Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

891.00/10–2248: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran

secret

Washington, October 22, 1948—6 p. m.

1006. Urtel 1209, Oct. 19.¹ FonOff instruction appears to have been based upon Brit Emb Wash tel recording discussion bet Emb and Dept Reps. Reps have reviewed original Brit Emb cable and find it substantially accurate report (except for statement re Iranian Army defection). In light urtel 1209, believe report must have been misunderstood at some stage before reaching you.

Statement by Dept Rep to Brit Emb Rep re “Dept’s policy regarding Iran” was limited to subject Shah’s general ideas concerning constitutional reform. In absence knowledge Dept or Brit Emb re details latest version Shah’s general project, beyond alternative procedures outlined urtel 1035, Sep. 2,² exchange of views limited largely to generalities. Dept Rep reiterated position taken Deptel 675, July 15,³ with additional observation it did not appear Iranian security seriously threatened by subversive group at present time or stronger leadership necessary to avoid complete collapse (last para Deptel 399, May 5).⁴ Dept Rep qualified statement re doubtful allegiance Iranian Army in Azerbaijan by reference possible action in case revolt or Soviet invasion (Tabriz A–35, Oct. 14⁴). Statement desirability Shah advocating general improvement Iranian conditions, etc., reflected Dept thinking embodied Deptel 948, Oct. 1, and Amb Allen’s frequent encouragement Shah limit his conspicuous political activity to matters paramount national importance.

Any new Dept views will be communicated you as they develop but, as always in first instance, for your observations and use by Emb your discretion. Prompted by Ebtehaj’s lucid statement Shah’s case (Deptel 962, Oct. 7⁵ on which your observations desired) and prospect receiving Brit FonOff’s suggested line of the thought (London’s 84, 12⁶), Dept has initiated comprehensive study possibilities constitutional reform in Iran. Only when study complete and views have been exchanged with Brit will we be able offer new suggestions which might be useful your conversations this subject. Absence compelling new developments Tehran, we agree time not ripe for constitutional reform by precipitate action.

Dept does not understand apparent difference bet LeRougetel attitude reported urtels 1035, Sep. 2 and 1195, Oct. 13, and that reported urtel 1209, Oct, 19⁷ supported by London’s 88, Oct. 19.⁸

Lovett

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed. The alternatives set forth were to enact legislation establishing a Senate which would then enact a law to provide for a constituent assembly; to have the Majlis pass a bill to establish such an assembly; should these fail, to have an immediate referendum (891.011/9–248). The nature of the referendum is not spelled out; but Ambassador Wiley had advised, on October 6, of information from British sources that the Shah was considering abdication unless given additional powers (telegram 1178 from Tehran, 891.00/10–648).
3. This was a repeat of 2750 to London, p. 162.
4. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed; it advised that Mr. Ebtehaj had “Argued that no Cabinet could function effectively under present system since Majlis has all power but no responsibility” and lacks “any compulsion take constructive action.” He said that the “contemplated reforms are (1) creation of Senate, (2) Shah to have veto subject to power Majlis to override by two-thirds majority, (3) Shah to have power dissolve Majlis and call new elections, (4) Majlis quorum requirements to be reduced.” (891.00/10–748)
6. This was a repeat of telegram 4471 to the Department, not printed.
7. None printed.
8. This was a repeat of telegram 4554, not printed.