501.BC Indonesia/4–349: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
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323, Gocus 650, My emphasis has been on endeavoring get parties face each other soonest in best possible atmosphere for final effort work out fair settlement through two stages of preliminary discussions Batavia and round table conference Hague.
Toward this end I urged both parties accept UNCFI invitation unconditionally. I protested to Schuurman when Netherlands led off with acceptance containing their usual reservation with respect to their interpreting their own responsibility for freedom and order. He only replied that Republicans could in turn make what reservations or conditions they desired. They did just this (Gocus 6492), influenced considerably I believe by AusDel. Conditions thus advanced naturally make conference more difficult than if parties had not so announced their positions. On other hand, each knew reservations other had and these were bound come out early in meetings, so harm is not too serious provided neither party or partisan press take such exception to conditions so imposed as to interfere with convening of meetings or place additional pre-conference conditions.
[Page 360]With reference Usgoc 347 and 3483 I provide hereunder certain ideas as to what Netherlands must do and what I am willing endeavor help obtain from Republicans for whatever use Department may see fit make thereof.
My thought is however that use of these ideas should be kept on informal basis and both Stikker and Spaak reminded strictly of full provisions SC resolution January 28 and directive March 23. As one of three representatives on UNCFI, I cannot recommend escapes from SC demands. With US as party to both decisions, I have not freedom which I assumed prior to police action of working independently of UNCFI with one or both parties. Republicans well aware their rights from SC debates and Netherlands deeply entrenched behind public opinion and official statements.
To achieve successful UNCFI conference Batavia, which is prerequisite to any round table talks Hague, believe Netherlands must:
- 1.
- Have Van Royen manifest from beginning sincere and generous attitude toward cooperating in endeavor reach settlement.
- 2.
- Move soonest toward genuine implementation SC resolution on restoration Republican Government to Jogja not on token basis but in manner to permit government function freely. This would require withdrawal Netherlands military forces from city of Jogja and immediate environs prior return of Republican leaders from Bangka, etc.
- 3.
- Permit entry into Jogja of sufficient members Republican Armed Forces to supplement available civil police to point sufficient for maintaining public order and safeguarding Republican officials. Entire responsibility for security within area to be administered by Republic must be in hands Republicans. UNCFI might be authority to determine whether this succeeds and what to do in case it does not.
- 4.
- Afford Republican facilities reasonably required for functioning government. At present this is seen as requiring inter alia carburants for power plants and motor vehicles; trucks, light cars and jeeps for transporting foodstuffs, fuel and equipment and permitting mobile police force; arms and ammunition and other equipment for police; electric light fixtures, office paraphernalia; supply of currency to meet Republican requirements and to maintain existing balance between Republic’s and Netherlands’ issues so that neither currency will be forced out of circulation in Jogja area and commerce will be as little hampered as may be necessary as result limiting area under Republican administration.
- 5.
- Release remaining political prisoners before termination Batavia meetings and prior to expecting Republican Government function Jogja.
- 6.
- Refrain from asking any commitments from Republicans prior to UNCFI meetings and from stating one way or another any additional Netherlands conditions to prompt participation in Batavia meetings.
- 7.
- Refrain from demanding once meetings start that Republicans enter binding agreements prior to Jogja impasse being solved.
- 8.
- Be prepared with frank and full outline of proceedings proposed for Hague conference and Netherlands undertakings thereunder.
Although Netherlands should not exact advance undertakings on following points, I am convinced Van Royen might early in meetings obtain informal understandings thereon probably with Hatta himself and I am entirely prepared to work toward Republican acceptance thereof, already having had personal assurance from either Sukarno or Hatta or both with respect most of these points:
- a.
- That Republicans assemble necessary political and military leaders soonest after return Jogja.
- b.
- That authority delegated emergency government be revoked soonest after Republican Government reconstituted and functioning Jogja.
- c.
- That cease-fire order of most effective character possible be issued soonest after reconstitution government Jogja and consultation with military leaders.
- d.
- That Republican Government accept Hague invitation and send delegation headed by Sukarno or Hatta thereto promptly after restoration and cease-fire.
- e.
- That Republicans strive prevent influx Republican military forces into Jogja.
- f.
- That Republicans cooperate toward maintaining freest possible traffic through Jogja and immediate surroundings, by reasonable agreements with respect to joint roadblocks, train movements, etc., and permit utilization of military observers in working out and possibly administering these matters.
- g.
- That Republicans go as far as they possibly can in Batavia meetings and bring Hatta in, if and when this becomes feasible.
Believe above observations Indicate large measure of differences can be bridged given willingness Netherlands to take initiative in practical statesmanship. However, one point must be clear. Stikker’s letter to Bevin provides Netherlands forces remain Jogja and have last word on law and order. Am convinced Republicans will not accept this condition; if they did, their government would appear a facade and they would lose support. Accordingly, key to possible agreement Batavia is whether Netherlands willing withdraw army from Jogja as anticipated SC resolution January 28. Signed Cochran.