893.01/4–2547
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit a few somewhat personal comments on the nature of the newly announced State Council. A radiogram70 already sent will have served to supplement your own knowledge of these individuals.
[Page 108]It happens that the list was finally completed on April 17, the anniversary of the day twenty years ago when the present Government first took office. But this reveals also the patience needed for even moderate reforms in the unwieldy mass which constitutes present-day China. I can testify that President Chiang K’ai-shek has been working ceaselessly at this task since the passing of the Constitution. He has had every inducement to complete it earlier. The result registers his effort to broaden the basis of representation in preparation for the inauguration of constitutional government. He has on the whole succeeded admirably in assembling the more progressive elements in his own party, in securing the support of two of the minority parties and in the selection of especially good non-party personnel, as well as in avoiding any open cleavage among the conflicting interests involved.
The most notable feature in the Kuomintang list is perhaps the absence of members of the reactionary C-C Clique and of the dominant military group. It is unfortunate that the presidents of all five Yuan remain unchanged and thus serve to swell the Kuomintang total, but for this the unwillingness of Carson Chang to accept office is chiefly responsible. Had he been willing to become President of the Judicial Yuan, a Youth Party man might have been given the presidency of another Yuan. As it is, however, the continuity of government business is doubtless facilitated. Three elderly members well-known for their consistently independent attitude within the party have been recalled from virtual retirement: Chang Chi (North China), Niu Yung-chien (Shanghai), and Tsou Lu (Kwangtung). Drs. Chiang Mon-lin, Wang Chung-hui, Wang Shih-chieh, and Wong Wen-hao represent the best type of patriotic, western educated types. T. V. Soong’s readiness to continue serving a Government which had so recently forced his resignation is very much to his credit and this is accentuated by the fine spirit with which he has done so. Shao Li-tze is generally respected as a broadly tolerant and conscientious official of the old scholar class. Chen Pu-lei has been President Chiang’s confidential secretary for many years and is probably included because of his technical usefulness. Wu Chung-hsin would seem to be the least desirable member from the western standpoint but has a long record of party loyalty.
The inclusion of the two minority parties is of symbolic value rather than because of the persons listed. These are in the main elderly scholars with but slight administrative experience. As it is, one vacancy among the Social Democratic Party is the result of split among them, and the Youth Party delayed the formation of the State Council by an undignified demand that their members be given a disproportionate number of posts all through the provinces.
[Page 109]Of the non-party members, K. P. Chen is an American-educated banker of fine character and ability and his acceptance of the invitation is an auspicious omen. Mo Te-hui has had varied administrative experience, chiefly in Manchuria, and is generally respected for his balanced judgment and integrity. Wang Yun-wu helped to build up the Commercial Press and has the general background of “big business”. Bolhan and the Kuomintang Tibetan72 bring in the non-Chinese elements in the Republic.
The list is composed chiefly of elderly men. But for a brief transition period, bristling with delicate and difficult issues, this is perhaps advisable. It ought not, however, to delay the absorption of younger men for training and promotion.
When President Chiang asked me rather eagerly what I thought of the list I felt able to congratulate him quite sincerely. I have since then told him that American opinion seemed in general commendatory but was inclined to reserve judgment until there was evidence as to how much power this new organ of government would have and what it would do with such power. I took the occasion to suggest that this would be a good time to begin with himself to prepare for the transfer from the age-long Chinese “government by men” to “government by law”, to limit martial law to actual military personnel and to stop all secret arrests and punishments. He nodded his assent as usual but will need constant reminders in his somewhat lonely struggle to fit himself and his people for practicing democratic principles.
When I called on the new Premier, Chang Ch’un, at his request, he reminded me of my comment when first hearing of his probable appointment to the effect that I pitied rather than congratulated him, and said that he really was undertaking this at a sacrifice and from a sense of duty. He expressed the hope that our mutual relations would continue on the old basis of personal friendship rather than a strictly official one. He then reviewed the state of the country, the civil war, and the Communist problem in a realistic way. He spoke of his chief deficiency as in economic and financial matters and of his predecessor’s absorption with these as well as of the necessity for either maintaining or abandoning Dr. Soong’s policies. He described his task of fitting the nation for Constitutional Government in the brief period of only eight months as repairing a dilapidated old automobile for travelling on a road which was itself in need of improvement. He also used the figure of pumping new life into an anaemic patient and the need for blood transfusion, which was his first explicit reference to the hope of American financial assistance. He went on to speak of the problems he had inherited, the brevity of [Page 110] the time and the complexity of the whole situation. He thought in terms of three factors: the weather, their own efforts, and external aid. His reference to the first of these reveals how predominantly agricultural this country is and how important are the harvests in the national economy.
I took advantage of the implied invitation given me to comment on the possibility of American aid, repeating essentially what I had been saying to President Chiang and others: that I had no instructions nor any reason to believe that a decision had been reached; that my Government was primarily concerned that any financial assistance which might be undertaken should be a real benefit to all the people of China rather than to any faction or group and would neither prolong nor give partisan advantage in the civil war; that in short the earliest possible termination of aggressive military action by the Government while keeping the door wide open to the Communists, and further progress toward reforms made possible by the present reorganization, were the results desired alike by friends of China in Washington and by all public-spirited Chinese.
Respectfully yours,