740.5/8–1150: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State
top secret secret
Frankfort, August 11,
1950—9 p. m.
1234. Eyes only for Secretary and Byroade. This reflects my further views on European defense in light of Department 949 to Frankfort,1 Department 629 to London, Douglas’ 720 and 784 to Department, Bruce’s 741 and 742 to Department, Kirk’s 359 to Department and my talks in London and Paris.
[Page 206]- 1.
- Fully agree with view of Douglas, Bruce and Kirk that US and UK forces in Europe should be increased as rapidly as is consistent with out [our] total obligations. Greater Allied strength on continent particularly in US and British elements would bolster confidence, encourage greater defense efforts and reduce corrosive effects of fear of Communist invasion. My estimate is that increase of US and British forces by say two new divisions each, together with corresponding French increase, would have profound effect. Such action must, of course, be coordinated with our other responsibilities which must be judged from Washington but full weight should be given to importance of such added forces in Europe. Beyond the psychological effect, and just as important, these additions with other available units would enable us to cope with an attack by eastern forces even though strongly augmented during the coming year, as I assume they will be. They would greatly discourage the Soviet from promoting such an attack unless they were prepared to fully deploy their own forces.
- 2.
- Subsequent exchanges of views have strengthened opinions in my 962 to Department that genuine European army provides only practical means of mobilizing Europe for effective defense. Accordingly, fully agree that immediate start should be made toward working out practical problems of creating and organizing such an army under single command and unified staff. Believe it wiser to stress its European rather than NAT aspect and to arrange for US (and if necessary UK) participation through NAT framework as suggested in Douglas’ 784.
- 3.
- While German participation even in European army must await French acceptance, I do not believe US or others should defer arriving at definite position awaiting that or other developments. The uncertainty as to time available for strengthening European defense and great desirability of having largest possible strength by next summer make each month too precious to allow delay. My impression is that French will respond to the same necessities as US and will not oppose prompt action within a European army structure.
- 4.
- I heartily concur in Bruce’s 742 to Department regarding program for European rearmament. Also urge sympathetic exploration of French idea for each country to make available to Central agency substantial funds for common procurement. This would fit into and strengthen the European army concept and might avoid much of the delay likely to result from national procurement on agreed basis.
- 5.
- Am fully aware that execution of recommended program poses difficult problems of organization and planning but see none that could not be solved by intelligent cooperation. The essential thing is to agree promptly on the basic objectives and then tackle the practical [Page 207] problems with the determination to work them out as quickly as possible.
Sent Department 1234, repeated priority information London eyes only for Douglas 98, Paris eyes only for Bruce 106.
McCloy