be to plan the organization of the European Defense Force.

3. Such a force would be under the higher direction of the NATO Standing Group reorganized along the lines of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with adequate staff support under a US director. The Director should be given a broad directive from the Standing Group (for the US and other national JCS) and full freedom to plan within this directive.

4. For the maximum utilization of production capabilities, as well as to further the concept of the European Defense Force it would be necessary to place production and procurement of major items under central direction.

5. To achieve the desired results it is essential that full participation by the United States be extended to NATO European Defense Organs. Specifically this would require that the Supreme Commander of the European Defense Force be an American national and that full US participation be extended to the International General Staff. The international production and procurement organization should also be headed by an American.

6. That the concept of the formation of a European Defense Force should be discussed as a matter of urgency with the European nations concerned. In order not to prejudice the successful outcome of discussions with the French and British, and eventually with the Germans, it is imperative that the utmost secrecy be maintained as to the nature of these conclusions.

recommendations

1. That the above conclusions be approved and the Secretary of State be authorized to proceed with the necessary diplomatic negotiations.

2. That the governing principles for the formation of a European Defense Force as outlined in this paper be accepted for planning purposes within the US Government and as a basis for discussion by the Secretary of State with the representatives of European nations. Final decision by the US Government on the details of the plan should be made only after consideration of the views of the other governments involved.

3. That the Departments of State and National Defense formulate plans so that the necessary steps can be taken to implement these decisions when intergovernmental agreement thereto has been reached.

1. See footnote 1, p. 183.