862.00/10–1749: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

3218. Had long conference yesterday with Adenauer who came for luncheon with his son and daughter.1 He reported that he had seen Schumacher, Karlo Schmid, and Suhr, and had talked with them about Berlin, dismantling and other pressing problems. Adenauer indicated that he had reached a general understanding with the SPD leaders on steps to be taken in Berlin along lines indicated to us at our meeting Friday in Bonn,2 namely, no inclusion Berlin as twelfth Land for the present, second, general representation of ministries in Berlin plus definite financial aid based on certain controls of expenditures. He feels strongly inclusion twelfth Land inadvisable and unnecessary to maintain position and he gave every indication that Schumacher and other SPD leaders though anxious not to go on record are dubious of the wisdom of forcing the issue now. Adenauer says his attitude is reenforced by his conviction that French would strongly oppose twelfth Land but if they were not pressed on twelfth Land might go along with other concrete measures in support of Allied position in Berlin. He plans to meet with Berlin representatives today with the idea of working out a plan of financial aid which perhaps could be announced in Parliament later in the week. He said he intended to reserve his position on these measures until he saw certain Berliners and said that he would again meet with SPD representatives before announcing any plan to Parliament. I told him our position was to permit establishment of twelfth Land if this is what Germans desire, that we wished to be firm and definite in respect to Berlin and that all should understand we expected to remain in Berlin; that if he and his government could generally be said to be opposed to inclusion of Berlin or any part of it as twelfth Land at the present time I doubted that we would be disposed to press it, but we did want unequivocal [Page 419] evidence of Western government’s support. Behind Adenauer’s personal interest in the maintenance of his own position in the Bundestag I feel there is strong desire on his part not to press the French too hard. He relies heavily upon Schuman and other French moderates, particularly in respect of dismantling, but he made it clear that he saw no hope of proceeding specifically with dismantling discussion immediately in light of existing French political situation. He indicated he very much desired to have a further meeting with Schuman who he understood would be Foreign Minister in new French Cabinet.

During foregoing discussion he referred to Karlo Schmid’s concern over embarrassments which might be raised through East German diplomatic representation in other countries, e.g., Sweden. Schmid thought if East Germans sent representative there West Germans should not follow suit.3 Adenauer indicated he did not agree with this, and I refused to indicate what Commission view would be if this did occur. He also made some animadversions regarding François-Poncet’s old line Franco–German approach but I indicated that I felt François-Poncet was sincerely desirous of reaching fair settlement of Franco–German relations and suggested that François-Poncet, with his knowledge of Germans and Germany was apt to be as objective as one could hope any Frenchman to be under all the circumstances.

I indicated Commission might be prepared from time to time to hold meetings in Berlin for such psychological advantages which this might have on Berliners and Germany as a whole. Adenauer indicated he planned to ask President Heuss to pay visit to Berlin but that he had opposed a visit last week of Heuss which would have looked too much like a propaganda counter to last week’s events in Berlin.4 He preferred to wait until definite economic plans had been announced for Berlin. Adenauer stated that he had told SPD leaders that the bar to the inclusion of Berlin as twelfth Land still prevailed, to which I replied that though this was true as of the present time I did not want him to indicate that it was necessarily the Allies who opposed the twelfth Land if the Germans themselves desired it; that he should not shift the onus of opposing the twelfth Land to the Allies when the Germans as he himself had, indicated, were either not clear about it or really did not desire it.

[Page 420]

[Here follows a discussion of the problem of refugees from the Eastern zone of Germany and the state of German railroads.]

McCloy
  1. A memorandum of McCloy’s conversation with Adenauer is in file 862.00/10–1749.
  2. Regarding Adenauer’s meeting with the Allied High Commission, see telegram 3136, supra.
  3. For documentation on the establishment of West German diplomatic missions, see pp. 266 ff.
  4. Adenauer was referring to the creation of the “German Democratic Republic”, October 7. For documentation relating to its establishment and the United States attitude toward it, see pp. 505 ff.