Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Volume I, Part 1

Department of State Disarmament Files

Minutes of Meeting, Department of State, September 3, 1948

September 3, 1948

top secret

Subject: Strategy on handling of atomic energy in the General Assembly.

Present:

• For Department of State:
  • Mr. Rusk, Chairman
  • Mr. Osborn
  • Mr. Raynor
  • Mr. Johnson
  • Mr. Arneson
  • Mr. Chase
  • Mr. Leith
• For United Kingdom:
  • Mr. Gladwyn Jebb
  • Mr. Denis Allen
• For Canada:
  • General McNaughton
  • Mr. Wrong
  • Mr. Carter

Action

Mr. Jebb agreed with the general strategy set forth by the representatives of the United States and Canada and said he would recommend such a course of action to the FonOff. Specifically, Mr. Jebb agreed to recommend four separate resolutions instead of one omnibus resolution. The strategy in question would generally be as follows:

1. Atomic Energy

(a) An attempt would be made to concentrate the initial discussion of security matters on the atomic energy issue in Committee I. The instrument used for initiating such a discussion would be a jointly-sponsored (i.e. by the UNAEC majority) resolution presumably along the lines of the U.S. draft offered in the SC. The discussion of atomic energy would, if possible, be sufficiently prolonged to achieve the desired educational objectives of an informed debate. It is hoped that the Chairman will be one who can both control the debate so as to prevent extraneous issues from being discussed along with atomic energy and who can break off the discussion at the appropriate point.

(b) At such point a sub-committee would be established to which the atomic energy question would be referred for such further drafting as might be needed on the jointly-sponsored resolution on atomic energy.

2. CCA and Article 43

(a) Meanwhile general debate could continue in Committee I on questions relating to CCA and Article 43 issues.

(b) In proper sequence, these two latter matters could be referred to the drafting sub-committee for preparation of resolutions.

3. Manner of securing separate debate on UNAEC, CCA, Article 43, and related political questions.

There was general agreement that having four separate resolutions would be the most effective means of separating out the results of the debate on the different issues mentioned so that the issues would remain clear-cut. These resolutions would be as follows:

(a) Resolution I on atomic energy along the lines of the U.S. SC draft resolution.

(b) Resolution II on CCA.

(c) Resolution III on MSC.

(d) Resolution IV on the general political situation affecting not only security questions but the whole action of the UN. This Resolution would refer particularly to what the British call the “root point” or “problem”, namely, the unwillingness of the Soviets to abide by majority decisions in UN organs and in general their completely obstructive tactics which prevent constructive action in the UN.

Having four separate resolutions would mean advance planning and lobbying to control the situation in the manner outlined above. (Provisions for securing joint-sponsorship of each are discussed below, pp. 6 and 7.)

With the exception of the atomic energy resolution, the substance of the four resolutions was not discussed in any detail but discussion revolved around the general idea of separate resolutions.

There was general agreement that the “majority” sponsors of the UNAEC should meet in Paris upon arrival to develop the best method of handling the problem of educating the other delegations. It was agreed that there should be a division of labor for this purpose.

Respecting a possible proposal’s being made in the GA to go on in UNAEC with a discussion of other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, there was general agreement that “we need not fear any such tactics since we have already answered such proposals several times on previous occasions. Our answers have generally been along the lines that since a strong and effective safeguards system has already been developed in the field of atomic energy, which is by all odds the most important field over which control must be established, the first task is to get acceptance of this control system. Once it has been accepted the international atmosphere will be so changed that all manner of things may then be possible, including measures of control in the field of other mass weapons. At this time, however, it is clear that the same obstacles to establishing effective control will be manifest in the field of other mass weapons as have been experienced in the field of atomic energy.”

Mr. Rusk started off the meeting by stating that he thought it would be most fruitful perhaps if Mr. Osborn would outline the position which the United States believed the majority should take in the GA and if Mr. Jebb would follow with a presentation of the British point of view. Mr. Rusk stated that this was only a suggestion, however, and that he would like others to make any suggestions they wished.

There was general agreement to this mode of proceeding except that General McNaughton said he desired to make a preliminary statement.

General McNaughton’s preliminary statement was a very forceful presentation of the view that there was one thing of supreme and transcendent importance in the security field and that was that the atomic energy issue should be debated with as little confusion with other issues as possible and should be followed, above all, by a resolution of approval by the GA of the UNAEC control plan. General McNaughton stated that if these things were accomplished he personally did not feel it was of too great moment what else was done in the security field.

