740.5/8–950: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Paris, August 9,
1950—8 p. m.
742. Departmental distribution as directed by Secretary’s Office.
- 1.
- In connection with the European rearmament program I believe it essential that we bear in mind the necessity of conceiving it as a collective enterprise and not an agglomeration of national efforts. Consideration should at once be given to MDAP resources no longer being siphoned off bilaterally but being disposed of under a common centralized direction.
- 2.
- What has heretofore been lacking in the NAT planning and MDAP
operation has been the necessary integrated plans. It would seem
that steps in NAT planning process
will be in the following logical sequence:
- (a)
- Establishment of an estimate of forces required for the defense of western Europe.
- (b)
- Estimate of the quantity and types of equipment, i.e., tanks, anti-aircraft, anti-tank, aircraft, etc., necessary to arm the forces required.
- (c)
- Establishment of a procurement and production program in accordance with capacity and cost of production by countries.
- (d)
- Economic and financial provision particularly from the US, necessary to permit individual countries to fulfill their shares as outlined in (c) above.
- 3.
- We have properly launched our additional preparations for rearmament by marshalling our financial resources and calling upon our allies to do likewise. Each participant in NATO is feverishly engaged in making computations as to what, on a national basis, it can contribute to a common effort. Some are enthusiastically placing production orders with no thought of how the end products will contribute to a joint endeavor. On the whole, such actions are not to be deplored, for at least they sustain an impulse to get under way, and most of these efforts will bring into being weapons of standard utility. But, if these projects continue without central direction, vast expenditures will accomplish comparatively little, especially as production patterns become frozen.
- 4.
- The procurement and production program envisaged in 2 (c) above should be instituted under a small group of competent experts from several countries, headed by an American. They must make the best use of industrial resources wherever available.
- 5.
- In this regard German industrial potential should be considered. (I agree with Douglas that it is a delusion to think that PLI would not be affected by our probable decisions.) Any attempt at this time to revive German war making facilities would be utterly mistaken. This should only be contemplated when unused capacity of this [Page 197] character amongst our partners is fully exploited or when it can be discussed without bitter friction. In this connection, a rise in the level of German steel output beyond actual limitations before the conclusion of the Schuman Plan would be fraught with grave consequences.
- We should, however, devote our attention to industrial production in Germany for collateral uses, such as manufacture of trucks, spare parts and a variety of other non-military items. By offshore purchases and other expedients normal in ECA procedures we should be able to do this initially without raising at this time political questions of steel level or change in PLI.
- 6.
- Financing of this procurement and production program will require sacrifices from all participants. I have discussed with Spofford the French idea of having a portion of the sum total of national appropriations subject to the control of a central body, presumably headed by an American. The French hold strong views on this point and will soon submit the technical working papers regarding it. I do not think that the suggestion should be dismissed out of hand. It has great merit from the standpoint of unifying otherwise dispersed efforts, of increasing efficiency and economy in production, and of avoiding waste. The necessary qualifications can be imposed to safeguard US funds from being disproportionately utilized by other participants to our disadvantage.
Sent Department 742, repeated information London for Douglas 216, HICOG Frankfort for McCloy 103.
Bruce