740.00119 Control (Korea)/5–1149: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
urgent
527. ReDeptel 330, May 9. I assume that observations in reftel re military, Naval and air demands were based on requests presented by Chough1 and not on my own modest recommendations. I do not know what Chough has requested and I doubt whether Rhee himself knows.
My requests have been based on conviction that only small well integrated Korean defense force is essential and in view of delicate security situation within South Korea there must be no lapse in either timely availability or weakness in any one essential category. Following comments re these requests may be pertinent.
(a) Steps taken by CINCFE and USAFIK assure fulfillment of arming and equipping Korean army by time of withdrawal.
(b) Studies now being finalized to set up facilities for repairing both Japanese and American arms and equipment. Small ordnance plant projected will also be capable of producing ammunition for Japanese rifles stock of which is practically depleted with no replacements available either here or in Japan.
(c) Regarding vessels sufficient to prevent smuggling and hostile infiltration. It is absurd to pour in hundreds of millions of dollars for economic aid and not spend a small amount to prevent critical items being smuggled to North Korea and to Japan and North China.
It is of equal importance to stop Communist guerrillas and agents who now find it simpler to infiltrate by sea than to try to cross the Thirty Eighth.
[Page 1019]Should NME be unable to provide craft requested mytel 447 April 26 suggest exploring possibility of having ECA purchase same as insurance safeguarding aid.
I think it will be admitted these requests are modest. They were prepared by me with the best American advice available. They do not reflect Korean far-flung demands for aid, pacts, etc. whipped up this past week. There is no doubt, however, that Rhee has tightened up considerably on the question of withdrawal awed by developments in China and jarred by border incidents and defections last week. He and all close to him were genuinely jittery.
UNCOK is not yet decided what part, if any, it should play in question withdrawal. It has not yet formally discussed my letter of April 14 and May 2.2 Luna and Liu are still absent.3 I am sure however, that UNCOK will go along with any decision.
In conclusion my recent telegrams do not reflect decision on my part for any fundamental revision of NSC 8/2.4 Army here has been readying itself for withdrawal and favorable action on my request for few fit coast guard vessels and modicum observation and transport planes would be real help in bringing Koreans around. I still hope to be able to have Rhee agree within few days to June 30.
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Korean Special Representative John M. Chang had forwarded to the Department under cover of an undated letter, probably transmitted on March 24, a lengthy memorandum from Chough Pyung Ok dated March 23 containing specific requests for military aid. On April 20, Mr. Butterworth acknowledged receipt of Dr. Chang’s letter and promised that Dr. Chough’s memorandum would receive “careful study and consideration.” (895.20 Mission/3–2449) None of the above mentioned documents are printed.
Dr. Chough stated in his memorandum that the specific requests for military aid had been approved by President Rhee. The document called for a standing Army of 100,000, minimum strength, plus a 50,000 man Militia, also minimum strength; a 3,000 man Air Force (minimum); a Sea Force of 10,000 (minimum); and a Police Force of 50,000 (unchanged from the present figure). An attached annex listed exact numbers of weapons, planes, ships, and other supplies desired from the United States.
↩ - See telegram 299, April 28, to Seoul, p. 997.↩
- Reference is to Rufino Luna and Liu Yu-Wan, Philippine and Chinese representatives on UNCOK.↩
- Dated March 22, p. 969.↩