Mr. Osborn then reviewed the position in which the majority of the UNAEC delegates found themselves at the seat of the UN at the present moment. Going back into the history of UNAEC developments he pointed to the fact that the Second Report was a majority report and was the product of the joint labors of all the majority members who had worked so competently for a period of many months on its development. Mr. Osborn stated after the UNAEC reconvened in January, 1948, there was a question as to what it should undertake in the immediate future. While initially there was some thought of proceeding with the matter of organization, it was soon felt by the members of the majority that the Commission had gone as far as it could without getting into those problems which were primarily political in nature and which could be settled only in terms of the conditions existing at the time an agreement would be signed. This point of view was crystalized by M. de Rose of the French Delegation who drafted the essential content of the Third Report on his own initiative. M. de Rose went so far as to recommend a final winding up of the activities of the Commission as being a complete failure. It was particularly significant that M. de Rose should take such an attitude since the French had started out with the idea of mediating between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Osborn noted that the French particularly resented the idea of calling the Third Report a United States Report.

Mr. Osborn added that the informal conversations which had been held for the preparation of the Second and Third Reports had been conducted on a personal basis and that the conclusions arrived at had ultimately been submitted to the five governments in question for official confirmation.

Mr. Osborn noted that this pattern of procedure had been going successfully and conclusions were being reached and agreed upon in plenty of time to permit adequate preparation for the GA when the UK FonOff suddenly asked that the conversations be halted until further conversations were held between the UK and the US as to GA strategy. Mr. Osborn, supported by General McNaughton, emphasized the fact that six weeks had been lost as a result of this action of the UK FonOff, and he added that the other nine delegates had agreed on a joint resolution.

Mr. Jebb replied to Mr. Osborn by stating in the first place that there had been considerable misunderstanding in regard to this whole matter. He had been away when the question of stopping the informal conversations had arisen. Without going into further explanations and excuses he stated that what the FonOff wanted to do was to look at the matter as a whole, though it did not wish to minimize atomic energy. By looking at the matter as a Whole the FonOff wished to call attention to the thread which rah through all angles of the security problem and other UK problems, namely, the damaging nature of the Soviet obstructive tactics to the progress of the UN generally in their being unwilling to abide even by overwhelming majority votes in UN organs.

However, Mr. Jebb stated that with further thought on the matter the FonOff had decided to withdraw its proposal for one omnibus resolution since he could see that there was danger of confusing the atomic energy discussions by combining it With a discussion of more general matted and the FonOff would be satisfied with a separate resolution covering the “root problem.”

Mr. Jebb did say, however, that whereas the United States apparently wished to give the impression that activities in the CCA and title MSC would be continued, his government felt that this would be deluding the public and thought that both bodies should be adjourned.

Mr. Jebb concluded his initial remarks by saying that it was the original intention of the FonOff to have one omnibus resolution, divided into parts I, II, III, and IV, but that as long as IV was adequately taken care of he believed that his government would be prepared to accept separate resolutions on I, II and III.

General McNaughton then took up the question of the possible adjournment of the CCA and the MSC to which Mr. Jebb had referred. He pointed out that the CCA and MSC activities were on an entirely different basis from those of the AEC. The former were still dealing with the initial phase of the problem whereas the latter had completed the essentials of a control plan. General McNaughton felt that until “we have been through the drill” in the CCA and the MSC we have no right to say that they cannot be carried further, nor would the members of the GA be adequately prepared for supporting an adjournment resolution in each case.

General McNaughton again emphasized the fact that whatever else happened we must get the approval of the majority UNAEC plan of control because of the moral victory it would represent and because with such approval we would be well armed to take advantage of a first rift in the Iron Curtain which made it appear as though progress would be possible in this field.

Mr. Rusk stated that apparently we were now all agreed on a debate in separate stages followed by separate resolutions. He added, however, that he did not believe we would want the atomic energy issue or the other issues immediately referred to a sub-committee. He thought we would want a general debate in Committee I which would be sufficient to educate the general public as to the issues involved. Following this general debate we could then table our joint resolution and have it referred to a sub-committee along with other resolutions and amendments. Meanwhile the general debate would continue in Committee I.

At this point there was a brief exchange between Mr. Raynor and Mr. Jebb respecting the nature of Resolution IV. Both expressed the view that this Resolution could perhaps include references to the veto question and then be generalized to deal with the whole political question. General McNaughton approved such a Resolution.

Mr. Osborn then returned to the question of the handling of CCA matters. He pointed out that the Soviets fear of an effective safeguard system in the field of conventional armaments was as real as in respect to such safeguards in the atomic energy field. Therefore, he suggested that it would be a good idea to spend time in the CCA following the GA in elaborating that section of the Resolution on Item II which briefly dealt with safeguards. Having done so the work of the CCA would then be somewhat comparable to the AEC in terms of completeness, the Soviet attitude would be made clear to the public, and the majority of the CCA could then go to the 1949 GA and properly ask for suspension of the CCA.

Mr. Rusk suggested that while he was sure we all felt this plan to be a good plan, it was still worth while to follow the British suggestion of getting GA approval in this session of the principles in the majority resolution on Item II. At the same time it was important to avoid any implications that we were closing the door on further discussions in the CCA.

Mr. Jebb said that if the Soviets advanced sweeping disarmament proposals, we should join in exposing it as a propaganda maneuver.

