840.50 Recovery/12–1549: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France
4823. Pass Harriman. From State, Commerce, ECA, and Defense.
In recent Nov intergovernmental discussions security trade controls, participating countries recognized principle of quantitative control and also principle of consultation in connection therewith. Since rather substantial area of agreement on multilateral 1A list appears be in prospect, considered appropriate raise specifically in intergovernmental Group estab of effective multilateral 1B policy. Accordingly recommended that a doc containing foil gen statement and specific proposals be circulated by US prior to Jan 9 mtg to serve as basis for discussion 1B problem at that mtg:
US exercises strict control over exports to Sov Bloc of approx 300 items which constitute US 1B list. US 1B list includes materials or equipment which are highly important from point of view their contribution to war potential of Sov Bloc and whose high strategic character is directly related to the quantitative extent to which they may be exported to the Sov Bloc.
Because of wide variety items included on US 1B list, varying techniques are appropriate to their control. While items such as non [Page 180] ferrous metals may be susceptible to quota control, for other items such as specialized machinery, specific strategic character of item must govern action in individual cases. Thus, term suggested by UK Del, namely, limitative control, seems appropriately describe what US intends include within its 1B policy, combining both quantitative and qualitative considerations.
US 1B list given consulting countries in late 1948 with request that, to extent practicable, exports these items to Sov Bloc be limited. In order obtain comprehensive basis for effective limitation of 1B shipments by individual countries, IIS suggested exchange of info on 1B shipments. UK and Ital have been providing such info on reciprocal basis.
Since late 1948, US has been exercising restrictive control over export to Sov Bloc of items on its 1B list with same care as has been case with its 1A list. In view of substantial area agreement recently reached re embargo most important security items, US regards it as essential that consulting countries now consider developing effective limitative control on other items of high security significance in effort further their mutual security objectives.
It is, of course, appreciated that in taking limitative action on trade in these items, individual countries will face trade problems similar to those which US has met during past year and half. From standpoint mutual security interest, for one or several countries to maintain strict limitative control over strategic items in absence comparable control by other consulting countries will reduce effectiveness of common security effort. Therefore appears essential this important problem be discussed by intergovernmental Group at Jan mtg.
To facilitate discussion this problem by Group, US submits foil proposals:
- (1)
- Re items on US 1A list which have not been accepted for embargo by all consulting countries, US asks that the several countries not now embargoing all such items take such steps as will permit reporting to Paris Consultative Group each proposed shipment to Eastern Eur prior to final action on the case. In turn, US will undertake comparable action on those items agreed to by the several countries for embargo but not currently appearing on US 1A list. This will permit multilateral review of and recommendations on proposed shipment such items and shld serve minimize security risk inherent in absence complete parallel action on these items. This arrangement wld be understood as not prejudicing further consideration these items for embargo on their strategic merits but wld seem be prudent course action foil pending their final disposition.
- (2)
- Re exports to Yugo and Finn of items appearing on embargo list, it wld seem useful coordinate govts’ actions through Paris Consultative Group. This wld involve using Group as means for exchanging info on exports 1A items to Yugo and Finn, and wld imply that on certain especially important categories any country might request Group consultation before final approval for shipment.
- (3)
- Since US 1B list has for many months been basis for extensive limitative control by US of shipments to Sov Bloc of many important strategic commodities, US requests that Paris Consultative Group consider adopting it as list for discussion further limitative controls. To promote most constructive discussion on this list, seems advisable immed attention be directed to identifying individual items in trade terminology and export classifications of each of the several countries and to collating them in such manner as will maximize their usefulness in reporting control action and exports.
During more than year’s experience in operating strict limitative control over 1B items, US has found that its 1B items can be grouped according to source of availability, extent of effective demand, susceptibility to overall quota control, or stringency of final action. Prelim exam of list in these terms reveals wide variation need for parallel action in achieving mutual security objectives. Such need ranges from transshipment control alone for items available only from single source, to action approaching embargo for 1B items of greatest significance to Sov war potential. At Jan mtg US will present prelim analysis its 1B list in these terms and will recommend for consideration of Group parallel action steps appropriate in each instance, and its view on priority attn which each deserves. It is clear, however, even at this time extensive reporting on approval or denial of shipments and on actual exports will be necessary on items accepted for control by Group to provide basis for joint action and on other items to determine initially type and degree control required. US is prepared on reciprocal basis make available at Jan mtg recent analyses its exports 1B items and at later date to furnish appropriate analyses of its record of approvals and denials for recent periods.
For OSR: Wash will forward shortly proposed detailed analyses of 1B list and proposed recommendations. [State, Commerce, ECA, and Defense.]