895.20 Mission/5–449
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador in Korea (Muccio)1
| Participants: | President Rhee |
| Prime Minister | |
| Minister of Defense | |
| Mr. Muccio | |
| General Roberts | |
| Mr. Drumright |
Mr. Muccio, accompanied by General Roberts and Mr. Drumright, called on President Rhee by appointment today. The President was accompanied by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense.
(The conversation largely revolved about the question of the augmentation of the Korean Military Advisory Group and the utilization of American consultants; all this has been reported in a separate memorandum of conversation.)2
The Korean Minister of Defense, referring to the situation in China, asked whether Mr. Muccio thought relations between Korea and the United States should be reconsidered in the light thereof. Mr. Muccio replied that he deplored the turn of events in China, but he asserted that he felt that the outcome of the struggle in that country would not be clear for some time to come. Mr. Muccio went on to express the view that recent events in China would make no appreciable imprint on the Korean problem in the meantime and in fact might give Korea a breathing space as the Communists—even though successful—will be so preoccupied with getting settled in North China that they won’t have time to think of Korea. He asserted that, a world conflict apart, he did not think there would be an invasion of South Korea from the north. The Minister of Defense said that in her history Korea had twice looked to the United States for guidance and assistance, but that the United States had not responded. He went on to state that although all China appeared to be going Red, all patriotic Koreans would fight the communists. Captain Sihn then inquired what aid could be expected from the United States “when the time comes?”
Mr. Muccio replied that in his view the most urgent need at the moment was to set up a sound, strong and good Government in Korea, a Government that will satisfy the aspirations of the Korean people. [Page 1004] If such a Government is set up, and he expressed belief that it is being set up, little trouble should be anticipated from North Korea. But in the case of a world conflagration, Mr. Muccio said it was beyond his ken and authority to go into that problem. At this juncture, the President stated that when in New York (before 1945) he had received a report through certain channels that some of the Soviet authorities were worrying about the future Korean connection with the United States. These Soviet authorities had instituted inquiries; for example, whether Korea would engage U.S. Military officers. The President said that this information was most interesting, so much so, in fact, that he had sent word of it to the State and War Departments.3 The President then added it seemed to him that the main purpose of Communist propaganda was to keep the United States and Korea divided. The President then said he wished to be frank. He went on to say that there was a question in the minds of the Korean people whether the United States can be relied upon. The Korean people never thought, he said, that the United States would drop China. The Korean people really do not know, he explained, what the U.S. Government should do. Here Mr. Muccio interjected that disintegration had been going on in China for several years. The President brought the subject back to Korea, asserting that 50 years ago during the final stages of the corrupt and incompetent Li Dynasty, the Korean people had said, “Never mind.” “Now, they say, let’s all die together,” the President went on to say with great emotion. “We will keep on fighting anyway, no matter what position the United States may take.”
The President went on to say that twice in 40 years the United States had abandoned Korea. Theodore Roosevelt had done so the first time4 and Franklin D. Roosevelt had done so the second time at Yalta.5 These matters, the president went on, are in the minds of the Korean people. The Americans liberated Korea, and they give us aid, but if the United States has to be involved in war to save Korea, how much can Korea count on the United States. Then there is the China situation and what can be done about that? Having delivered himself of these statements, the President then said: “We need assurance we will be aided.” Mr. Muccio replied that the United States had been aiding Korea, that it is aiding Korea at the present time, and that it proposes to continue aiding Korea in the future. In a word, he said, it is our definite policy to aid Korea. The economic rehabilitation program we have in effect provides the basis for the economic well-being of the Korean people. The military assistance program now being finalized will make available arms, munitions, and equipment sufficient for assuring internal stability, and also enable South Korea to defend [Page 1005] itself against hostile infiltration and any attack short of an all-out international conflagration. The Prime Minister then injected his usual stand that South Korea should be kept by the United States within its Pacific line of defense as a bridgehead on the continent for the impending war with the U.S.S.R. Mr. Muccio pointed out that the United States was doing everything to avoid war, that the vast majority of the people of the United States were still of the opinion that world war was not inevitable, and that we were straining every resource to avert war, that we were all doing our very best to win the cold war and that it was not up to us here to prepare for a hot war. Should that unfortunately come about, the military would have to step in and take over direction.
The President then asserted it had been suggested the United States has decided it is not worth while to try to defend Korea. Hence the proposals made working for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. In this connection, the President cited the Royall statement on Japan6 as indicative of the American position in this respect. If Japan was outside the United States defense line, the President suggested, then Korea must be well outside that line. The President then asserted that the story of the contraction of the U.S. defense line in the Pacific had been spread all over Korea. Its spread had created great unrest and had furnished much grist to the Communist propaganda mill. Only the other day, the President went on, Kim Koo7 had told three thousand Koreans at Kunsan that the United States was dropping Korea, and so on. The President added that most Koreans were determined to fight to the last man, come what may, but a few people were not that way; some were defeatist. All this, he continued, has a tremendous influence under the surface. The President then said he would be grateful if President Truman and the State Department could help him clarify this situation. “We have certain assurances,” the President said, “but it remains a difficult and critical situation.”
- Transmitted as an enclosure to despatch No. 245, May 4, from Seoul, received in the Department on May 18.↩
- Supra.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 1093–1094, 1095–1096.↩
- See ibid., 1945, vol. vi, p. 1028, footnote 31.↩
- See ibid., p. 1021, footnote 11.↩
- See airgram 35 from Tokyo, February 12, p. 648.↩
- Former President of the Provisional Government of Korea in Exile (in China), and Head of the Korean Independence Party.↩