In connection with the question of a continuation of the CCA activities, Mr. Osborn called attention to the hysterical attacks of the Soviet representatives on the US for suggesting that the CCA be continued rather than suspended. From this he deduced that the Soviet line was to have been geared to a US proposal for suspension and he felt it was particularly important, therefore, that we make no move toward suspension at this time. Mr. Rusk then asked whether there was general agreement that in respect to each of the four resolutions we should get as broad joint sponsorship as possible.

General McNaughton felt this would be fine.

Mr. Jebb stated that at present this seemed a good idea but he was not sure how his government would react and he wondered how we would determine sponsorship, for example, in respect to Resolution IV, General McNaughton replied that we could have the joint sponsorship depend on those who made up the majority in each case, and that on the general resolution, since there was no majority to fall back on, the British should make up a list. They could best do this because of their wider international contacts and great experience.

Mr. Rusk then inquired whether it would not be well to divide up the generar security debate in Committee I so that different nations could cover different aspects of the problem, for example, the British might advance their views with respect to the “root problem”. There was general agreement that this would be a good idea.

At this point Mr. Osborn thought it would be useful for Mr. Jebb’s benefit to give a picture of how the views of the majority in the UNAEC had evolved. The details of Mr. Osborn’s statement will be set forth in a separate memorandum. In general the theme he advanced was to the effect that the original Baruch plan contained elements which might have been elaborated in one of two ways, either in the direction of creating an authoritative and somewhat arbitrary agency or in the direction of an organization based on democratic principled. He believed that the Second Report did the latter through such things as the quota scheme, limitations upon the development of power plants and emphasizing an adequate inspection system rather than a system of sanctions.

There was general approval of this interpretation of the Second Report as a useful instrument in winning popular support, provided statements along these lines were sufficiently qualified as being interpretations of the Second Report.

Some discussion on dividing up the task of “educating” other delegations in Paris followed. The feeling, was expressed that this should be settled when we got to Paris since little more could be done here.

In connection with the educational process referred to in the preceding paragraph, Mr. Rusk questioned whether we should not establish a committee to answer legitimate questions which various delegations might have with respect to atomic energy. The reaction to such a suggestion was generally unfavorable on grounds that this would invite fishing expeditions and could not be properly controlled. It was proposed that instead, this be done through the ordinary diplomatic channels. Mr. Jebb suggested, for example, that the US might take upon itself the education of the Latin American delegations. Mr. Johnson proposed that in, respect to the Latin Americans, it would be better for one of their own number to do the educating, for example Mexico.

The meeting next turned its attention to the question of what should be done respecting a suggestion such as Secretary General Lie’s that mass weapons considered.¹ General McNaughton and Mr. Osborn both stated that it was their firm conviction that we need not fear any such tactics since we had already answered such proposals several times on previous occasions, Our answers had generally been along the lines that since a strong and effective safeguards system had already been enveloped in the field of atomic energy, which was by all odds the most important field over which control must be established, the first task was to get acceptance of this control system. Once it had been accepted the international atmosphere would be so changed that all manner of things might then he possible, including measures of control in the field of other mass weapons. At this time, however, it was clear that the same obstacles to establishing effective control would be manifest in the field of other mass weapons as had been experienced in the field of atomic energy. Mr. Osborn added that he thought there was far less danger of a stampede on such an issue today than a year ago, because the eyes of most of the nations had been opened to the real nature of Soviet objectives. Mr. Rusk added the caution, however, that we would need to do some lobbying on this matter and in this he was generally supported.

The discussion then turned briefly to the question of whether we should take any initiative in respect to CCA and Article 48 matters if the Soviets or some small nation did not raise either matter. Mr. Jebb replied that he thought we should take the initiative on each case but that we should be sure to instruct the Chairman as to the necessity of discussing one at a time and keeping the debate on an orderly basis in this way. In respect to Article 43 matters Mr. Raynor suggested that he thought agreement had been reached at Ottawa which would take care of the problem.² General McNaughton said that he was very much against the armed guard proposal being developed in such a way as to create as “young army”. He stated emphatically that he thought the armed guard should be restricted to police work with emphasis on specialists in communications. He added that in his talk with Secretary General Lie a couple of weeks ago, Lie had agreed completely with him and particularly had agreed that any fighting which had to be done should be done in the second degree, namely, by national contingents.

The meeting was then closed by Mr. Jebb’s affirmative reply to Mr. Raynor who said that he thought we were now all agreed on separate resolutions on the four items and an orderly debate in sequence on these items.

The formal action of the meeting is stated in the opening paragraphs of these Minutes.

1. Reference is to a statement contained in the Secretary General’s annual report; for text, see United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 1, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1947–30 June 1948, p. xiii. Hereafter cited as GA (III), Suppl. No. 1.
2. For the record of the Ottawa staff conversations, August 30–31, see p. 403.