Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

891.00/11–148: Telegram

The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State

secret

Tehran, November 1, 1948—5 p. m.

1249. In conversation with Shah evening October 30 I said I was deeply concerned by his plan for constitutional reform. I said I was not disturbed by plans themselves but by timing. This was, I said, the moment of the 28th veto.¹ To me, the two matters of prime importance to Shah (Embtel 1233, October 27²) should be foreign affairs and national defence, both of which are firmly in his hands. To take an initiative that would jeopardize his position, would, I thought, [be] unnecessarily hazardous. In other words, I urged Shah not to use threat of abdication (Embtel 1178, October 6³) as weapon with which to coerce Majlis. I added that psychologically a threat was not good political instrument.

Shah remained unhappy and noncommittal. It is clear he has his mind very definitely made up to correct a situation which has been unduly exaggerated in his thinking.

In subsequent conversation with Prime Minister I went over same ground, reiterating that as I had made clear to Shah, I had no desire influence political thinking Iranian Government. I suggested though moment was inopportune for drastic political initiative and repeated to Prime Minister that I felt Shah should concentrate on foreign affairs and national defence. Referring to Shah’s apparent intention to give a four months’ ultimatum to the Majlis before abdicating, I suggested that during four months in question the enemies of Iran and opponents of present dynasty would be given an opportunity to carry out an effective propaganda and agitational campaign, which Shah had apparently had no plans for combating. Prime Minister expressed his enthusiastic approval that Shah’s proposed initiative should be postponed.

I have noted Deptel 1006, October 22 constitutional reform. I have no special comments re Ebtehaj’s view on this question (Deptel 962, October 7⁴) except that as indicated above I feel moment is inopportune.⁵

Sent Department, repeated London 112.

Wiley

1. Presumably the 28th veto by the Soviet Union at the Security Council.
2. Not printed; Ambassador Wiley advised that “At present moment in world situation, I think Shah would be well advised to concentrate on foreign affairs and control of army both of which at present he has fairly firmly in his hands, and postpone his ideas for far-reaching changes in domestic political structure and let government retain primary responsibility for social and economic reforms.” (891.00/10–2748)
3. Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 189.
4. Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 189.
5. The Department, on November 5, endorsed the views set forth in telegram 1249. It also advised Tehran that it shared the views of the British Foreign Office that the “constitutional project [for] increased executive powers should be initiated only, if at all, after budget and seven-year plan legislation are passed.… Le Rougetel would impress on all influential Iranians desirability concentrating on seven-year plan.” The Department stated additionally that “In absence compelling reasons Iranian national security requiring drastic action increasing executive powers, constitutional project should be deferred until present provisions constitution re Senate fully implemented.” (telegram 1045, 891.00/11–148)