Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Germany and Austria, Volume II

501.BC/11–2448: Telegram

The Acting Head of the United States Delegation to the United Nations (Dulles) to the Secretary of State

top secret
urgent
niact

Paris, November 24, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 912. Eyes Only for Secretary from Jessup. Developments here on the Berlin case make it necessary in my opinion to secure clarification of our general policy concerning the attempts to settle the Berlin issue. The principal developments to which I refer are:

First: Stephen White’s article in the Herald-Tribune, datelined Berlin, November 22, containing in direct quotes statement attributed to “an authoritative official of the American Military Government”.¹ While this may be a product of irresponsible journalism, you know the effect which such stories may have. The impression conveyed by the quotations in the article is that either the United States has repudiated the policy which we have been following and which was clearly indicated in your reply to the Evatt–Lie letter,² or else that there is a wide split between our authorities in Berlin and Washington.

The publication of this article has caused me major embarrassment in my negotiations with the French and British, and inevitably has increased the suspicion which you know has frequently pervaded French circles relative to our policy on Germany and on the Berlin question in particular. Following the difficulties fused [caused] by the Ruhr announcement³ and preceding by a few hours Ambassador Caffery’s and my call on Schuman to present our request concerning plans for the introduction of the Western mark as the sole currency of Berlin, this article seemed to give greater significance to the second development.

Second: The second development is that on the arrival of Knapp and Abramson from Washington to render expert assistance on details of a currency plan for Berlin, I became fully aware for the first time of the fact that there is not and never has been an overall United States position concerning a technical plan for introducing the Soviet mark as the sole currency of Berlin under quadripartite control. The Washington point of view which they presented made it necessary for me to notify the French and British that on the basis of instructions from Washington I could no longer agree to the reply to Bramuglia’s questions to which I had given personal approval subject to instructions. While we found a way to get over this hurdle and to reconcile our difficulties, the cumulative impression upon the French and perhaps on the British is most harmful.

Following your talk with Pearson of Canada,⁴ I spent an hour with him, alone, Monday night and repeated your assurances that we desired to secure a settlement of the Berlin question and were prepared to cooperate fully and loyally with him and the other members of the six in working out a plan. He is bringing Norman Robertson to Paris to concentrate on the technical aspects in conjunction with the Belgian expert and the experts of the three Western governments.

As I understand our policy as developed in various conversations with you in Paris, it is based on the following proposals which are to guide my activities:

1. We stand on our position which you and President have frequently stated that we will not be forced out of Berlin.

2. We do wish to settle the Berlin question in the sense of securing the lifting of the blockade.

3. We will not buy such a settlement by any appeasement or by a repudiation of our fundamental thesis that we will not resume negotiations under duress.

4. We are still willing to have the Soviet mark introduced as the sole currency of Berlin under Four-Power control provided that the blockade is lifted.

5. We recognize that recent Soviet actions in Berlin leading to the splitting of the city greatly increase the difficulties of finding a formula on the currency which will give reasonable protection to our interests.

6. We recognize that following the elections of December 5, the split of the city will probably be complete and that this factor must be borne in mind in working out any currency plan.

7. While these developments increase the difficulties, they do not introduce a wholly novel element in the sense that we have from the first recognized that no matter how good a technical plan is agreed upon, there would remain serious risk that the Soviets could manipulate the situation to hamper and even perhaps to destroy our position in Berlin through economic and financial manipulation.

8. In the negotiations for elaborating a currency plan for Berlin, we are still ready to operate on the basis of the principles contained in the August 30 directive although we do not admit that the August 30 directive constitutes a binding international obligation.

9. We have for a long time, in accordance with a suggestion from the Department, had in mind the possibility that neutral financial experts might themselves evolve a currency plan which the Council would ask us to accept and which we would accept whether or not it met all of our views.

10. When we took the decision to submit the Berlin case to the Security Council, we accepted the risk that the Security Council might ask us to accept some solution which we did not consider 100 percent perfect. We have recognized from the outset that our principal safeguard against such risks lay in our friendly relations, particularly with the Canadians, who, through Pearson, are now intensifying their efforts to guide developments.

11. This means that our experts while endeavoring to secure what seems to us the best possible solution, cannot flatly refuse to go along with alternatives proposed by the experts of the six. In view of our conclusion that, failing successful progress in the Security Council activities, we must proceed to the introduction of the Western mark as the sole currency of Berlin on December 10 or at the latest on December 20, we are under a special obligation to bend every effort to enable the Security Council to develop its plans and to refrain from interposing political or technical obstacles.

12. In regard to the combination of work on the currency plan with Bramuglia’s idea of a staggered lifting of the blockade, Pearson has, and is justified in having as a result of his talk with you, the understanding that we do not exclude the possibility of accepting some arrangement along these lines. Pearson has very much in mind the necessity of presenting any such proposal in a way which you would emphasize that the blockade is actually being lifted and that any reimposition of the blockade in case of a breakdown of the currency plan would constitute a Soviet disregard of the view of the Security Council.

Have just received Carter’s No. 1 to Bohlen for me relative to Clay’s message to Draper.⁵ In our conversation with Clay, I specifically asked when he said that the introduction of the Soviet mark as the sole currency would be utterly impossible with the completely split city after December 5, if he meant that it really would be “impossible”. He corrected his absolute statement and admitted that it would not be impossible but that it would involve new considerations requiring new arrangements. The situation may boil down to this: The best plan which the neutrals may produce after consultation with our experts may in the opinion of the latter afford us insufficient protection in terms of the necessary Four-Power control; in other words that it will enable the Russians to make our position in Berlin untenable. While we shall make every effort to persuade neutrals not to propose such a plan, and I believe we shall be successful in this, we would of course need to secure instructions as to whether we should accept or reject it if it is proposed.

Unless I receive instructions to the contrary, I shall proceed here to make every effort to assist the six in working out currency plan at the earliest possible date and shall instruct staff here, while pressing for most favorable plan possible, to avoid anything which might be considered as obstructionist tactics. If you wish to change your instructions to me I should appreciate word soonest in order that I can prepare our retreat with as little damage to our reputation as possible. Paragraph eight of London’s 917, November 23,⁶ presents fair balance of alternatives, but I believe decision should not at this stage be based merely on these factors without taking into account our commitments to French, British, and the six. If you wish to confirm your instructions along the lines indicated above, or otherwise, I believe it of utmost importance that these should be telegraphed to me and repeated to Berlin for their information.

Bohlen generally concurs in foregoing but will comment in separate message on his understanding of the immediate issues confronting us here in Paris.⁷ [Jessup.]

Dulles

1. In his telegram 2832, November 28, from Berlin, not printed, Ambassador Murphy reported that General Clay had been interviewed by correspondent White. Clay’s remarks formed the basis for White’s article. Clay had, however, not departed from established policy in his statements to the correspondent. (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2848)
2. Regarding the letter under reference, addressed to the United States, the united Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union on November 13, see the editorial note, p. 1251.
3. The reference here is presumably to United States and British Military Government Law No. 75, November 10; regarding the issuance of these laws, see the editorial note, p. 465.
4. No record of this talk found in the Department of State files.

5. Not printed; it quoted a message from General Clay to Secretary Draper which read in part as follows:

   “… election in Berlin of 5th December will almost certainly result in split city which will necessitate immediate issue of western currency and will, in fact, make acceptance of single currency after that date virtually impossible. Soviet rejection of election necessitates Soviet rejection of elected government. To bring city back under single government would then require new election which would repudiate 5th December election and which would not likely be accepted by Democratic German parties holding 5th December elections.

   “Political events have overtaken the currency question which is in my opinion no longer the main issue which when resolved would lift blockade. Unfortunately, neutrals do not understand this and could effect a currency solution which seems sound but which we could not accept because of existing political situation. This would, in effect, make us appear to be the unyielding power.” (501.BC/11–2348)

6. Not printed; the paragraph under reference here read as follows:

   “8. The question, it seems to me, is whether in the absence of four-power control of the municipal affairs of Berlin, any four-power control over currency, however extensive or limited which is consistent with our rights in Berlin, plus a satisfactory trade agreement accompanied by the lifting of the blockade, will make it easier or more difficult to stay in Berlin than would be the case under a conclusively divided city with the Western mark ‘B’ circulating as the exclusive currency in the western sectors and with the blockade continuing indefinitely in force.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2348)

7. Bohlen felt the immediate issue was the nature of the approach of the neutral experts. If they tried to mediate at the technical level, they might easily produce a plan that would be totally unrealistic due to the split in Berlin. If they set out to study the problem of quadripartite control of the Soviet mark, then Bohlen believed that the experts would arrive at the same conclusions as the western experts (Delga 935, November 25, from Paris, not printed (501.BC/11–2548)). In telegram 2832, November 28, from Berlin, not printed, Murphy reported Clay’s agreement with these comments by Bohlen (740.00119 Control (Germany)/11–2848).